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00:00 Let's start with the communique.
00:01 Does the setting up of a standby force mean
00:07 we are ready to go to war?
00:10 And my answer, as the answer I gave last week
00:16 when we were talking about the use of force,
00:22 the possibility of the use of force, is no.
00:29 It doesn't mean that next week we are going to war
00:32 or next month we are going to war.
00:34 I will ask, I mean, I will put it in the form of a question.
00:42 Does having an army means you are ready to go to war?
00:48 Does it?
00:52 There are countries that have had armies for 50 years,
00:56 100 years, who have never gone to war.
00:59 But you set up an army just in case.
01:04 So having a standby force does not mean
01:08 you are going to war next week.
01:10 It simply means, like the Boy Scout logo
01:15 or Boy Scout motto, be prepared.
01:20 You are going to be foolish if in the middle of a crisis
01:25 you still have a laid back position.
01:28 And you are letting the other side know
01:32 that you are serious about the objective, not the means.
01:37 You are serious about the objective.
01:41 The means still remain fluid.
01:45 So that's really my own interpretation.
01:48 So I'm not going to ask for Nigerians with passports
01:52 to dust off their passports and start booking flights
01:57 and heading for the airport in order to avoid war.
02:02 So that's my own interpretation of the communique
02:10 that had come out of Abuja.
02:14 The reaction from the Nigerian side
02:20 shows a determination that they also regard it
02:25 as a serious crisis.
02:29 You don't, usually in a situation like this,
02:37 you don't make too many enemies for yourself.
02:42 Whether it is ECOWAS or the EU or the European Union.
02:50 Or the United Nations or the United States or France.
02:55 Usually in a situation like this,
03:02 you even look for what do you lose, I would ask,
03:07 by talking.
03:10 What would you lose?
03:15 But when you turn down all avenues for dialogue,
03:20 except those that you handpick for religious reasons
03:29 to dialogue with, I think there's a misreading
03:37 of the situation.
03:42 If I were advising the Nigerian government from day one,
03:47 I would have advised them,
03:49 talk to anybody who comes to talk to you.
03:53 You don't lose anything.
03:56 And if you think that they are wasting your time,
04:00 they are also wasting their own time.
04:02 But don't antagonize people,
04:07 especially when you are playing the weaker hand.
04:12 Don't antagonize people.
04:14 Not asking you to give up your position
04:17 or give up your objectives.
04:19 But there are ways and means in which you can let people know
04:24 how serious you are about your own position
04:30 without necessarily antagonizing them.
04:37 They will perceive this communique from Abuja
04:42 as part of the,
04:45 who is going to blink first syndrome.
04:50 So it's like a chess game.
04:56 Eko has now moved his bishop,
05:03 whilst we're protecting its coin.
05:06 On your side, if that is it,
05:11 how do you counter the move by the bishop
05:14 without exposing your own coin?
05:17 There are still several steps in that chess game
05:23 before they capture your kingdom.
05:27 Several steps.
05:30 The fact that they've moved to their bishop
05:32 does not mean that the game is over.
05:35 So there's no need for panic,
05:37 whether from the Eko side or from the side of Ejo.
05:42 But I think that the statement purportedly
05:50 made by the Senegalese president,
05:55 I think is very important,
05:58 which is that the coup in Niger
06:03 is one coup too far.
06:07 Or was it the Ivorian president who made, I don't know.
06:11 One of the presidents from the Francophonies
06:15 said the coup in Niger was a coup too far.
06:20 The linkage between this
06:24 and the position of neocolonialism in Africa
06:28 simply illustrates what scholars
06:34 in international affairs have always known,
06:40 which is that a crisis does not present you
06:45 with a one goal issue.
06:54 Because it's a not one factor issue, a crisis,
06:58 especially one that has several components.
07:04 And in this particular case of Niger,
07:10 it presents the complexity.
07:15 Number one, all of us,
07:19 and that includes our leaders,
07:21 have to be against neocolonialism.
07:26 All of us have to be against neocolonialism.
07:31 All of us have to recognize and deprecate
07:37 the post-colonial policies of the French in Africa.
07:47 We have to deprecate it from the one goal.
07:51 When, and thirdly, we now have to deprecate
08:00 existence of coups,
08:04 even when the coup is directed
08:14 at one of those responsible for the chaos
08:19 that you have in the sub-region.
08:24 Now, how do you now reconcile this?
08:27 How do you?
08:28 If you are against France,
08:33 France neocolonialism,
08:36 does it mean you have to be in favor of the coup?
08:40 And if you are against the coup,
08:45 does it mean you are in favor of French neocolonialism?
08:52 It's oxymoronic.
08:53 And so for policy planners,
08:59 how do you now balance what looks now like
09:07 contradictions in the objectives
09:12 of immediate policies of short-term goals?