House Homeland Security Committee Holds A Hearing On Foreign Anomalous Health Incidents
The House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing on Wednesday on on Foreign Anomalous Health Incidents Targeting Americans.
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NewsTranscript
00:00:00 The Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence will come to order.
00:00:04 The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from expert witnesses from the
00:00:10 national security realm that will inform our understanding of anomalous health incidents,
00:00:15 or more commonly known as Havana Syndrome. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
00:00:20 Good afternoon and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
00:00:25 Law Enforcement, and Intelligence. We are holding this important hearing to examine anomalous health
00:00:31 incidents, otherwise known as AHIs or Havana Syndrome, and discuss the potential targeting
00:00:36 of U.S. government officials and their families in the homeland and elsewhere.
00:00:40 Although this issue has recently gained significant media attention,
00:00:44 the issues surrounding anomalous health incidents or Havana Syndrome are not new.
00:00:51 Dating back to 2014, a number of U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials and their
00:00:56 families have reported major medical symptoms that have affected their auditory and sensory
00:01:01 motor skills. These issues became public in late 2016 after a group of Canadian diplomats and U.S.
00:01:08 government employees and their families assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba, began
00:01:14 experiencing similar symptoms. After the reported incidents in Havana, government officials and
00:01:19 their families began reporting similar symptoms in the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Germany,
00:01:25 Austria, Serbia, Australia, Taiwan, and Colombia, as well as here in the United States. Multiple
00:01:31 agencies within the intelligence community have conducted assessments in an attempt to identify
00:01:37 the factors that cause AHIs or who, if anyone, is responsible for these incidents. Unfortunately,
00:01:44 none of these studies could conclusively identify the causes of these incidents. However,
00:01:50 the State Department commissioned a study through the National Academies of Science,
00:01:54 Engineering, and Medicine that found that I quote, "unusual presentation of acute directional or
00:02:00 location-specific early phase signs, symptoms, and observations reported by Department of State
00:02:07 employees to be consistent with the effects of directed pulsed radio frequency energy."
00:02:13 Many of the chronic, nonspecific symptoms are also consistent with known radio frequency effects,
00:02:19 such as dizziness, headache, fatigue, nausea, anxiety, cognitive deficits, and memory loss."
00:02:25 Since the National Academy's findings, generally, the IC, the intelligence community, has stood by
00:02:33 their initial findings and maintains that the origins of these symptoms are still unknown
00:02:37 and not likely to be derived from the actions of a foreign adversary.
00:02:42 Today, we hope to gain a better understanding of anomalous health incidents to address this
00:02:50 pressing issue. It's paramount that we acknowledge the gravity of this situation. And I think when
00:02:56 you really look at what we're doing today, it's to have a transparent discussion, to talk to our
00:03:02 three expert witnesses, to hear in a manner consistent with what they went through,
00:03:09 what the facts are. And as Congress, the role on oversight is so important. That's what we're
00:03:14 doing today. And so I'm proud that this is a bipartisan effort. And I now recognize the
00:03:19 ranking member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for his opening statement.
00:03:23 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you. This is an important issue. It deals with the health
00:03:27 and welfare of our government officials as well as others. Thank you again, Mr. Pfluger,
00:03:34 and good afternoon to all of you. Welcome to witnesses today. I'm here today filling in for
00:03:39 a ranking member, Mr. Magaziner, who I'm happy to say he and Julia welcomed their daughter,
00:03:46 baby daughter to their family just I think a day or so ago. So Magaziner, Mr. Magaziner,
00:03:53 enjoy your time with your beautiful family. Today's hearing has been called to examine the
00:03:58 anomalous health incidents affecting a range of US national security personnel, including
00:04:04 intelligence officials, members of our armed forces and diplomats. Sometimes referred as
00:04:12 Havana syndrome, anomalous health incidents were first reported, as the chairman suggested back
00:04:19 in 2014, by US personnel assigned to our embassy in Havana. Many have described the symptoms that
00:04:27 were chronic and debilitating. Sadly, these incidents have not been isolated to Havana.
00:04:34 US personnel have reported such incidences in Hanoi, Vienna, London, Moscow, as well as here
00:04:42 in the United States, in Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Pennsylvania. There have been
00:04:48 several investigations into the cause of these incidents, including a study by the National
00:04:54 Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, several studies by Jason, an independent group
00:05:00 of expert scientists, a brain imaging study by the University of Pennsylvania, as well as others,
00:05:06 and that list is not exhaustive. Today we have the privilege of hearing from retired Lieutenant
00:05:13 Colonel Greg Edgren, among our witnesses who ran the Pentagon's investigation into these
00:05:19 situations. We also understand the Intelligence and Foreign Service Affairs Committees have been
00:05:26 engaged in an intensive bipartisan oversight of these anomalous health incidences for a while now.
00:05:33 And last year, the intelligence community completed a coordinated assessment regarding
00:05:39 the causes of these incidents and found no evidence of an adversary adversarial activity.
00:05:47 I know the lack of a finding in these cases after nearly eight years of incidences
00:05:52 is a source of frustration for the victims and frankly for all of us as well.
00:05:58 And I am pleased that recently the Biden administration came out with a statement
00:06:04 that they will continue to conduct comprehensive examinations of these effects and their possible
00:06:11 causes. The Director of National Intelligence, Ms. Arvo Haines, reiterated these comments in
00:06:18 her testimony to the Senate last week stating that the intelligence community
00:06:24 is continuing its investigations into what happened in these situations.
00:06:29 This committee, I should say, is dedicated to working with our partners, the administration,
00:06:36 and other relevant congressional committees to ensure that such examinations, investigations
00:06:42 proceed and that we take care of our people. Let me repeat, we will take into, continue to take
00:06:51 care of those afflicted by the Havana Syndrome and will continue to look for sources and causes.
00:06:58 And Mr. Chairman, I want to ask also unanimous consent that Mr. Eric Swalwell be permitted to sit
00:07:06 in this committee and ask questions of today's witnesses. Without objection, so ordered. Thank
00:07:11 you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I yield. I thank the Ranking Member and other members
00:07:15 of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
00:07:19 We're pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very important
00:07:23 topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise, raise your right hand.
00:07:26 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security
00:07:33 of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
00:07:37 but the truth, so help you God? Thank you. And let the record reflect that the witnesses have
00:07:43 answered in the affirmative. I'd now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Mr. Gregory
00:07:48 Edgren is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and a former U.S. government official. He led the
00:07:53 investigation efforts for the Defense Intelligence Agency into the causes of AHIs and who, if anyone,
00:08:00 was responsible for causing these incidents. Mr. Edgren's career has covered eight countries
00:08:06 and three U.S. embassies. He now serves as the CEO of Advanced Echelon LLC, a company in the
00:08:12 United States with interagency experience leading AHI efforts. Mr. Christo Grozev is an award-winning
00:08:20 journalist and the lead investigator for The Insider. He is also a member of Bellingcat
00:08:25 Productions, which looks to translate Bellingcat investigations into a range of new media products.
00:08:31 He was the lead Russia researcher at Bellingcat until February of 2023. His investigations into
00:08:38 the identity of the suspects in the 2018 Novichok poisonings in the United Kingdom earned him and his
00:08:44 team the European Prize for investigative journalism. Lastly, Mr. Markzide is a Washington,
00:08:51 D.C.-based attorney who specializes in crisis management and handling administrative and
00:08:56 litigation matters mainly relating to national security, international law, foreign, sovereign,
00:09:02 and diplomatic immunity, and the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts. Mr. Zide often represents
00:09:09 former and current federal employees, including military officers, defense contractors, and other
00:09:14 national security professionals and whistleblowers. Again, I thank the witnesses for being here today.
00:09:21 I'll offer each of you an opening statement. I know you've submitted those as well, so please,
00:09:26 if you don't mind, summarize it, and we have a timer to keep to five minutes so that then we'll
00:09:31 go into the question-answer period. I now recognize Lieutenant Colonel Greg Edgreen for five minutes
00:09:37 on his opening statement. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, Congressmen. It is an
00:09:43 honor to speak with you today and give voice to the unseen, the U.S. government, AHI survivors,
00:09:48 and their families. My name is Greg Edgreen. I stood up and led the DIA's task force, which was
00:09:54 in charge of taking care of our survivors and determining the cause. For background, I'm not
00:10:00 an analyst. I'm a retired Army and intelligence officer. The following are my personal opinions
00:10:06 and do not represent the opinions of the government. Given the classification of this topic,
00:10:11 many of my comments will have to be made at a future closed-door session. As a country,
00:10:17 we have been here before. Most people think this all started in Havana in 2016, the widely
00:10:23 reported Havana Syndrome. This led to the U.S. withdrawing most of its staff and ending
00:10:28 rapprochement between Havana and Washington. But before Havana Syndrome, there was the Moscow
00:10:34 Signal. Soviet intelligence bade the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with microwave transmissions.
00:10:39 The health effects were similar to what we see today. There are many examples of syndromes and
00:10:45 ailments from Americans injured in the line of duty that the government did not recognize
00:10:51 for many years, which were eventually proven. Agent Orange used in Vietnam, the Gulf War Syndrome,
00:10:58 burn pits during the forever wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. In all of these examples, America
00:11:05 took too long to acknowledge these injuries and our service members languished without care.
00:11:11 Havana Syndrome is no different. The gaslighting of AHI survivors continues to this day as history
00:11:17 repeats itself. Throughout all this, I learned America's best men and women in national security
00:11:25 are being targeted and neutralized in a global campaign. HIs have been reported in the press
00:11:32 in every continent except for Antarctica, with a large percentage of these attacks occurring in the
00:11:38 homeland, in America, in this town. The impact has been that mission-critical government officials
00:11:47 working abroad and at home are being removed from their post with TBIs. Don't take my word for it.
00:11:53 Nikolai Petrushev, the Secretary of Russia's Security Council, wrote in September 2023,
00:12:00 and I quote, "In recent years, hundreds of employees of foreign intelligence services
00:12:07 involved in organizing intelligence and subversive activities against our country
00:12:12 have been neutralized." End quote. The American people are losing strategic warning and decision
00:12:19 making advantage in great power competition. America's eyes are being blinded, their voices
00:12:26 muted, their ears deafened. This is emboldening our other strategic rivals such as China and could
00:12:34 encourage North Korea and Iran to take similar actions with no repercussions. We collected a
00:12:41 large body of data ranging from signals intelligence to human intelligence to open source
00:12:48 reporting and everything in between. Unfortunately, I can't get into specifics based on the
00:12:54 classification, but I can tell you at an early stage, I started to focus on Moscow and consistently
00:13:00 there was a Russian nexus. Since 2010, the number of counterintelligence incidents began to rise and
00:13:07 so did Russian gray zone activities. These included assassinations, poisonings, sabotage
00:13:14 attacks against NATO allies and others, many of which has been documented by CRISTO. After talking
00:13:20 with the survivors who were hit in the U.S. and abroad, I quickly realized these were no longer
00:13:25 isolated incidents. There were reports of CI incidents which included harassment, room intrusions,
00:13:31 houses being defiled, tossed, pets poisoned, assaults on our personnel, officers and diplomats
00:13:38 being drugged, doxing. Families harassed then in an attack via directed energy, a red line to many
00:13:47 because of the debilitating nature of these weapons. The U.S. government never hit back
00:13:52 and our nation's hidden heroes continue to be targeted today.
00:13:56 Investigators often talk about motive, means and opportunity. First, let's look at the motive.
00:14:02 When President Putin says things like, "If one looks into the security sphere,
00:14:07 new physical principles weapons will ensure the security of any country in the near historic
00:14:11 perspective." We understand this very well and are working on it. If you know anything about the
00:14:17 Russian Ministry of Defense, this is referring to directed energy weapons. Second, the means.
00:14:22 Look at the contract for directed energy weapons which is uncovered by my colleague CRISTO.
00:14:26 Look at the open source photos of Putin awarding scientists prizes for innovation, for weapons
00:14:34 based on new physical principles. And third is the opportunity. Of course they can do this.
00:14:39 As openly reported in 2014, three CIA officers were stationed in Ukraine that year during a
00:14:46 popular revolt that overthrew Moscow's preferred leader. Later those CIA officers went on to other
00:14:52 assignments and reported HI attacks. One in Uzbekistan, one is in Vietnam and the third
00:14:59 officer's family hit in London. Despite this large body of data, the ODNI said there's nothing to see
00:15:07 here. Everything is dismissed. And last month the NIH said there's no evidence of physical damage
00:15:13 despite all survivors reporting the same symptoms. This same study is now under review for its
00:15:19 methodology. I would like to point this committee to the AHI experts panel whose findings were
00:15:25 released in 2022 which saw all the same intelligence and information we did but came to the opposite
00:15:32 conclusion of the DNI. They noted that the signs and symptoms of AHIs are genuine and compelling
00:15:39 and that pulse electromagnetic energy particularly in the radio frequency range explains the core
00:15:47 characteristics. I think the bar for AHI attribution was set so high because we do not
00:15:54 as a country and a government want to face some very hard truths. Can we secure America?
00:16:00 Are these massive counterintelligence failures? Can we protect our people on American soil?
00:16:07 Is this an act of war? Despite our history of walking away from those who sacrificed for their
00:16:14 country, I am optimistic. With congressional support, with your support and an informed
00:16:19 public, it is time to take action. This is a non-partisan issue which has spanned several
00:16:24 administrations. Let's start to get this right with executive and legislative action. First,
00:16:30 please. Mr. McGren, I'm going to go ahead and if you can wrap up, we'll get to the next. Mr.
00:16:35 Chairman, could I have two more minutes, please? One more minute? One more minute is fine. We need
00:16:41 to execute existing funding with the defense health program which was allocated to take care
00:16:46 of the survivors and their families and we should fully implement the Havana Act and we need a VA
00:16:52 diagnostic code because right now there is none. We need to award Purple Hearts and their civilian
00:16:57 equivalents. On the legislative front, we need a new NDAA that covers this and a Havana Act.
00:17:03 I would like to thank this committee for their attention in this issue.
00:17:06 Thank you to Oriana Zil, Michael Ray, Michael Weiss and Christo for keeping this issue alive.
00:17:12 I urge this committee to take care of our unseen survivors, execute existing funding and most
00:17:19 importantly, pressure the government to fight back. Thank you. Thank the witness. The chair
00:17:27 now recognizes Mr. Brozev for his opening statement of five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
00:17:33 dear committee members. My interest in investigating the anomalous health incidents
00:17:37 occurred around the time that there was initial publicity around the Havana cluster. As a
00:17:42 journalist, I just watched from the sidelines and believed that U.S. intelligence and U.S. law
00:17:48 enforcement are going to get us the truth and I was looking forward to that until one day I was
00:17:53 approached by a friend, a common friend, by a member of the U.S. intelligence community in Europe
00:17:58 who advised me or nudged me, asked me to look into this independently and I realized that
00:18:04 there's something possibly limiting the capabilities or the willingness of U.S. law enforcement or
00:18:11 intelligence to do a thorough study. That's when I started looking into this as my own
00:18:16 investigation and over time it grew into a multi-country investigation involving the
00:18:21 Spiegel in Germany, the insider in Russia and our colleagues from CPS 60 Minutes with whom we
00:18:27 joined hands in 2023. I would like to present a summary of our findings as of this moment but
00:18:33 mind you our investigation is still in progress. Based on extensive interviews with victims,
00:18:38 victims' families and also analysts who agreed to talk to us, we can now state that to our own
00:18:46 comfort and conviction there is at least 68 incidents that cannot be explained away with
00:18:50 psychosomatic symptoms or pre-existing conditions and we've taken those as the bare minimum that
00:18:56 allowed us to create a time-space map. Time-space map that allowed us to geolocate these incidents
00:19:01 and further match them to possible travel of potential culprits and that was an important
00:19:06 first part of our investigation. We established that the Russian government, as Lieutenant Colonel
00:19:11 Green said, had the long-standing motive and plans to develop something that they call wave weapons.
00:19:18 It's a term they use as a catch-all term for both acoustic and directed energy electromagnetic
00:19:24 weapons. This has started back in Soviet times. There are several patents that we've reviewed
00:19:30 from the 70s, however the real boost to this program occurred in 2013 when President Putin
00:19:37 created a special R&D institute called the Institute for Prospective Military Studies in
00:19:41 Russia which was tasked with, among other things, developing new physical property weapons including
00:19:47 wave energy. We know that there have been many awards issued by this institute and that they do
00:19:55 annual contests, closed-door contests, for military engineers providing prototypes and testing data
00:20:00 on such weapons. We've obtained documentary evidence that in 2017 a military engineer
00:20:06 serving in a commanding position in Gerev's clandestine sabotage and assassination unit
00:20:11 known as 29155 was the recipient of the annual award from this institute for a project that was
00:20:17 termed testing non-lethal acoustic weapons suitable for use in urban warfare. Notably,
00:20:24 the same military commander was immediately promoted to a political position as a personal
00:20:28 representative of President Putin in the far east of Russia. It's a very rare switch in a career of
00:20:35 a secret spy in Russia which is usually given after a kinetic achievement and there are many
00:20:40 examples in the past that I won't go into. Unit 29155 is the most aggressive clandestine sabotage
00:20:46 unit of Russian military intelligence that has been responsible, as many of us know,
00:20:51 for offensive operations such as the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal with Novichok,
00:20:57 a series of devastating explosions at NATO munition facilities in Europe spanning 2011-2018,
00:21:03 the poisoning of three Bulgarian people involved with selling weapons to Ukraine,
00:21:08 and we've established that spies of this unit, including the commander Andrei Varyanov,
00:21:15 have had sustained communication with military scientists from Russian military institutes,
00:21:20 including the Institute for Prospective Studies, but also the 16th Research and Development
00:21:25 Institute with specific competence and background in researching the effect of electromagnetic and
00:21:29 acoustic waves on the human brain. We've also established that a medical research facility
00:21:36 affiliated with the GRU in St. Petersburg has shown specific interest in researching the effect
00:21:41 of ultra and infrasound on the human brain and a medical facility linked to that particular
00:21:46 institute has conducted research in a very rare medical condition known as the Minor Syndrome,
00:21:52 which we have seen occurring among a sub-cohort of the actual American victims of AHI.
00:21:57 And crucially, we've established that members of this same clandestine unit have traveled
00:22:01 extensively around the world under false identities and have been in the proximity of,
00:22:05 or within feasible reach, of confirmed AHI incidents in at least four cases, including
00:22:11 Frankfurt in 2014, China in 2016 and 2017, Tbilisi in 2021, and further overlaps of people linked to
00:22:18 this unit we've seen in Belgrade and Hanoi. The totality of the evidence uncovered by our team
00:22:25 has proven that Russia has the motive, the means, and the opportunity to have developed and used
00:22:30 non-lethal acoustic or electromagnetic wave weapons against members of the U.S. Intelligence
00:22:35 and Law Enforcement community. Members of the unit 29155 were present in locations and at times
00:22:41 directly preceding or coinciding with known Havana incidents in at least four cases, and there are
00:22:46 many more that we have to discover. I'll close with just a personal statement. These findings
00:22:51 present not a smoking gun but a very plausible operational theory on the existence, origin,
00:22:56 and culprits behind the AHI. I expect the United States Intelligence community will address our
00:23:02 findings on their substance, on their merit, including providing alternative explanations
00:23:07 for why these people, who are known to only engage with kinetic operations, with assassinations,
00:23:12 poisoning, and exposures, never in intelligence gathering, were at the wrong time at the wrong
00:23:17 place if they continue to believe that none of this can be attributed to a foreign adversary.
00:23:22 Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Grozev. And the chair now recognizes Mr. Zaid for his
00:23:27 opening statement of five minutes. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee,
00:23:32 thank you for the opportunity to appear today and testify about a topic that has mostly silently
00:23:37 plagued our nation's intelligence, diplomatic, military, and law enforcement personnel in some
00:23:43 form for decades, and that is anomalous health incidents or AHIs. I've had the privilege of
00:23:48 representing federal AHI victims and their family members for over a decade, years before the issue
00:23:54 came to prominence with the 2016 attacks in Havana, Cuba. I now represent more than two dozen
00:24:00 federal AHI victims, as well as numerous lawful whistleblowers from within CIA, DIA, ODNI, NSA,
00:24:08 Departments of State and Commerce, USAID, and the FBI. The victims are not just selfless public
00:24:15 servants, but their spouses, children, including infants, and even pets. These criminal attacks
00:24:22 have primarily taken place overseas on multiple continents, but have also occurred on our homeland
00:24:28 in Washington, D.C., northern Virginia, Florida, and elsewhere. As part of my first case, I was
00:24:34 provided an unclassified memorandum by NSA in October 2014, two years before Havana, that
00:24:40 revealed the existence of intelligence information concerning a foreign adversary, quote, "with a
00:24:46 high-powered microwave system weapon that may have the ability to weaken, intimidate, or kill an
00:24:52 enemy over time and without leaving evidence." The 2012 intelligence information indicated that this
00:24:58 weapon is designed to bathe a target's living quarters in microwaves, causing numerous physical
00:25:04 effects, including a damaged nervous system, end quote. Today's hearing can only present a sliver
00:25:10 of relevant information. The overwhelming majority of evidence concerning AHIs is hidden behind
00:25:17 classified walls. Having had authorized access to classified information on this topic, but without
00:25:24 revealing that information, it is my view that the executive branch, particularly at the behest of
00:25:29 and manipulation by officials within CIA, is not truthfully reporting what it knows. While I commend
00:25:36 their acknowledgment that AHI victims are suffering genuine and compelling health effects, I am
00:25:41 convinced that the evidence that exists in the classified arena directly contradicts the public
00:25:46 conclusions expressed by federal agencies as to the origin, cause, and scope of AHIs. That review
00:25:53 of that evidence would lead reasonable people to conclude one or more foreign adversaries are
00:25:58 behind at least some of these incidents, and that numerous federal agencies have failed to fully
00:26:04 undertake substantive investigations, deliberately delayed collecting or ignored crucial, credible
00:26:10 evidence, and have intentionally withheld information even from sister agencies so as to
00:26:17 influence and manipulate their decision-making process. There is intelligence, scientific,
00:26:23 and medical evidence that substantiates the existence of AHIs, and that some of the attacks
00:26:29 were perpetrated by a foreign adversary. That evidence can be specifically identified in the
00:26:35 proper classified setting. That said, there's a wealth of publicly available information concerning
00:26:41 the history of directed energy, and particularly its scientific, intelligence, and military
00:26:46 applications. I provide an overview in my written testimony. Given the many years our government has
00:26:52 been experimenting with developing directed energy weapons, why would anyone not believe
00:26:57 our adversaries are engaged in the same efforts? A recent investigation by 60 Minutes, Der Spiegel
00:27:03 and The Insider identified potential credible links between AHIs and alleged Russian operatives
00:27:10 from military unit 29155. This included activities within the United States. What was the government's
00:27:17 response? CIA doubled down, that there is nothing to see, and that it knew of and had already ruled
00:27:23 out the same evidence. That is a blatant falsehood that has infuriated many serving members of the
00:27:29 intelligence community because so much of the evidence to the contrary is available to them
00:27:34 in reports, briefings, and cable traffic. Of course, this evidence is classified. Today's hearing is
00:27:41 not going to solve the controversy that AHI presents, but there are many steps that Congress
00:27:46 can take. These include ensuring continual and consistent health care for AHI victims, ensuring
00:27:54 immediate implementation of and funding for the Havana Act of 2021, as well as amending it where
00:28:01 necessary, investigating why law enforcement and other homeland agencies have not been permitted
00:28:07 to pursue AHI leads concerning criminal attacks on American personnel, and instead CIA analysts
00:28:14 who do not possess the same skill sets or authorities have been allowed to control the
00:28:18 investigations, and require the executive branch to develop comprehensive standard protocols that
00:28:25 provide U.S. personnel and their families with guidance as to risks involved and how best to
00:28:30 report any incidents. It is time for the U.S. government to be on the right side of history.
00:28:35 I welcome the opportunity to try and answer your questions and providing you with classified
00:28:39 responses in the proper secure setting. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ziden. Members will now be
00:28:45 recognized in order of seniority for their five minutes of questioning, and if time allows, an
00:28:50 additional round of questioning may be called after all members have been recognized. Without
00:28:55 objection, the chair seeks permission for the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Gessen, the
00:29:02 gentleman from Florida, Mr. Jimenez, to also wave on to this committee. Without objection, it's
00:29:08 awarded. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning, and again, thank the witnesses
00:29:15 for your statements. I'll start with you, Mr. Grozev. Maybe give us an idea of how this could
00:29:26 happen in the United States. Talk us through a scenario that you've investigated that technology
00:29:35 and location, things that we can kind of put it into context and understand in layman's terms.
00:29:41 In terms of technology, I'm not an expert in the technology behind this, but I've read enough and
00:29:50 I'm sufficiently technically minded to understand that there's more than one way to achieve this
00:29:56 same effect on the human brain, and one of the most disturbing denials that I've seen in some of the
00:30:03 publications leading up to our findings being published was an attempt to create the impression
00:30:09 that no technology would allow this impact on the human brain. That is provably untrue. There have
00:30:16 been experiments that prove that both acoustic waves, directed waves in the ultrasound, primarily
00:30:25 the ultrasound band, but also electromagnetic directed energy, especially post nanosecond
00:30:32 energy beams in the millimeter band through something called the Frey effect, which converts
00:30:38 electromagnetic energy into an acoustic band wave that can be within or without or outside of the
00:30:47 audible band, can have the same effect on the human brain, which can have long-term
00:30:52 concussion-like symptoms, but in really traumatic degree of concussion. So that is a given, and
00:31:01 I don't think today we have the expertise to talk about that, but there's sufficient evidence that
00:31:06 that is possible. We also know that the Russian intelligence apparatus has worked on that, and
00:31:12 something I would like to mention as well is that after our publication, a former member of Russia's
00:31:18 intelligence community reached out to me and said, "Well, this is what we've been working on since
00:31:21 the 80s, because we thought that the Americans were doing that to us, and we wanted to develop
00:31:27 a counter technology for the same thing. So of course we're doing that," which is interesting,
00:31:31 because Russian intelligence officers believe they're doing this, and American intelligence
00:31:36 officers are saying they're not doing this. Did this individual, this Russian agent,
00:31:40 remain anonymous? Unfortunately, for their own safety, I'll have to leave them anonymous,
00:31:46 but it's a person with, in my view, sufficient knowledge of exactly the
00:31:52 intents, the red lines that this entity would be exposed to. We know that members of this unit have
00:32:03 engaged with scientists who have worked on a project called "reversal of epilepsy symptoms
00:32:10 through radio waves," which for anybody known how Russia intelligence formulates their findings for
00:32:16 the public-facing domain should read them as the exact opposite, reversing essentially the polarity
00:32:25 might leave with the exact opposite effect, creating epilepsy symptoms, and so on and so
00:32:30 forth. This interest is long-running for the GRU, for Russia's military intelligence.
00:32:35 One last thing I will mention is that we found that the only other place, other than among the
00:32:41 cohort of American and Canadian intelligence and law enforcement officers who have been affected
00:32:48 by this, that we've seen very, very similar symptoms was in a Russian school in 2017.
00:32:54 We found the evidence to this similarity in a hacked email box of a military researcher from
00:33:03 the St. Petersburg Institute for Experimental Medicine working for the GRU. This institute
00:33:10 showed uncanny interest in exactly what happened in that school where 26 children complained of
00:33:17 exactly the symptoms that we've received in this investigation from American officers and diplomats.
00:33:23 Again, it was this institute that followed up and did research and may have been behind those
00:33:30 incidents in Russia, but we don't see them anywhere else other than around Russian operatives.
00:33:35 Mr. Seid, is it your belief that these attacks have happened inside the United States, and if so,
00:33:41 can you give us some of the locations and details that you can share with us?
00:33:47 Yes, without a doubt, they have happened here in the United States. As I mentioned in my opening
00:33:53 testimony, we know of quite a number, and I would say perhaps the majority of them were in the
00:33:58 Washington, D.C., Northern Virginia area. There are also a number, particularly of FBI personnel,
00:34:04 down in Florida. I do know of some other locations of which I can tell you more about
00:34:11 in a more private situation, not necessarily because of classification, but for privilege
00:34:18 of the individual client not to reveal it. But there is no doubt there have been quite a number
00:34:24 of cases here, particularly relating to the CIA. CIA and FBI, most predominantly, also State
00:34:33 Department. Thank you. My time has expired. I now recognize the Ranking Member for his line of
00:34:38 questioning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Clearly, what I've heard today is very disturbing. Before
00:34:45 I get to my questions, I just want to reiterate that we're going to do everything we can to assure
00:34:50 that the victims, those that are suffering, will receive consistent health care for what is ailing
00:34:59 you. But, Mr. Edgren, the evidence, no intentional attack, yet what I'm hearing from Mr. Zaid, Mr.
00:35:13 Khruschev, is that there's a possibility that something is out there attacking us, especially
00:35:21 in the homeland. Mr. Edgren, based on what Mr. Zaid just said, what are your thoughts?
00:35:29 My personal thoughts, as an intelligence officer, is that I agree with them. My personal opinions
00:35:37 is that this is a global campaign and it includes attacking us here at home. It is a strategic
00:35:45 issue that is going to impact us. Is this an attack by the Russians, just the Russians,
00:35:51 and is it against the U.S. solely or other allies as well? I have to be careful what I say here.
00:35:59 So let me say this. And if I can, say what you can. If you gentlemen feel better talking about
00:36:04 this in a more secure setting, we can work on that as well. Congressman, thank you for the question.
00:36:12 Give me 20 minutes in a skiff and I'll convince all of you. I know where the bodies are buried.
00:36:17 I know the cabinets to look in, the questions to ask, and the people to subpoena. I will say that
00:36:22 this is a global campaign and it's focused on attacking our people, the best of our people.
00:36:28 It's not the middle-range people that are being attacked. It's those that are succeeding,
00:36:33 succeeding and providing work, work that winds up on the president's desk every morning. So
00:36:39 it's a massive issue. It's something that doesn't come to light. And it's something that,
00:36:44 especially with the Department of Defense survivors, the unseen, they're totally left
00:36:49 out of this. Because the Havana Act doesn't cover your active duty members. They're told to go to
00:36:54 the VA, but there's no VA diagnostic code. So we're not getting them care. It's not consistent.
00:36:59 We have funding available that's allocated that we could provide to take care of all of our people
00:37:05 in our government. We're not using it. That's why I urge you to contact the Defense
00:37:09 Health Program. In my last two and a half minutes, would you say this is more on behalf of the U.S.
00:37:15 government in terms of what we've been looking at? Is this more of a malfeasance as opposed to
00:37:21 misfeasance? That's a good question. I'm sure just like so many other issues, it's a combination.
00:37:28 I can't explain some of the obstacles that those in the government have erected to block
00:37:36 information. I can tell you, you know, firsthand that I have opinion would be that that information
00:37:42 is being blocked. There is information that is absolutely being blocked from one agency
00:37:47 to the other, particularly at the CIA. I mean, that's who we're going to point to the most
00:37:53 of information that the CIA has that its sister intelligence agencies it hasn't been shared with.
00:37:59 And I can identify a number of specific classified documents in the in a proper setting.
00:38:06 So, Graca, any thoughts?
00:38:07 I would like to be the devil's advocate and allow for the possibility for some legitimate reasons
00:38:17 why the U.S. government and intelligence offices, agencies might not want to make this a public
00:38:24 issue. One of the few legitimate explanations for this, in my mind, is the fear of proliferation
00:38:31 of such a weapon in case it becomes widely known that it's achievable, feasible and maybe not too
00:38:37 costly to manufacture. That's why I don't require public answers to our findings, but I encourage
00:38:45 skiff answers to everything we found out to you and to government so that we exclude the
00:38:54 possibility that is if that is the case of an attack on American officials by the Russian state.
00:39:01 Is there any way to protect our officials from these weapons?
00:39:05 This is exactly why I do not take into account a possible legitimate reason for for hiding this,
00:39:12 because I, from my personal point of view, making this public is the best protection.
00:39:18 My last few seconds, Mr. Redman. Any thoughts?
00:39:22 The best way to protect our people is to fight back. When you're hit in the shadows,
00:39:27 you have to hit back twice as hard and tell your adversary why you did that.
00:39:31 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm out of time. I'll yield.
00:39:35 The gentleman yields. I'll recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane,
00:39:39 for his five minutes of questioning.
00:39:40 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. Thank you to our witnesses for showing up.
00:39:45 Many Americans, including other members that I've spoken to recently, don't exactly know what to
00:39:53 think of these anomalous health incidents. I spoke to one the other day, just yesterday,
00:40:00 who said, "I thought that was debunked." Like Havana syndrome, where our citizens are claiming
00:40:08 very serious medical conditions following perceived attacks. And after hearing you,
00:40:14 your testimonies, it sounds like all three of you believe that these are hostile actions
00:40:21 orchestrated by our adversaries against American citizens. Is that correct?
00:40:25 Yes.
00:40:27 Yes.
00:40:29 Not all of them, of course.
00:40:32 Okay. And I can't remember which one of you said, at least 68 incidents
00:40:38 that you believe to be attacks using these type of weapons. Is that correct?
00:40:44 At least 68 incidents, I said, cannot be explained away with pre-existing conditions
00:40:50 with psychosomatic symptoms.
00:40:52 Can you go over again real quick, Mr. Grozev, why you believe that our nation's
00:40:57 own law enforcement and intelligence investigations have concluded the opposite
00:41:04 of the claims made here today?
00:41:05 One general observation, and again, I don't know the answer, but based on my 10 years of
00:41:12 investigation of Russian intelligence operations and observing the parallel findings of law
00:41:19 enforcement and intelligence publications, I find that there's an over-reliance on something
00:41:26 that a colleague and a victim, a colleague of the victim's, a victim himself, called the
00:41:33 straw, drinking straw insight that is unfortunately used for many of the conclusions. Reliance
00:41:40 over reliance on human intelligence sources that may be recruited within the Russian
00:41:47 intelligence community who are asked, do you know if this is you guys? And the answer may
00:41:52 be no. And that may be a very honest, sincere answer. From my investigation, it's clear
00:41:58 that any operation like this is heavily compartmentalized and it's firewalled to a degree
00:42:03 where even members, other members of the same unit might not be aware that this has been
00:42:07 going on. And to rely on human intelligence for conclusions of this stature is, is probably
00:42:16 very inefficient. What we do find is unexplained travel. We find unexplained communications
00:42:24 that all points to a very plausible and internally consistent theory that these people are
00:42:29 behind the attacks. Again, I just, I can see several reasons why the US intelligence might
00:42:35 not want to make that public, but they must make it known to qualified and, and in a secure
00:42:43 setting and provide answers to our findings. Guys, if your assessments here are correct,
00:42:50 these are very covert weapons, aren't they? They don't leave behind bomb fragments,
00:42:56 bullet holes, et cetera. They could absolutely be used by our adversaries and have very low
00:43:02 levels of, very easy to deny if they were even there, that they were used. Is that correct?
00:43:11 That's correct. There's no entry or exit wound. How they're designed is to make the target feel
00:43:18 like they're crazy, like they're imagining things, especially on the low duration,
00:43:22 the low intensity, long duration hits. But you were saying that the targets are most often
00:43:29 always either CIA, FBI, intelligence, law enforcement individuals. Is that correct?
00:43:36 No, I said diplomats, intelligence community and department of defense make up the lion's share.
00:43:42 You often don't hear about the department of defense, despite DOD having 10,
00:43:47 five or 10 times the number of survivors that department of state has.
00:43:51 Thank you for that correction, sir. And you guys also said that these attacks are happening right
00:43:58 here in this city. Is that correct? Yes. Yes. Can you expound on that a little bit more?
00:44:06 I mean, there have been some that have gone public with respect to Washington, D.C.
00:44:11 The particularly credible ones, and I'm not saying that those are not credible,
00:44:16 but the ones that have received the most attention on the inside of the intelligence
00:44:20 community are in northern Virginia, and they are particularly of CIA personnel.
00:44:25 I think it was Mr. Grozev said you spoke to a Russian agent who said that they believe that
00:44:35 Americans are using the same weapons on them. Is that correct? That is correct. Back in the 80s,
00:44:41 might that have something to do with part of the CIA's motive to cover up the existence of
00:44:47 the this tech and these weapons? That is a very logical possibility. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:44:54 I yield back. Gentleman yields chair now recognize the gentleman from New York,
00:44:58 Mr. Goldman for his round of questioning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
00:45:01 our witnesses for being here. Mr. Grozev, I want to follow up a little bit on the
00:45:06 interactions you've had with Russian intelligence about these A.H.I.s. If you had a conversation with
00:45:17 an intelligence officer where a Russian intelligence officer where he or she said that
00:45:25 these are the same weapons that were used in the 1980s. Isn't that an admission that they know
00:45:31 they're using them now? It is an admission that it's very plausible that they're being used now
00:45:41 because the person was not privy to this particular operation is or she is retired. But again,
00:45:47 the important thing was the important thing is that he was serving at a time when there was
00:45:53 a concerted effort for the Russian intelligence services to develop a counter weapon. And he
00:45:58 believed given time past since then, it has been developed. I see. So he has retired and but
00:46:04 believes that based on the similar symptoms or what other factors went into it? Very,
00:46:13 very similar symptoms were being conveyed in terms of Soviet diplomats stationed abroad of
00:46:21 intelligence background had returned back to Russia with to the Soviet Union with symptoms
00:46:28 that they believed were caused by an acoustic weapon. That was their relief. It's not the fact
00:46:34 that it is what happened. But again, it explains partly the motivation for them to develop a
00:46:39 weapon that will be targeting exactly the type of people that we see being targeted.
00:46:43 And I know there's some geospatial data that indicates there were Russian intelligence
00:46:49 officers near alleged incidents abroad. Do any of you know whether that is also the case
00:46:58 for any of the incidents that have been reported domestically?
00:47:02 I do not have that data, because the particular unit that we've focused on, they would not dare
00:47:12 come to the United States. Therefore, if the Russians were doing this on US soil,
00:47:18 they would have used sleepers, long term proxies that would be here. But that is not a unit that
00:47:24 I've discovered in my own career. And therefore, difficult to identify
00:47:28 as affiliated with Russian intelligence. Sir, I think you should refer that last
00:47:34 question to the FBI and classified spaces. Obviously, the episode with my client,
00:47:40 an active FBI agent that was authorized to speak to 60 Minutes talks about an incident in Key West.
00:47:47 And most of that information is either law enforcement sensitive or classified.
00:47:51 Are any of you aware of any reported incidents from individuals who are not
00:48:02 members of the United States government? Domestically, I should say?
00:48:11 I am not, but I will throw a caveat in there. Generally, I only focused on former and current
00:48:18 government employees that were attacked. Mr. Zaden, are you?
00:48:22 There are many people who believe they are victims of AHIs. All I have to do is look at my
00:48:31 Twitter feed whenever I post on the topic. I only represent federal government employees
00:48:37 and their families, so I don't focus on the accuracy of those particular claims.
00:48:43 Mr. Grozev, do you have any insight? Not on American soil, but in other parts of
00:48:50 the world, there have been complaints that appear to be credible from Russian activists
00:48:56 or Russian opposition leaders living abroad. Mr. Zaden, I want to ask, and this is a
00:49:04 hypothetical, but I'm trying to understand why our government would try to block information
00:49:18 sharing or conceal information that they have. And one thing that comes to mind is whether
00:49:26 there's an operational risk to revealing any of the details of their investigation.
00:49:37 Is that something that you have come across in any of your work?
00:49:41 Yes, and quickly, because I know your time is elapsing here. So I do think that that is,
00:49:47 and I agree with Mr. Grozev, that there's a lot of reasons why the information might
00:49:52 not be publicly released. And I do think that's something we could address more in a classified
00:49:58 environment to explain that. But there are understandable reasons why the U.S. government
00:50:03 has not revealed much of what it knows. But the question is, how about to you?
00:50:09 But also, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to follow up on that, there is a conclusion that has been
00:50:16 made public that it is highly, highly, highly unlikely, I forgot what the language is, that
00:50:22 this, these symptoms were caused by some sort of, you know, foreign malign actor.
00:50:31 So the last ODNI assessment that came out in 2023 had indicated, and to the public,
00:50:37 it seems very damning, this highly unlikely that a foreign adversary was involved. But if you
00:50:42 actually look at the levels within each of the agencies as to the level of credibility that they
00:50:50 have assessed to that is actually quite low for most of them. And there's a lot of pushback,
00:50:55 even internally, among some of the intelligence agencies as to the qualification of that
00:51:01 information. I'll say just very quickly, finally, they talk about, in particular, I think one of
00:51:06 the CIA's public documents, that many of these cases can be explained through environmental
00:51:11 factors, pre-existing medical conditions, but they don't explain any of that, which could easily be
00:51:17 said in another sentence. The environmental factors include the following, whatever, whatever.
00:51:22 We looked at prior health conditions and 85% had football injuries when they played in high school
00:51:28 and college. None of that information is in there, which leads one to believe that there's something
00:51:34 more. The other thing I'll say just really quickly on that, the news media missed the story on that
00:51:40 CIA assessment. They said they looked at more than a thousand cases, and they concluded the
00:51:45 vast majority could be explained otherwise. But there are at least two dozen cases that even the
00:51:51 CIA acknowledges they can't explain away by any other alternative factors. That, to me, is the
00:51:58 story that should have been in the New York Times and the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal,
00:52:02 that there are two dozen cases the CIA can't even explain away. Is that part of your 68, Mr. Grozev?
00:52:09 Absolutely, yes. Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging. I yield back. Gentlemen, time has
00:52:13 expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. I thank
00:52:17 the chair and our ranking member for allowing me to wave on to this hearing. I thank the panelists.
00:52:24 This is an issue that I know well from eight years on the House Intelligence Committee.
00:52:34 I first just want to say to Mr. Zaid that your clients who you represent are heroes.
00:52:44 The people who were subjected to this are American heroes. I've met a number of them,
00:52:52 and they served their country abroad. They toiled away, oftentimes without their family,
00:53:03 leaving everything here in the United States, and oftentimes without any of us really having a sense
00:53:07 of what they are doing. They were exposed to this. This condition, when you meet with the victims,
00:53:17 is completely debilitating. It changes your life. It turns it upside down. If you're a young parent,
00:53:28 life is already disorienting. If you're subjected to this, it's even more difficult to be a parent.
00:53:34 Put yourself through this, the questions you have. Something that I've been struck by
00:53:40 in meeting with so many of these victims is, yes, they want to get well themselves. They have an
00:53:47 obligation to their families to take care of their families. They have expectations of the agencies
00:53:53 that they work for. But in every single one of them, they want to share as much as possible
00:54:01 to prevent the next attack. So their sense of duty, even after being attacked and even after
00:54:08 being debilitated, is still, I don't want this to happen to somebody else. Mr. Zaid, I don't know if
00:54:14 you can animate that just a little bit as to the patriotism of the people you represent and wanting
00:54:22 to get to the bottom of this. No, thank you, Congressman. I agree 100 percent. And it was
00:54:26 mentioned by Mr. Ed Green, the notion of these oftentimes are the best of the best who have been
00:54:32 impacted. And I have heard repeatedly from so many of them that what they want to achieve here
00:54:39 is to make sure that their peers, their colleagues, and their future colleagues do not have
00:54:44 this happen to them. And they want to go back to work. I mean, most of them were in their 30s and
00:54:53 40s when they were impacted and would still have long careers ahead of them. And they want nothing
00:54:59 more than to put their efforts into working for the national security interests of the United States.
00:55:07 They are true heroes. I agree 100 percent. And as we think forward about what can we do,
00:55:15 this is the Homeland Security Committee. Obviously, this issue crosses jurisdictions,
00:55:20 the House Intelligence Committee, Armed Services Committee, and Homeland Security Committee. But I
00:55:25 would just welcome from the Lieutenant Colonel, how should we be thinking about this on the homeland?
00:55:34 And if this is indeed a foreign adversary using a technology or a technique, how do we prevent it
00:55:43 from coming onto the homeland where the target environment is even richer than Americans abroad?
00:55:53 Thank you, sir. First of all, I must say that, yes, there's much needed legislation. We need a
00:56:01 new Havana Act, something that's not a one-term payment. It was a great step in the right direction,
00:56:07 but it had some shortcomings that we're going to fix in the next go-around. What you're referring
00:56:12 to would obviously have to fall under the next Homeland Security Act and securing our borders.
00:56:17 Because if I hypothetically was going to plan an operation, I'd have to get a couple guys across
00:56:22 our border. They would go pick up a weapon and then start surveilling the target and then hit
00:56:27 them and then disappear. And so I think there's a larger question there that I'm not qualified
00:56:34 to answer, but there's some long-term things that need to be done in terms of new acts. But in the
00:56:41 short term, we need to do things like implement the original Havana Act. DOD still hasn't done it.
00:56:46 They still have not implemented the Havana Act. And we need a VA diagnostic code. Thanks to the
00:56:52 VFW brothers and sisters that are here today and for your meeting earlier, we don't have a VA
00:56:57 diagnostic code for the 500-some DOD survivors. How are they going to get long-term care and
00:57:03 disability without that? Well, I hope this issue you see in a room that is often contentious,
00:57:11 explosive, volcanic, that you've got members on both sides who first honor and salute the victims
00:57:19 and want to do everything we can to make sure that they're made whole and if they can return,
00:57:25 can return. And then, of course, as the victims have wanted to do, make sure we do everything
00:57:30 possible to prevent anyone else from suffering from this. And I yield back. Thank you, Chairman.
00:57:35 I think the gentleman will now enter a second round of questioning. I know we have a couple
00:57:40 of other members who were seeking to wave on, and we will again alternate according to seniority
00:57:47 on both sides of the aisle. So I recognize myself for another round of questioning.
00:57:51 Let me just kind of go back to Mr. Ed Green. When you look at, you know, what is your,
00:58:00 I guess, analysis of how many victims you can identify that have been, that have occurred here
00:58:09 in the United States? And then, you know, secondly, what's been the response by government agencies
00:58:16 to those victims from the time that they reported to the communication between agencies,
00:58:22 if any communication exists, and maybe focus a little bit on the FBI.
00:58:26 Yeah, thank you. I can't get into specifics about the numbers, but after having talked with
00:58:32 Mr. Zaid about this, I could say comfortably. Why can't you talk about the numbers just so
00:58:37 everybody can understand? Because numbers in specific locations of attacks are classified,
00:58:41 but I can tell you roughly 20 to 30 percent of the cases that I saw were in the homeland.
00:58:46 In terms of the response on the homeland, it gets tricky because it involves authorities here within
00:58:52 the FBI, and what I have found is that we needed a faster response mechanism. The U.S. government
00:59:00 doesn't have a central clearinghouse for AHIs. So let's say someone in the Air Force is attacked on
00:59:06 soil. How do you quickly find out about that and freeze the crime scene and go out and evaluate it?
00:59:12 And there's no coordination that's happening in between departments and agencies and organizations.
00:59:17 It's happening, but it's very slow. It involves letterhead memorandum that takes weeks to
00:59:22 process. CCTV footage expires in this town within 24 hours. Talk to me about the classification.
00:59:28 Who classified it? You'd have to ask the ODNI. They oversaw all things related.
00:59:36 Your understanding and what you're testifying to now is it is classified, so there is an
00:59:41 acknowledgment of an issue. Clearly, clearly, sir, there is. Mr. Grozev, I'll ask you the same question.
00:59:49 How has the FBI handled the complaints and the, you know, you want to call them the victims,
00:59:57 not if you want to call them the victims, and they're, I guess, reaching out to within the FBI.
01:00:05 How have they handled it? I'm not privy to that investigation. From my incidental observations,
01:00:15 my belief is that the FBI feel that they have to toe the line of the intelligence community on this
01:00:24 topic, and they feel, some of them feel that they wish they could do more to protect their own
01:00:31 colleagues. Okay. Are they being told, is it your feeling that they're being told from superiors or
01:00:36 others within the FBI to stand down? I do not have evidence they've been told, but being
01:00:43 patriots, it might be a self-imposed limitation to not contradict the overall finding of the
01:00:51 Director of National Intelligence. I'll ask the same thing to you, Mr. Zayed. Is that your
01:00:55 understanding, or is there something similar to that going on? Without a doubt, I think the FBI
01:00:59 is becoming better, more receptive, but I'll give you a perfect example. In March of 2021,
01:01:07 the FBI drafted a workforce message concerning AHIs to go to everyone about what to do,
01:01:14 how to report it. It took them six months to issue that notice. During that time, my client,
01:01:21 Carrie, who's in the 60 Minutes episode, was hit. That workforce message still didn't go out,
01:01:26 and it took a long time to even get medical care for many of the FBI victims. It has been a
01:01:31 complicated process. There are specifics that we could absolutely provide to in a more protected
01:01:37 environment, more so for the privacy of the individuals, but also from a classification
01:01:42 standpoint that would show you where the system has broken down. How high does this go? We're
01:01:48 talking about, as has been testified to today, high, successful, well-performing people, but I
01:01:55 mean, can you give us some details about how high this goes in our government? From a victim
01:02:01 standpoint? Yes, from a victim standpoint. I mean, it has been reported individuals connected to the
01:02:07 NSC and the White House have been impacted. Those that, as Lieutenant Colonel Ed Green,
01:02:11 those that could brief the President up to— Yeah, and some, I mean, some of them have been public
01:02:16 in some prior 60 Minutes episodes of believing that they have been impacted, and I mean,
01:02:22 there would be evidence that would be in the classified sphere. Of the incidents that are
01:02:26 happening in, say, Northern Virginia, Washington, D.C., are families, family members also reporting
01:02:32 having symptoms and being attacked? Not as many. Usually, it has been in the overseas locations
01:02:41 where the family members have been impacted, generally because it is, as I described in that
01:02:46 NSA memo, bathing the residents, and, you know, they have no idea who might be inside the residence.
01:02:53 That's where literally pets have been impacted because they've been in the beam, the wave,
01:02:58 whatever. Most, there have been government buildings impacted in Northern Virginia,
01:03:03 and it's usually been individuals either in their home, hotels, or driving. Is it the panel's
01:03:13 belief that this is primarily happening from, attributed to Russian operatives?
01:03:18 I've said this before. There's an extremely strong Russia nexus inside China. I think
01:03:29 that changes a bit. And quickly, Mr. Grozev.
01:03:32 We have the specific evidence of Russian operatives being in China at the time when
01:03:39 American diplomats suffered incidents. This could not have happened without the knowledge and
01:03:44 at least passive cooperation by Chinese intelligence, which means Chinese intelligence
01:03:49 would be exposed to the capabilities and possibility of such a weapon, which probably
01:03:54 means they have developed their own version or borrowed it from Russia.
01:03:57 Thank you. All right. My time has expired. I recognize the ranking member.
01:04:00 Thank you. Mr. Edgren, we started talking about, you know, the lack of government action
01:04:09 recognizing this issue. You compare this to Agent Orange and some of the other ailments our military
01:04:15 personnel have suffered, and it takes decades to acknowledge that, yes, this is an issue. It's a
01:04:21 medical issue to be taken care of, to be treated on a long-term basis. It's kind of where we
01:04:27 started today. I think that I agree with you and with the chairman and Mr. Swalwell, who
01:04:35 worked on this issue for a long time, that we do have to take care of the victims
01:04:40 the best we can. Now we're shifting to something else, which is essentially a cover-up. What you
01:04:48 all are saying is there's a government cover-up, the fact that something is out there afflicting,
01:04:56 targeting us. Is this where we're going with this?
01:05:02 Thank you. Great points. I won't get into classification of the problems. I will tell you
01:05:09 that the government in the IC assessment is wrong. It's dead wrong. I can't tell you if it's a cover-up,
01:05:14 why they're doing this, malfeasance. I won't go there. What I can tell you is that it's my firm
01:05:21 belief we already have attribution. Right now is the time for action, retribution, and we need to
01:05:27 prioritize taking care of our people because there's a lot of survivors and their families
01:05:32 that have been attacked here in the homeland that are in a long wait line to get to Walter Reed
01:05:37 because we're not executing funding that's already been allocated by you gentlemen to take care of
01:05:44 these survivors. You fix Walter Reed and the defense health program, everyone benefits.
01:05:49 Mr. Zaid. So, sir, I've been working in the national security field for 30 years representing
01:06:00 some of our most covert intelligence officers who I respect a great deal and the agencies.
01:06:05 The word cover-up, I will tell you that there are many legitimate reasons why there could be
01:06:14 what the agencies are doing to explain why they are doing it. What I will tell you is
01:06:19 would you say would you use a cover-up as a statement or other words? So, cover-up would
01:06:25 depend on intent. There could be good reasons to withhold information. I will say that the public
01:06:32 statements that the executive branch is making is inconsistent with the classified record.
01:06:39 And then it would be Congress's job as an oversight authority to determine why that is, whether it
01:06:47 was a legitimate reason to mislead the public or because of some nefarious reason or all the above.
01:06:55 But the record on the inside in the classified theater is not consistent with the public
01:07:02 statements. Mr. Grozev. If this is true and it depends partly on classified data that I'm not
01:07:10 privy to, then it's a judgment call that was made to mislead the public in the interest of
01:07:18 national security interest. But it will be up to Congress to decide whether that judgment call was
01:07:24 correct. One additional effect of such a judgment call that may not have been taken into account is
01:07:31 the effect of encouraging the hostile power. In the hypothesis that this is indeed a Russian
01:07:37 covert operation and the whole intelligence community of the United States has publicly
01:07:44 denied this ever happening, this will be such a trigger, such an incentive for Russia to escalate
01:07:50 and to it will be for somebody who knows how the mind of President Putin works. I can tell you that
01:07:56 if they did it and the United States government has concluded they didn't do it, this will
01:08:02 encourage an escalation in the war in Ukraine. This will encourage an escalation because this
01:08:06 person thinks the rest of the world are complete idiots. And really, that's how his mind works.
01:08:12 So take this into account when you assess the judgment call. Thank you. Any other thoughts?
01:08:20 Chairman, I go ahead Mr. Edgreen. I would just like to thank this committee for
01:08:26 for focusing on this issue. One of the things we always did at the DIA was not questioning the
01:08:33 individual. Are they really having symptoms? We got immediate care for every single symptom and
01:08:38 I think that's the right way to do it. In terms of attribution, I think we over empowered CIA
01:08:44 analyst and when they kicked it up the food chain to ODNI for Nick assessment, when you look at it,
01:08:50 the people they kicked it up to were other CIA analysts on loan. So this was a self-licking
01:08:54 ice cream cone. We need more people inside the Department of Defense or with an operational
01:08:59 background to look at this because if you show an analyst flowers, they're going to look for a
01:09:04 wedding. You show a case officer those flowers, they're going to look for a funeral. Thank you,
01:09:11 gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I yield. I thank the ranking member.
01:09:17 Chair, I recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This next
01:09:23 question is for Mr. Zaid and Edgreen. Are either of you aware of any individuals who have AHI
01:09:28 symptoms have passed away from their ailments? I do.
01:09:35 I do. Do we know how many that you're aware of? We need to discuss that somewhere else.
01:09:46 For the privacy of the families, it's a small community. Right. Mr. Chairman, are we going to
01:09:52 be able to move into a classified setting at some point or at another time? I think that possibility
01:09:59 will exist at a later time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There's concerns that the FBI has
01:10:06 totally dropped the ball on this investigation. Would the panelists agree with that assessment?
01:10:14 I would. And I would say that a great question for you to ask is to the FBI,
01:10:20 how many people did you have assigned to this? They're going to come back with a big number.
01:10:25 And then you're going to ask how many people were assigned to this full time?
01:10:29 And then you're going to see the looks on their faces. Because by my accounts, I had roughly two
01:10:35 officers from the field office. I had a GS-15 at headquarters and an analyst. The best one out of
01:10:41 all of them was the analyst. And I'll say they all had additional duties. That wasn't their main job.
01:10:49 They were doing things like looking at January 6th, looking at terrorism threats here in DC.
01:10:54 So it's been very small. It hasn't been resourced properly. And anytime you work with the FBI,
01:11:00 and this is fascinating because I did my whole career abroad, it's easier. They put things into
01:11:05 a black box. And one of the main problems we had is they had on a criminal hat, crim as they say
01:11:12 in the FBI, and not a CI hat. Gotcha. Do you believe that a Homeland Security investigation
01:11:19 should get engaged in this investigation? Absolutely, because they were cut out. You only
01:11:24 had, I believe, my time there, one Homeland Security officer. She was an analyst for Secret Service.
01:11:32 Homeland Security investigation should be involved.
01:11:34 Have any of you three panelists ever seen one of these weapons?
01:11:39 I have seen a 1991 version of the weapon, and it looks like a satellite dish with a
01:11:48 unit this size attached to it. And of course, over the years, miniaturization has been possible.
01:11:56 Obviously, there's a limitation to how miniaturized it can be because of the antenna
01:12:01 size, which is always related to the wave. But still, it is something that can be well contained
01:12:07 in the trunk of a car or even a large backpack. Is this a type of weapon that could be cobbled
01:12:13 together once foreign operatives are on our own soil, or is this something that would have to be
01:12:19 manufactured in a nation state? My experience shows that it can be
01:12:27 cobbled together. It's something that can, a rough, crude version of this that will probably
01:12:32 require longer exposure than the more advanced version that has been tested, as we see from
01:12:39 this document, can be put together inexpensively. But again, I would abstain from commenting further
01:12:47 lest I encourage people to try it at home. That would make this weapon and this tactic
01:12:53 even more dangerous, wouldn't it, Mr. Krozev? Correct.
01:12:56 Can you tell us, sir, about this contract you discovered for these weapons?
01:13:00 The contract was an award by the Institute for Prospective Military Studies, an annual award
01:13:14 that means that this was the best development for a unit, research and development achievement,
01:13:21 for a unit whose goal is to encourage the production and manufacturing and discovery
01:13:26 and invention in the area of new weapons, both lethal and non-lethal. I know that this same
01:13:33 commander won the award of this institute two years in a row. We're only privy to one of his
01:13:41 devices, to one of his achievements. We don't know what the subsequent years' delivery from him was.
01:13:49 But again, I mention this in order for you to understand that the perceived value, the perceived
01:13:56 merit by the Kremlin of this particular award, of this particular achievement, was high enough for
01:14:02 it to be the only award for the year and for this person to achieve a political placement, a position
01:14:09 that is not usual for a security operative. And this is the value of our finding. This was a very
01:14:18 momentous moment for the Kremlin, this particular achievement. Mr. Chairman,
01:14:23 can I have 30 more seconds? I think it was you, Mr. Grozev, who said that in your investigation
01:14:29 you were able to conclude that one of these units was operating on our soil,
01:14:35 was found near individuals that contracted these illnesses. How were you able to confirm
01:14:42 this unit's proximity to individuals who experienced these injuries? We've used over
01:14:49 the years an amalgamation of data sources from the Russian market of data, which is a unique
01:14:57 phenomenon. We've obtained border crossing data. We've obtained ticketing data, hotel reservation
01:15:06 data, and telephone communication data for essentially 60 members of this unit that we've
01:15:12 identified over the years. Have any of them been apprehended, Mr. Grozev? Several of them have been
01:15:18 indicted. Four of them are, six of them are indicted in Bulgaria over, including the person that we
01:15:25 just referred to, the engineer who discovered the acoustic weapon or delivered it. They're
01:15:32 indicted, but they're obviously hidden, well hidden in Russia and cannot be apprehended.
01:15:36 Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Gentlemen, yields. This now concludes the
01:15:44 questioning portion of the hearing. I'd like to thank the witnesses. I'd like to thank you for
01:15:50 your time, your service, for being able to come here today and share with us, obviously, as my
01:15:56 colleagues on both sides of the aisle have said, the health, the well-being
01:16:00 of all of the service members and government officials, it's very concerning. What we've
01:16:07 heard today is very concerning, and you know, I think as we look at the next steps, I would just
01:16:14 encourage continued communication with this subcommittee, with other subcommittees and
01:16:22 committees that are looking at this as well. The members of the subcommittee may have some
01:16:27 additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to please respond to these in writing.
01:16:32 And pursuant to Committee Rule 7(d), the hearing record will be open for 10 days.
01:16:37 Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.