For educational purposes
The fight at Goose Green in May 1982 was the most famous battle of the Falklands War, which saw British and Argentine troops struggle for control of the Falkland Islands.
In the wake of the shock Argentine invasion, Britain sent a hastily assembled Task Force to the South Atlantic charged with the job of restoring British sovereignty.
The Argentine positions at Goose Green were thought to pose a threat to the British advance across the Islands and troops from the Parachute Regiment were sent to deal with it.
The fight at Goose Green in May 1982 was the most famous battle of the Falklands War, which saw British and Argentine troops struggle for control of the Falkland Islands.
In the wake of the shock Argentine invasion, Britain sent a hastily assembled Task Force to the South Atlantic charged with the job of restoring British sovereignty.
The Argentine positions at Goose Green were thought to pose a threat to the British advance across the Islands and troops from the Parachute Regiment were sent to deal with it.
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LearningTranscript
00:00The fierce battle for Goose Green during the Falklands War of 1982 is perhaps the most
00:09infamous of a brief but bloody conflict that cost more than a thousand lives. Believing
00:16the Argentine force stationed there to be a threat to the British advance, 450 troops
00:21of the Parachute Regiment attacked in the darkness on the 28th of May, and by the 30th
00:27they had overcome a garrison of more than 1,600 Argentines. Victory, however, came at
00:36a cost. At home, Britons watched the moving scenes on their TV sets as two para buried
00:42its dead, and the first stories of the heroism of Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding
00:48officer who won a posthumous Victoria Cross, filtered through. In just a few short hours,
01:02Goose Green had taken its place in British military history.
01:48In May 1982, the British Army fought its first set-piece land battle since the Korean War some
02:0230 years earlier. It was also the largest engagement it had fought in the Southern
02:07Hemisphere since the Boer War in South Africa at the turn of the century. Hardly a lucky omen.
02:13The unit that was given this dubious honour was the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment,
02:212 Para. They, like everyone else, had been stunned by the sudden Argentine invasion of
02:30the Falkland Islands on the 2nd of April 1982. Almost incredibly, a speedily assembled British
02:40military task force left for the South Atlantic just three days later. Its mission? To recover
02:47the Falklands and restore them to British sovereignty. Argentina had a long-standing
02:55claim over the islands they knew as the Malvinas. The decision to seize them was made by a desperate
03:01government, unpopular with the people and the military. This was, it believed, the one issue
03:07on which the country was united, and little thought was given to what the British reaction
03:12might be. While the USA tried to broker a peace agreement, Margaret Thatcher's government gambled
03:19all on the determination and professionalism of the country's armed forces. One of the most
03:25experienced units was 2 Para, which had recently seen active service in Northern Ireland and had
03:31acquired a charismatic commander in the person of Colonel H. Jones. When Colonel H. Jones took
03:40command of the 2nd Parachute Battalion in April 1981, he was inheriting a unit that hadn't really
03:48seen an awful lot of high-intensity conflict in recent years. Largely because of their deployment
03:55to Northern Ireland, they'd actually become out on a limb, a battalion without really having a role.
04:01They had rifle companies that were hired out to other units. They lost the cohesion that's so
04:06important for infantry units. When they came back to Britain, therefore, it was absolutely crucial
04:11when Colonel H. took command that he reorganised the unit, he found out what the strengths and
04:17weaknesses of his battalion were. Jones was driven, highly focused, highly intelligent, didn't suffer
04:25fools gladly, didn't suffer people who disagreed with him gladly. He was an officer who couldn't
04:34help but inject himself into every aspect of battalion life and people commented that he
04:41put his mark on the battalion. It was certainly his battalion. Recalled from leave to barracks in
04:50Aldershot in early April 1982, two paras sailed south aboard the MV Norland. The voyage to the
04:57South Atlantic took four weeks and upon its arrival the battalion joined the remainder of
05:03the task force as it regrouped and reorganised at Ascension Ireland. Four weeks at sea must have
05:09seemed a lifetime for soldiers who are accustomed to hard physical exercises in open spaces, but two
05:15para made the best of their lot, maintaining their fitness while undergoing thorough weapons and
05:20first aid training. It wasn't a pleasure cruise by any stretch of the imagination. It was a very
05:28demanding routine of physical fitness, of exercises, of competitions, weapon training competitions, in a
05:38very restricted space. They had to do what they could around the deck of the boat, running first
05:44in plimsolls so that the deck didn't actually make too much noise for the for the naval officers
05:51that were on board. Then they marched in their boots, they did a lot of running, a lot of physical
05:56exercise to keep them in trim and the long voyage down south could have actually taken the edge off
06:01that and that fitness was going to be absolutely crucial to them in the actual Falkland Islands
06:05battles themselves. By mid-May the Falklands War was not going all Britain's way. Although the Royal
06:19Navy had controversially sunk the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, Britain had lost a number of
06:24ships to daring attacks by the underrated Argentine Air Force. The overriding concern of Margaret
06:31Thatcher and her War Cabinet was to maintain national unity and international support for
06:36Britain's actions and to achieve these aims an early and conspicuous military success was going
06:42to be critically important. For the task force the pressure was on. Having waded through three feet of
06:51freezing water, two para came ashore on Blue Beach on the Falkland Islands at 7.15 a.m. on the 21st
06:59of May 1982 and moved to the area around San Carlos settlement. There they regrouped and moved
07:06south to Sussex Mountain leaving logistic support back closer to the beach. This was the late autumn
07:14in the Falklands when temperatures are always around freezing and the driving rain seems to
07:18penetrate every fibre. Sussex Mountain was a very exposed position some 800 feet above sea level and
07:26two para were actually given a very good task for a battalion to be given very early in the battle
07:33to get up there and actually protect the important landing beach of San Carlos. It was a real feather
07:39in Colonel H's cap to actually be given that task but when they got there they were exhausted and
07:45they really found what the conditions in the Falklands would be like. Sussex Mountain's 800
07:49feet high. Now 800 feet doesn't sound very high but in the Falklands 800 feet will actually place
07:56you in the direct path of the wind coming from Antarctica and at night that wind is cold. They
08:02tried to dig in on the summit of Sussex Mountain and they discovered that after the first couple
08:07of spadefuls of peat had been removed the hole they were digging very rapidly filled of water.
08:11They had become wet when they landed and some of them were to stay wet for the rest of their
08:17times in the Falklands and Jones knew that the longer they stayed up there the worse his
08:24fighting efficiency would become. He was desperately anxious to get them into action
08:29and the Paras were equally anxious. Two Para had been placed under the overall command of
08:37three Commando Brigade Royal Marines led by Brigadier Julian Thompson. With the pressure
08:43for action from London growing by the hour it soon became clear that it was two Para which
08:48would fight the first big land battle of the war. The ultimate British objective was always to be
08:56Port Stanley the capital of the Falkland Islands. However almost all of East Falkland and the entire
09:02Argentine garrison lay between the landing beaches at San Carlos and Stanley itself.
09:08The Argentines were well supported by aircraft and artillery while the task force had the major
09:18logistical problem of putting its guns and ammunition ashore and then getting them to
09:22where they were needed. This problem was made worse by the sinking of the container ship Atlantic
09:28Convair on the 25th of May which carried all of the task forces helicopter reinforcements.
09:33Brigadier Thompson wanted time to consolidate his position but the war cabinet in London feared that
09:43any serious delay would hand the initiative to the Argentines. On the 26th of May the decision
09:49was therefore taken to mount an attack upon the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green.
10:04War is a political act and recapturing the Falklands was certainly a political act on
10:12the part of the British government and with the losses to the Royal Navy, a belief, a feeling
10:19that international pressure was growing, that the force had landed but nothing seemed to be
10:26happening, then you had this enormous pressure on Thompson to achieve something. To Brigadier
10:33Thompson the situation seemed very different. His task was to establish his beachhead, to get his
10:39supplies ashore, to make sure that his men had enough supplies in terms of food and in terms of
10:44ammunition to allow them to fight the campaign and to him the objective was absolutely clear.
10:49It was Port Stanley, its harbour and more particularly the vital ground which was the
10:54airfield and the demand that he should attack Darwin and Goose Green seemed to him a totally
10:59unnecessary diversion. The men of Tupara were relieved to be going into action for
11:16they had already lost the equivalent of a platoon to the ravages of frostbite and exposure.
11:20The settlements of Darwin and Goose Green were only ten miles south of Sussex Mountain,
11:29lying on an isthmus which connected the Lofonia part of East Falkland with the main island itself.
11:35And so just after dusk on the 26th of May, the paras laden with heavy kit moved off
11:44the mountain to begin their march across the bumpy, marshy ground. This was yomping,
11:54a term that was made famous by the Falklands campaign and an activity with which the British
11:59infantry were to become very familiar. Colonel H Jones gave the orders for the attack to his
12:07company commanders and battalion specialists late on the 27th of May. Even then he did not
12:13have anywhere near as much information as he would have wished. But to have delayed any longer
12:18would have denied his subordinates the time they needed to brief their own men.
12:22Colonel H Jones and the 2nd Parachute Battalion were not particularly well served in good,
12:30accurate intelligence by their superior headquarters, 3rd Commando Brigade. They
12:35got Max extremely late. There wasn't the aerial reconnaissance photographs that
12:40Colonel H Jones would actually have really liked to have had to plan his assault.
12:44On one hand you had the SAS saying that there didn't seem to be too much there and what appeared
12:53to be there didn't appear to be very good. And on the other hand you had reports that there was
13:00quite sizeable forces. So Jones really was committing himself to a degree to the unknown.
13:082 Para's own reconnaissance patrols had been observing the area for some time and their
13:14information was invaluable in helping the intelligence officer to piece together a
13:18reasonable picture of the Argentine positions. There were known to be elements of the Argentine
13:2412th Regiment occupying the area with a large Air Force detachment of the airstrip. There were
13:30well-prepared positions around all the settlements, the airstrip and on the ground that overlooked
13:35them. There were a number of 35mm and 20mm anti-aircraft cannon which were also murderously
13:43effective when used against troops on the ground. The Argentines also had 155mm artillery and
13:50mortars, which although no one in the task force yet knew it, had much better night vision aids
13:55than their British counterparts. The British troops were also unaware that they were outnumbered by
14:01more than 3 to 1. Argentine strength around the Darwin-Goose Green Peninsula was about 1,200 men,
14:11but an awful lot of those were actually Argentine Air Forcemen who weren't necessarily going to
14:18actually take part in the battle. Bayonet strength, rifle companymen, they amounted to about 554 men,
14:25which was roughly equivalent to the number of attacking two para-soldiers. The difference,
14:31however, with the two para-soldiers and the Argentines is that the two para-soldiers were
14:35extremely well-equipped. They had the best equipment available at that time, they were
14:40highly motivated, highly trained and importantly they were concentrating their effort on the
14:46enemy's positions. They held the initiative. The Argentines demoralised, cold, poor equipment,
14:52poorly led, poorly motivated, held a 20-mile perimeter. They were conscript soldiers. They
14:59didn't know when the enemy was going to attack and potentially that could cause their cohesion
15:04a problem when the assault finally went in. The plan was in six phases. In phase one, C Company,
15:14the patrol company, would recce and protect routes forward and start lines for the three
15:19rifle companies. Phase two would see A and B Companies attacking the first two enemy positions
15:25at Burnside House and Camilla Creek. In phase three, A and D Companies were to take Coronation
15:32Point and secure an area on the west side of the Isthmus. In phase four, B Company would pass
15:38through and take Boca House, with D Company in support. Phase five would see all three rifle
15:45companies push forward towards Darwin and Goose Green, while C Company cleared and secured the
15:50airfield. Phase six would be the final capture of Darwin and Goose Green, with C Company providing
15:59a screen force covering to the south. Jones had to take out a series of positions where he wasn't
16:08quite sure where the enemy actually was, and so he had to plan for this phased day-night attack,
16:17first silent, then noisy, once surprise was lost, and then keep that momentum going down this long
16:28finger of land. The difficulty for him therefore is to keep control of the battle in a way that
16:36he wanted. Therefore he had a sixth phased battle, which to many of his subordinates was far too
16:42complicated, over-complicated in fact. In fact, many of them didn't even understand the very nature
16:49of the plan, but there just wasn't the time to have it explained to them. It was delivered as a
16:53fait accompli, and they just had to deal with it in the best way that they could. Jones was up against
17:00it in terms of time, and he knew it. He put together a plan, but I think in his own mind he knew that
17:10it wasn't going to be as easy as he allowed for. Shortly before the orders were given, Battalion HQ
17:19was given a terrible shock. While listening over the radio to the BBC World Service, the newsreader
17:25announced that a parachute battalion is poised and ready to assault Darwin and Goose Green.
17:31Hardly able to believe his ears, Colonel H Jones exploded with anger and rounded on the BBC's
17:38Robert Fox, who was attached to the battalion, threatening to sue the BBC, Whitehall and the
17:44Prime Minister. How this information came to be broadcast is still a mystery. The Argentines had
17:54indeed monitored the broadcast, just as Jones had feared, but doubtless working on the assumption
17:59that no country would be incompetent enough to announce its army's battle plans to the enemy,
18:04dismissed it as a crude bluff. Colonel Jones and his officers had no way of knowing this,
18:10of course, and Major Chris Keeble, second in command, was all for cancelling the attack.
18:15Chris Keeble's immediate reaction was that the attack should be cancelled. Now, Jones was going
18:23to have none of it, and Chris Keeble recorded that Jones said to him, he said, Chris, he said,
18:29I've waited 20 years for this. I'm not going to wait a minute longer. Now, I think what we have
18:36to remember is that 42-year-old lieutenant colonels commanding their battalions for the first time
18:42generally don't get the chance that Jones was going to have. Every officer dreams of this,
18:48that one day he will command his battalion in battle, and this was Jones's moment,
18:55and he wasn't going to let that moment pass. It wasn't just Jones's emotional state as a
19:0142-year-old battalion commander. Even if his position had been compromised, he was
19:07under orders to launch that attack. He really didn't have the authority to call off the attack.
19:12There was only a relatively small amount of fire support available for the assault. There
19:19were the battalion's mortars, but only three 105mm light guns from 29 Commando Regiment
19:25Royal Artillery. HMS Arrow could give naval gunfire support during the hours of darkness,
19:31but come daylight, she would have to withdraw out of range of the Argentine guns.
19:42The main problem was not the shortage of guns, but the difficulty of getting enough ammunition
19:47to them. Adding to these problems was the fact that guns, and especially mortars,
19:52would have to be dug out of the soft peat after firing a number of rounds. All in all,
19:57the situation was far from ideal. 2 Paras fire support was light because, being a parachute
20:07battalion, they wouldn't expect to have huge amounts of fire support. This isn't a set-piece
20:12battle. This is a battle in which they'd actually landed by beach, along lines of
20:17communication, and they had to deal with that in the way that airborne forces normally do.
20:21They just get on with it and use speed and surprise. However, the amount of fire support
20:26that Colonel H could have had was far less than he actually received. Now, part of that was his
20:30fault. Part of it wasn't. Thompson actually perhaps should have given him some armoured
20:37support. He has chastised himself since 1982 for not providing that. What happened was that there
20:45had been a plan to make a raid on Goose Green, and in a sense, Thompson simply maintained,
20:55with a bit more ammunition, the resources that he had earmarked for the raid. But now,
21:01of course, it was anything but a raid. However, Colonel H also didn't take all of his melans,
21:07didn't take all of his mortars, and also didn't take all of his 105mm light artillery pieces,
21:13largely because he needed to get a move on. He wanted to engage the enemy as quickly as possible.
21:19He had just a few hours during darkness in which to engage the enemy, and he thought that
21:24waiting for more weaponry and then being encumbered on his march towards the enemy
21:29would cause problems that could lead to loss of life. So he decided, and this was probably a wise
21:34decision, to actually limit his firepower and use what surprise he had. Tupara had reorganised to
21:41take account of these limitations by increasing the number of machine guns in both the rifle
21:46companies and the support company. This allowed the support company to provide fire bases to
21:51occupy the Argentines as the rifle companies attacked. But again, the supply of ammunition
21:57would be crucially important. On the 27th of May, the first paratroopers started to move out to
22:10begin phase one of the operation. They moved in silence in order to advance as far as possible
22:16before the element of surprise was lost. By 2 a.m. on the 28th of May, everything was in readiness.
22:24At 2.30, HMS Arrow began to fire upon Argentine positions, and the first assaulting companies
22:34had fixed bayonets and were ready to cross the start line. Phase one of the attack was complete,
22:40and phase two was beginning. A and B companies found the going hard as they traversed streams
22:50and deep ravines. There were also a number of fences which, though not major obstacles in
22:56themselves, served to slow things down. More worryingly, the sound of what seemed to be
23:02troop movement was heard close by, raising the fear that the Argentines had reacted to the BBC's
23:07report and were about to attack two para in the flank. Much to everyone's relief,
23:12the noise was found to be coming from nothing more than a herd of horses.
23:17At 5.45 a.m., A company assaulted Burnside House, having first poured fire into it from machine
23:34guns and 66-mm anti-tank rocket launchers. The Argentine defenders fled, leaving two of their
23:40number dead. Forward-dazed civilians were also found there, taking shelter under a pile of
23:46mattresses. At 7 a.m., B company began its assault. To their surprise, they encountered no barbed wire
23:57obstacles and no minefields. But although the darkness made the going slow, the Argentines
24:03were taken completely by surprise. A trench system was taken by six platoon. Nine Argentines
24:12were killed during the attack and there were no losses to two para. To maintain the momentum of
24:22the attack, B company now pushed on to what had been D company's phase 3 objective. Although they
24:29encountered a number of defensive positions, most had been abandoned. But the company soon
24:34came under fire from the front. Illuminating flares were called for. The Argentine position
24:40was attacked with an M79 grenade launcher and the platoon commander and his party eventually took it.
24:47There's an old saying in the military that plans don't survive first contact and certainly two
24:59para and Colonel H learned that in their advance towards Darwin and Goose Green. He had about 14
25:05hours to advance 14 miles and as soon as he began to advance, he actually recognised the strain on
25:12his troops. That's largely through the terrain and unforeseen factors, the friction of war. For
25:19example, as the troops advanced, they found that a pond that had been relatively shallow in summer
25:26and they'd been told that, had of course in winter filled up and was incredibly deep. And so they
25:31actually had to bypass that, adding time on to their march. He also found that the terrain,
25:37the peat bogs and the tussock grass also meant that they had to approach quite slowly. Also,
25:44it was dark. They were very keen to ensure that they didn't run into other enemy positions that
25:51the intelligence hadn't picked up. And so they were extremely cautious. All of this led to the
25:58second parachute battalion actually making far less progress than Colonel H would have liked
26:03in the time allotted. The dispersion of the Argentine positions meant that the company was
26:11now widely spread apart, making communication difficult. However, though the British had been
26:17shelled, the bombardment had done little real damage. Furthermore, the system of fire support
26:23machine guns was beginning to work. Now it was time for D Company to get into the action and
26:30continue with the plan for phase three of the battle. As D Company advanced, it came under fire
26:38from an Argentine position made up of about six trenches, which were salted with machine gun fire
26:43and phosphorus grenades. The fighting was fierce. D Company lost three men killed, with several more
26:54wounded before the position was finally taken. During the fighting, HMS Arrows gun jammed,
27:01and the Type 21 frigate was unable to continue with her fire support. A number of Argentine
27:09shells landed around British battalion headquarters. Fortunately for everyone,
27:14the softness of the ground reduced the shells impact. And although one landed not far from
27:19the commanding officer and the adjutant, both were unhurt. It was now time for A Company and
27:28their commander, Captain Farrah Hockley, to move on to Coronation Point, its phase three objective.
27:33As A Company moved to contact, Captain Farrah Hockley's main concern was a position which had
27:41been identified by intelligence on Coronation Point. Now, he wasn't to know it wasn't there.
27:47So if you look at A Company's movements, if you look at his dispositions, then what he is doing
27:52is he's actually moving to contact to an Argentine force, which is in fact not there. And it diverts
27:59his intention from the Argentine main line, which was there. Farrah Hockley's concerns about
28:05Coronation Point sucked him onto the low ground, when really a MAP appreciation should have been
28:15ringing serious alarm bells about Darwin Hill and Darwin Ridge, that dominated any approach to Goose Green.
28:25When they actually got there, of course, they found that there was no company there.
28:30They then had to reorientate themselves and then attack towards Darwin Ridge.
28:35Three platoon took up positions to the north of Darwin Bay in order to cover the move around by
28:40the rest of the company. Led by two platoon, the company moved around the side of the bay,
28:46intending to use a gorse-filled gully to move onto the high ground in order to dominate the
28:51area and sweep down into Darwin. Daylight, though, was fast approaching.
29:02By that time, they were already 80 minutes behind schedule. And with the approach of the Parachute
29:09Battalion, the Argentinians had been, with their outposts, had been looking for the attack and had
29:16time to prepare themselves. And they immediately ran into newly prepared enemy positions, which
29:22slowed them even further. Two platoon began to suffer casualties. One platoon then charged into
29:29the gully and also suffered several wounded. Because the British had to fire and fight uphill,
29:35the Argentines had a tremendous advantage, and their troops were no raw conscripts.
29:42These were well-trained, determined soldiers. To add to the difficulties of the British troops,
29:48it was now broad daylight. Any British soldier trying to fight his way out of the gully
29:55soon became a casualty, and the company aid post was rapidly filling with wounded men.
30:01The lack of heavy fire support began to take its toll, and Farrah Hockney was confronted with the
30:07very real possibility of not only being unable to get out of the gully and onto Darwin,
30:11but of the company being unable to survive where it was. Even three platoon on the other side of
30:18the bay was being mortared and was beginning to suffer casualties. B Company had started its attack
30:26on Boca House at the same time as A Company had begun to move on Darwin.
30:32They too were having no easy time of it, and their casualties were starting to mount.
30:40The Argentine trenches and bunkers had been well prepared and would be difficult to overcome.
30:46Several attempts were made to do so, but the Argentine fire was too intense,
30:50and eventually the men of B Company had to withdraw to cover.
30:56Throughout, 2 Para was under constant shell and mortar fire, and this, together with the liberal
31:02use of white phosphorus grenades, had set light to much of the gorse on the battlefield.
31:11The view from a headquarters can often differ significantly from the reality on the ground.
31:17Fighting or grinding infantry engagement can be a very slow business,
31:22more so when the enemy is determined to contest every foot and yard of ground.
31:27It is the ultimate frustration for a commander determined to maintain the momentum and drive on.
31:33This was the case with Colonel H Jones. He was conscious that he was losing darkness,
31:41and once daylight came, if he wasn't up on the Darwin Hill and Darwin Ridge, he was in
31:49difficulty. And I think he became preoccupied with A Company's lack of progress, and quite
31:56naturally went forward to assess what was going on. Now there are, of course, enormous dangers
32:03involved in going forward. One can very quickly begin to suffer from tunnel vision. One begins
32:09to forget that one is a battalion commander, and you concentrate on the problems that are
32:13immediately in front of you. Now it's clear that this happens to Jones, that he begins to
32:18concentrate on the A Company battle for Darwin Hill, and actually the rest of the battalion
32:23becomes something of a distraction to him. Once he got forward, once he got in under that lip
32:33of Darwin Hill, once he could see the problem that A Company faced, he also, by his nature,
32:42could see the solution. And so more and more, as was his nature, he tended to take over.
32:52Colonel Jones ordered Captain Farrah Hockney to advance and occupy a ledge some 60 meters away,
32:58but once they were in position, they came under intense Argentine fire.
33:03The adjutant, the company second in command, and one of the section commanders were killed.
33:08One soldier bleakly observed, if you don't get out now, sir, you ain't getting out.
33:14And Farrah Hockney retreated to the comparative shelter of the position he had left only a short
33:19time before. Meanwhile, Colonel Jones had moved around to the far side of the ledge,
33:27and was determined to attack the Argentines in the flank while the fighting to their front
33:31distracted them. Setting his sights on an Argentine post that had been firing murderously
33:38on A Company, he removed the magazine from his submachine gun, checked it, replaced it,
33:44and charged alone towards the enemy position. Tragically, there was a second Argentine
33:50machine gun post in a hidden position, and the desperate warning shouts of his comrades
33:55came too late. It opened fire, and Jones fell mortally wounded. The message was sent over the
34:04battalion radio, Sunray's down. For his heroic action, Colonel H Jones was later awarded a
34:11posthumous Victoria Cross. It does actually motivate 2 Para, especially on the left flank,
34:24to move again. It also had an incredible effect on the rest of the battalion as well, because it
34:29also made them think, the CO's down, he's been killed by the enemy, we now have got to get to
34:35grips with them, and we've got to finish this battle off. A Company now made one last attack.
34:42This time they broke through the Argentine positions, and it must have come as some relief
34:47to see their enemy begin to surrender. The position was actually broken by some brilliant
34:55work with the Milan. The first time the Milan was fired at an Argentine position, it went over
35:01the top, missed. But then the next two times were direct hits on Argentine positions,
35:09and that discouraged the Argentines. That was the catalyst in not so much allowing the Para's
35:20to fight their way through, but convincing the defenders who could see the impact of one of those
35:29rockets into one of the trenches, that that was in store for them unless they surrendered. And so in
35:38a sense you had a very strong platoon company position who suddenly decided, having been given
35:46a demonstration, to put up the white flag.
35:54Although two Para had been fighting for 10 hours, it was still only halfway down the isthmus.
36:00The battle had to go on. With Colonel Jones gone, Major Chris Keeble, the second in command, took
36:07over. He knew the battle plan intimately. Now he had to make it work. The main task was to get the
36:16attack moving while ensuring that enough ammunition was coming forward, and that casualties were being
36:21evacuated as quickly as possible. The first objective was to take Bocca House. It was decided
36:30that two Para would put in a two-company attack, with extra fire support from machine guns and
36:36wire-guided Milan anti-tank missiles. So once quick orders had been given, and ammunition
36:42redistributed, D Company began its advance across ground that was, for the most part,
36:48hidden from the Argentines.
36:56They decided to actually use the dead ground, the beach that was actually protected by a cliff,
37:03to outflank the position and attack it from the seaward side. While that allowed them to get to
37:09the flank, it didn't overcome the very real problem that the company then faced in getting
37:17from behind that cover provided by that bank on the beach, and then advancing up those six or seven
37:25hundred yards up on top of the ridge itself. So it provided an approach. It didn't guarantee
37:35a solution and a result. That was done by intense machine gun, intense Milan fire.
37:46In quick succession, two Argentine bunkers were destroyed.
37:50It was not long before dozens of white flags of surrender began to appear.
37:56At great speed, D Company came up from the beach, and in order to maintain momentum,
38:01they pushed on to the top of the ridge to occupy positions dominating Goose Green.
38:07Here, it was decided to concentrate on two objectives. The first was the schoolhouse,
38:13which lay on the east shore, some four hundred yards north of Goose Green. The second was the
38:19airfield. Throughout the day, 2 Para's logistic base was working hard to keep the battalion
38:29supplied with ammunition, mainly by helicopter, but also by commandeering any vehicle that could
38:35be begged, borrowed or stolen. The business of evacuating the growing number of 2 Para and
38:42Argentine wounded continued, and they were ferried to what became known as the Red and Green Life
38:47Machine at Ajax Bay. This was a field surgical unit that was given its colourful name because
38:54it comprised both parachute and commando medics. Elsewhere, the battle continued.
39:02C Company began to clear Darwin of Argentine troops. B Company continued down the west side
39:08of the isthmus, while D Company advanced on the airfield, and A Company, still in the gully,
39:15set about reorganising themselves. In a scene that resembled the fighting
39:23during the Great War some 70 years earlier, C Company emerged on the skyline,
39:28advancing on the schoolhouse with bayonets fixed. More men became casualties when the Argentines
39:36turned their deadly anti-aircraft cannon on the British troops as they came forward.
39:42Despite this, C Company, supported by a patrol from D Company,
39:46began to gain the upper hand, and soon white flags of surrender were seen to be flying from
39:51the building. Now, there came one of the most controversial and tragic incidents of the entire
40:01Falklands War. As Lieutenant Jim Barry and two fellow soldiers moved forward to take the surrender
40:08of a group of Argentines, there was a burst of gunfire. Lieutenant Barry and his comrades were
40:15killed. It may have been an honest, dreadful mistake caused by the confusion of battle,
40:21but the British were in no mood to find out or risk any repetition. The schoolhouse was
40:27razed to the ground. There were no Argentine survivors. Inside the building,
40:33there were only piles of charred, twisted corpses.
40:37What happened in the confusion around the schoolhouse is typical of any battle that you care to look at,
40:46and the reality was that at one end of it, you have a platoon commander trying to negotiate a surrender,
40:56while at the other side, totally oblivious to what's going on with the attempt at surrender,
41:05you've got a fight being fought. Now, in this situation, the two mixed.
41:14Because of its nature, war is mistakes, and war is people dying when perhaps, in hindsight,
41:24another situation would have meant they shouldn't have died. And it was true for Goose Green.
41:38Tupara was in the process of regrouping when it came under air attack from the Argentine Air Force.
41:44A Skyhawk jet and a Pucara fighter aircraft were shot down.
41:47Shortly afterwards, three RAF Harrier jets flew in to strike the Argentine positions on the point
41:57near Goose Green. Their cluster bombs caused terrible damage, and perhaps more crucially,
42:03seemed to further weaken the crumbling Argentine morale. Just before dark, a single Pucara aircraft
42:12dropped napalm close to the two parapositions, but it was shot down from the ground by a very
42:18brave lone soldier with a blowpipe missile, and the napalm did little damage.
42:27At last light, a group of Argentine helicopters appeared to be landing reinforcements to the
42:32south of Goose Green, but they were immediately attacked by British artillery fire and quickly
42:38withdrew. Major Keeble was now able to take stock and plan for the next phase of the battle.
42:46His enemy was now hemmed in around Goose Green, but to his consternation, he was informed that
42:51114 innocent civilians held captive by the Argentines were also in the settlement. Keeble's
42:58military options were now limited. Artillery bombardments and airstrikes were clearly out of
43:04the question. Suddenly, it seemed that there was still a long way to go before final victory could
43:11be achieved. That night was cold and miserable, and seemed very long. The British troops were wet
43:23and tired, with the prospect of another hard day's fighting ahead, but with perhaps the
43:28consoling thought that the Argentines in Goose Green would be feeling the same.
43:33The likelihood was, though, that for them, dawn would bring defeat.
43:45Weighing up his options, Major Keeble decided to offer the Argentines the opportunity to surrender.
43:51After first deploying infantry and artillery reinforcements around Goose Green,
43:56he sent two Argentine prisoners into the settlement at 6 a.m. on the 30th of May,
44:02with a message that left the Argentine commander in no doubt as to his position.
44:07Either surrender or accept the consequences of military action.
44:14It can only have come as a relief when the Argentine prisoners returned with the message
44:19that their commander wished to talk.
44:21The meeting took place just after midday in a hut on the airfield. Major Keeble led the British
44:27party, while Air Vice Commodore Wilson Pedroza represented the Argentines.
44:33After some tough talking, the Argentines returned to the settlement.
44:40Tutu Parra thought that they had actually been defeated, because they hadn't actually taken the
44:45objective, but they decided to pretend that they hadn't been defeated.
44:51They decided to pretend that they had won. The Argentines also thought they'd been defeated,
44:58and they decided that the most sensible thing to do was to surrender. And that is the psychological,
45:04the moral domination that Tutu Parra achieved over the Argentine defenders.
45:09Keeble shows his strength. He's a clever man, because it's an exercise in brinkmanship
45:18and diplomacy on the battlefield that works. But by the same token,
45:26he has now been reinforced in terms of ammunition. I think now Thompson realizes how difficult a task
45:34Tutu Parra's was set, and he's got the resources to fight it through to the finish,
45:41if he has to. But he doesn't have to, because they give in.
45:49And at 1.10pm, around 250 members of the Argentine Air Force emerged onto the airfield
45:56and laid down their weapons, followed over the next 40 minutes by more than a thousand soldiers.
46:03The men of Tutu Parra could scarcely believe their eyes. They, of course,
46:08had had no idea as to the true numerical strength of their enemy.
46:12When the surrender started, the soldiers of Tutu Parra were absolutely astounded to see first
46:19tens, twenties, and then hundreds of prisoners coming out from Goose Green. And all of them knew
46:27that if the battle had been fought that day, it would have been a very much bloodier affair
46:32than it actually was.
46:33The civilians that had been held captive were released,
46:36and at 2.50pm, the surrender was formally agreed. It was all over.
46:50What had it all achieved? 50 British troops had been killed or wounded,
46:56while 141 Argentines had become casualties or lost their lives. In this most bitter of wars,
47:03fought in the harshest of conditions, the British task force had fought its first land battle
47:09and had emerged triumphant. It had taken a huge step towards its final objective.
47:15British morale was boosted, while the Argentines had suffered a devastating,
47:19demoralizing defeat.
47:21The importance of Darwin-Goose Green is to be seen at so many different levels.
47:27At the strategic level, it was absolutely crucial for the politicians, for the civilians,
47:32for the Prime Minister, for the War Cabinet, to have something to actually suggest that the
47:38British Army, and especially the Parachute Regiment, was getting on with the job.
47:42A morale-boosting campaign.
47:45The British Army, and especially the Parachute Regiment,
47:48was getting on with the job. A morale-boosting battle victory.
47:52It's the turning point in the Battle of the Falklands, because up until now,
47:59in terms of public perception, everything was going wrong. Ships were being lost,
48:05there didn't seem to be any progress ashore, and now suddenly this victory, which seemed to be
48:13a victory against the odds. Up until Darwin-Goose Green, the British knew they had to win,
48:18but they weren't quite sure how they were going to win. Now they knew how they were going to win.
48:25Private Dixon, from Three Commando Brigade Air Squadron.