For educational purposes
He was considered Hitler's most capable strategist, to the allies the most dangerous opponent.
His career is typical for most of the conservative Prussian generals who took a reserved view of National Socialism and, nevertheless, as willing tools, executed Hitler's merciless war.
Erich von Manstein developed the plan of operations for the French campaign in 1940 and thus established his reputation as an operations genius.
Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein was the architect of the defeat of France in 1940, the greatest triumph in German military history.
On military questions Manstein vigorously contradicted the Fuhrer, who suspected his politics and finally dismissed him.
He was considered Hitler's most capable strategist, to the allies the most dangerous opponent.
His career is typical for most of the conservative Prussian generals who took a reserved view of National Socialism and, nevertheless, as willing tools, executed Hitler's merciless war.
Erich von Manstein developed the plan of operations for the French campaign in 1940 and thus established his reputation as an operations genius.
Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein was the architect of the defeat of France in 1940, the greatest triumph in German military history.
On military questions Manstein vigorously contradicted the Fuhrer, who suspected his politics and finally dismissed him.
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LearningTranscript
00:00They used to call it the art of warfare, war as a game of strategy.
00:10Certain moves can be considered brilliant, like the French campaign, his greatest triumph.
00:19Some moves required brute force, such as the conquest of the Crimea and Sevastopol, the
00:26world's strongest fortress.
00:30My most able general, said Hitler, our most dangerous opponent, said the Allies.
00:38A Prussian field marshal obsessed with duty, discerning, obedient.
00:46Why wage war for a criminal?
00:49Why obedience to the very end?
01:19The battle of arguments, two unequal partners at a map table, the Commander-in-Chief of
01:49the Allies, the strategist on his skill.
02:17Wittgenstein believed he was serving Germany by waging Hitler's war, and by prolonging
02:22it.
02:23He didn't want to see the crimes.
02:45That he was never prepared to do.
02:48The embodiment of hope for the resistance was a prisoner of his obedience.
02:52Manstein was not a Nazi, anything other than a Nazi, and there were insurmountable contradictions
03:00between Hitler and Manstein on both sides, but according to tradition and education he
03:07believed he had to do his duty.
03:09This can be judged, this can be said to be a failure, or one can have an understanding
03:16of history.
03:37Even as a child, Erich von Lewinsky dreamt of becoming a soldier.
03:41It was my inheritance, he said.
03:45He was adopted by the von Mansteins, and brought up in the tradition of the Prussian
03:49officer's corps.
03:52Like his forebears, he wished to serve the emperor and the fatherland.
03:58His life as a soldier began at cadet school in Berlin-Lichterfelde.
04:03Their drill was founded on the principles of obedience, comradeship, beauty.
04:13At the wedding of Crown Prince Wilhelm, Cadet Manstein was among the party.
04:21As pageboy to a Russian grand duchess, later to be an enemy, when his emperor led the empire
04:28to war, Lieutenant Manstein had to break off his training.
04:32He was glad to get to the front.
04:36A talented staff officer, he was wounded in close combat and shattered by the defeat.
04:42He was lucky to have survived.
04:48Republic for Manstein, the word meant chaos.
04:52He was taken on by the new Reichswehr, one of only 100,000 men who dreamt of a new strength,
04:58who despised democracy, yet thought themselves non-political.
05:01Or self-deception.
05:30Defeating politics is also a political stance.
05:33Party bickering at the Reichstag disgusts me, said Manstein.
05:51The new government was legitimate, technically, and, like Manstein, against democrats.
06:14Hitler's rise to power was no bad thing in Manstein's eyes.
06:20He abhorred the brownshirt mob.
06:23Though he hoped for a strong army, but when Jews were no longer allowed to serve, only
06:28one man protested.
06:30His first disagreement with those in high places.
06:57He wrote to his superior, that we unreservedly agree with the ideas on race and national
07:03socialisms beyond doubt.
07:05But the soldier's honour must not be forgotten.
07:10Is this already a form of resistance?
07:12The protest fizzles out.
07:15He is closer to the Reich president, an uncle by marriage, than he is to Hitler.
07:20But after Hindenburg's death, the former Lance corporal rules alone.
07:25He has already stripped the SA of its power.
07:28The army now swears allegiance to him personally.
07:32Manstein serves the Fuhrer as he once did the emperor, unconditionally, loyally.
07:38But also as a career move.
07:40Hitler needs experts for his wars.
07:44Men like Manstein.
07:45He's considered a brilliant strategist.
07:48He is promoted as rearmament begins.
07:51The major general is not very popular with other officers.
07:55He assumes he knows better, and is usually right.
08:00A man with a future ambitious.
08:03A new Moltke?
08:07In Berlin, he already saw himself as the up-and-coming chief of staff.
08:11A house of his own, a staff car, a golden future.
08:17Only scandal could halt his rapid rise.
08:21Werner von Fritsch, the army's commander-in-chief,
08:23was falsely accused of homosexual offences and dismissed.
08:27His closest colleague went with him, Erich von Manstein.
08:32The fall of an idol, it came as a shock.
08:51He didn't talk to us about it, and we were very unhappy afterwards.
08:55He immediately sold our beautiful Berlin house,
08:59because he said he would never return to Berlin.
09:20Things like him were hard to do without.
09:24March 1938.
09:25The Wehrmacht marches into Austria.
09:28Manstein had developed the plans.
09:33Entry into the Sudetenland.
09:35As chief of staff of an army, he contributed to Hitler's triumph.
09:41The invasion of Poland, a leap forward in Manstein's career.
09:46Chief of staff of an army group.
09:50The Blitzkrieg, also his achievement.
09:57During the victory parade in Warsaw,
09:59he stands before Hitler in the front row.
10:08France, the next target.
10:10Hitler wanted to attack as soon as possible.
10:14His tactics resembled the Schlieffen plan, which had failed previously.
10:20The original plan was that the German army,
10:27with a strong right wing,
10:30as was the case in 1914,
10:33through Holland and Belgium,
10:35Holland was still there,
10:37in the First World War Holland was excluded,
10:40should advance in the direction of Paris.
10:47But Hitler was dissatisfied with his general strategies.
10:50What about the element of surprise?
10:52Manstein asked himself the same question.
10:56At the Electors' Castle in Koblenz,
10:58the chief of staff of Army Group A devised the counter-strategy,
11:02which made him famous.
11:05In seven memoranda to the upper echelons,
11:07he pointed out the advantages of his plan.
11:13But the top brass procrastinated.
11:15They considered Manstein's strategies too risky.
11:20The troublemaker on his way up was transferred again to Stettin,
11:24then in eastern Prussia.
11:26But his strategy could not be buried.
11:29Hitler's chief adjutant heard of it
11:31and summoned Manstein to the new Reich Chancellery.
11:39February the 17th, 1940.
11:42Manstein explained to Hitler how France could be deceived and conquered.
11:47Powerful tank divisions of Army Group A
11:49would advance where the enemy least expected them.
11:52A lightning offensive through the Ardennes.
12:00The area was considered tank-proof and was barely fortified.
12:03Simultaneously, Army Group B would attack Holland and Belgium,
12:07provoking a counter-offensive by the Allied troops.
12:13Then the trap would shut and the enemy's retreat would be cut off
12:18by a rapid advance to the Channel Coast,
12:22like the cut of the scythe across France.
12:26The concept of Blitzkrieg.
12:29It was a very difficult plan.
12:31It was a plan with a relatively high risk.
12:35On the other hand, it had a decisive advantage,
12:39and that was always the decisive moment in the war, the surprise.
12:44Hitler was immediately convinced.
12:46An offensive exactly as he'd imagined it.
12:49But, as Manstein noted in his diary...
12:52The genius lacked a complementary figure of a general
12:55who was truly trained in strategy and also passionate for victory.
13:00Hitler was not quite so flattering about Manstein.
13:03He's certainly a clever fellow, but I don't trust him.
13:08May the 10th, 1940.
13:12The sideline strategist notes in his diary...
13:14Start of the offensive in the west.
13:18I am sitting at home.
13:22But after a few days, it became clear that the strategy was working.
13:25Its creator soon became famous.
13:28It gradually became known that this reorganisation
13:33and also the strategic planning
13:35essentially went back to one person,
13:39the then head of the staff of an army group,
13:43General von Manstein.
13:45The tanks advance against scant resistance to the French coast.
13:48Manstein leads only one army corps.
13:51Then, the surprise.
13:54Hitler halts the advance.
13:55The defeated British army manages to flee across the channel at Dunkirk.
14:00Manstein had wanted a decisive result.
14:04Later, he called it a lost victory.
14:09Paris in German hands.
14:11Manstein's plan had made it possible.
14:14The upper command of the Wehrmacht is well known.
14:17The complete collapse of the entire French front...
14:22Hitler called this victory the most beautiful moment of his life.
14:26And Manstein's role?
14:28Rather insignificant, said Hitler.
14:30Of all the generals with whom I discussed the plan,
14:33Manstein was the only one who understood what I meant.
14:38Of course, he saw it as his greatest achievement at the time.
14:42We at home knew that it came from him.
14:45And of course, he wasn't very happy
14:48that everyone else,
14:51except Hitler,
14:53were now reclaiming the plan for themselves
14:55and that Hitler was selling it
14:59as his ingenious idea and deed.
15:07From France to Russia, Operation Barbarossa.
15:11The war took on a new dimension.
15:13The army's instruction, annihilation.
15:17Manstein now commanded a tank corps.
15:19He maintained that he did not pass on the commissar decree.
15:25Shooting prisoners, he said, would be unsoldiery.
15:30He refused to see how criminal the war really was.
15:35A quick thrust.
15:37This was how he made himself eligible for higher duties.
15:40He was given his own army and a new task.
15:45It said that Devastopol had to be conquered by Christmas.
15:52And our division
15:56had pushed back.
15:57We wanted to give the Fuhrer a Christmas present.
16:01The war had become that absurd.
16:06Crimea was designated as a settlement area
16:09for South Tyrolians.
16:11Hitler was already calling Sevastopol
16:13Theodrichhafen,
16:15Manstein's battle of logistics.
16:17He was a strategist.
16:18I would say,
16:19he was the kind of soldier
16:20who would use men as chess pieces
16:23on the board.
16:26He might have been very good at it,
16:28I admit.
16:29But, from a human point of view,
16:32it meant nothing to him.
16:35A murderous battle against the Red Army
16:38and the Partisans.
16:39A war of annihilation.
16:43Manstein was caught up in it.
16:46He issued these orders.
16:48The Jewish-Bolshevist system has to be exterminated.
16:52Harsh revenge on Jewry is a necessity.
16:57An executioner?
17:04What was Manstein?
17:07Anti-Semitic?
17:09Opportunistic?
17:11Or merely ambitious?
17:13It was by the same orders
17:15that Manstein forbade his soldiers
17:17cruelty, individualism, slovenliness.
17:21The illusion of a fair war.
17:24And the reality in the East.
17:30December 41.
17:32The attack on Sevastopol.
17:34Hitler's Christmas gift.
17:36Manstein intended to take the fortress within 11 days.
17:39The first attack, a disaster.
18:06Crimea was a theatre of war and murder.
18:10Behind the lines, the Einsatzgruppen
18:12had murdered 90,000 people
18:14since the beginning of the war.
18:15Jews, communists, gypsies.
18:18Manstein claimed ignorance of it.
18:37..the population of the occupied territories in the East
18:41and that they were working
18:43under special instructions and under the responsibility of Himmler.
18:48Was that all?
18:50A captain en route to Manstein's headquarters
18:53saw what the Einsatzgruppen were really doing.
18:57The scene of the crime.
19:06MAN SPEAKS GERMAN
19:18Manstein replies to his counsel at the Nuremberg trials.
19:22MAN SPEAKS GERMAN
19:36MAN SPEAKS GERMAN
20:06MAN SPEAKS GERMAN
20:15He was only interested in the front
20:17and what he suppressed, others should not learn.
20:21MAN SPEAKS GERMAN
20:36MAN SPEAKS GERMAN
20:43The second assault on Sevastopol, May 42.
20:47Before it was stormed, the fortress was softened up
20:50by a rail-mounted cannon called Dora.
21:00After an epic siege and 42 days of bitter fighting, the city fell.
21:06Hitler's Christmas gift.
21:0910,000 soldiers had to pay for it with their lives.
21:15The feeling of victory on a battlefield, said Manstein,
21:18is an extraordinary experience.
21:20For July 1st, 1942, his diary says...
21:24Very thankful to God and all those who have shed blood for this victory.
21:30The cult of victory.
21:32Hitler struck a new medal, the Crimean shield,
21:35and bestowed the Marshal's baton on Manstein, who said he had earned it.
21:41The family guards the relic to this day at a safe location.
21:46Whether I have now fulfilled my ambition, he wrote to his wife,
21:50I do not know.
21:53Congratulations at the Fuhrer's HQ.
21:56Hitler now saw his Field Marshal
21:58as a miracle weapon for the Eastern Front.
22:02Where all else had failed,
22:04Manstein was to bring Leningrad to its knees.
22:08He sees his son Gero one more time.
22:10A few days later, his son is dead, killed at the front.
22:15There was no time for grief.
22:17Hitler dispatches him to the next crisis.
22:19The Sixth Army, encircled at Stalingrad.
22:22The strategist is expected to salvage what can be salvaged.
22:26He has hardly any troops, yet he is optimistic.
22:31The soldiers of the Sixth Army are pinning their hopes on him.
22:34He sends them a message.
22:38I have a message for you.
22:40We will do everything to get you out.
23:10Manstein knew that the Sixth Army could not be supplied from the air.
23:15Yet, like Hitler, he believed they should hold out.
23:19At first, he wanted to assemble enough troops.
23:22Then he, too, supported a breakout.
23:26But he did not want to issue the order himself, nor could he.
23:40He did not want to issue the order.
23:45Manstein urged his commander to authorize the breakout.
23:48Hitler demanded that they stand fast at any price.
23:52He was dreaming of the oil fields in the Caucasus,
23:55and a thrust by Manstein as far as India.
23:58But Manstein said the fate of the Sixth Army was at stake.
24:02They had to break out immediately.
24:06November 26, 1942.
24:09Manstein writes in his diary,
24:11Rejected by the Fuhrer.
24:18There was one last hope.
24:20A rescue operation.
24:22General Hoth was to fight his way through to the encircled army with three divisions.
24:31Operation Wintergale.
24:33The aim, to make a breach.
24:36Manstein noted, Operation Thunder may have to follow immediately.
24:40Thunder meant breaking out of the encirclement.
25:06Hoth's tanks came within 48 kilometers of Stalingrad.
25:11Then, a new crisis.
25:13The collapse of an Italian army destabilized the southern front.
25:17Manstein had to fill these gaps, so he broke off the attack.
25:36For the encircled army, soon there was no hope left.
25:42Manstein put on a brave front.
25:53That was January the 3rd.
25:55Officers like Bismarck were still being flown in to the encircled army.
25:59He had just overheard Manstein phoning the high command in Berlin.
26:04He said, very clearly, or soberly,
26:07the World War II liberator should not transmit his experience of Verdun.
26:12What the people are going through here is considerably more.
26:17And that goes to the limit of possibilities.
26:21The 6th Army was expected to tie up Russian troops, not surrender.
26:25A 6th Army captain described the tragedy to Manstein.
26:43Manstein believed that he'd done his best for the 6th Army.
26:46The encircled men saw it differently.
26:49The weakness was that he hadn't said enough to Hitler.
26:53Up to this point, and no further.
26:55You can't step back.
26:57And if necessary, you can be sentenced to death,
27:00if you are so convinced that this is the case.
27:03And he was convinced that this decision to leave Stalingrad there was wrong.
27:14It is possible that it would have cost him his head.
27:19But that's not the point.
27:21In Stalingrad there were over 300,000 soldiers,
27:25of whom 6,000 had come home from captivity.
27:30He had to know that. He had to see that.
27:49One of these men was Manstein, Hitler's most able general.
27:53He could lead the Wehrmacht toward resistance.
27:56Don Army Group HQ, end of January 1943.
28:00Stauffenberg tried to gain Manstein's support for the coup d'etat.
28:04A frank discussion behind closed doors.
28:08I can only say that Stauffenberg was very disappointed to return,
28:15because he didn't get Manstein's approval.
28:19Manstein gave him the reason.
28:22He said that a troop leader in his position
28:28can't ask the troops to refuse an order,
28:36because that would lead to a total collapse of the front.
28:42And Manstein added, it was too soon.
28:45The people were not ready.
28:47It was also too late, since the Western Allies had already asked
28:51for unconditional surrender in Casablanca.
28:56While at Manstein's headquarters, Stauffenberg said to an officer,
29:02You all have the knowledge, but only a few are ready to act.
29:12Caught between duty and resistance, Manstein chose obedience.
29:17He told someone who had chosen resistance,
29:20Prussian field marshals do not mutiny.
29:23Prussian field marshals must mutiny if it is necessary.
29:26That's why they are field marshals.
29:28They don't have to mutiny.
29:34What is he supposed to do?
29:36Please tell me. No one has ever been able to say that.
29:39What is Manstein supposed to do?
29:41What is he supposed to do?
29:43He can't march to Berlin with his Beereskope.
29:49He should have made himself available.
29:52He shouldn't have had to take the gun against Hitler.
29:56He should have been there when something happened.
29:59But he definitely should have been there as a figure.
30:26At the map table, as so often, opinions differed.
30:31Conflict points were always those, because Manstein had ideas.
30:36Of course, they often moved backwards.
30:39Because if I want to save people and have success,
30:43then I have to move back and forth.
30:45And there was always doubt.
30:47Because Hitler often said, we don't want to talk about it.
30:50It was very clear that he cut off the word.
30:53Hitler forbade retreat, but Manstein wanted room to manoeuvre.
31:24He gradually realised that the war could not be won with this Fuhrer,
31:29which he wanted to win, if only to satisfy his ambition.
31:33He wanted to retreat from conquered territory,
31:36lure the enemy in and then attack their flank.
31:39Hitler rejected this strategy.
31:41But then he experienced that the war could not be won.
31:45The war could not be won.
31:47The war could not be won.
31:49The war could not be won.
31:52But then he experienced that up to 30, 40 km,
31:56the Russian tank battalion Hockerth was approaching,
31:58and he would immediately run away.
32:00And then there comes a time,
32:02and this is the time of this operation,
32:04of a few days, a week, I don't remember exactly,
32:08when Hitler actually said nothing.
32:12The only time when Manstein had completely free hand.
32:22Like a chess player castling, he shifted his troops and counterattacked.
32:26To have stabilised the Eastern Front after Stalingrad,
32:29Manstein considered it his greatest achievement.
32:39The success strengthened a fatal belief
32:42that this war was far from lost.
32:45He must have been a bit optimistic.
32:49I don't want to believe that in his heart
32:53he was already convinced of a failure.
32:57According to the attitude he had,
33:00he was of the opinion that with motivation
33:04and with the right, timely intervention,
33:10he could still conjure up a remedy.
33:16That was an illusion, with or without Hitler.
33:20He would never again give Manstein a free hand.
33:23It was his war. He decided the strategy.
33:26Manstein obeyed.
33:28Hitler planned to weaken Stalin's army crucially in a huge tank battle.
33:32The date for the attack was changed again and again.
33:36He was very angry and said
33:40that every day we were late would question our success.
34:06The Kursk began with a delay.
34:10Manstein's army group carried out the main thrust.
34:13He was certain of victory.
34:15But the Soviets were ready for them.
34:17Operation Citadel failed.
34:19Was it Manstein's fault?
34:36We had the impression that it would go well.
34:40Manstein said it would go well.
35:06Before they could even begin to say anything,
35:10Hitler said,
35:12Gentlemen, I know exactly what you want from me.
35:16I'm not going to talk about it.
35:18Field Marshal von Manstein,
35:20begin to explain to me the situation of your army group at the front.
35:36Hitler remained obstinate.
35:38Between the lance corporal and his field marshal,
35:41the atmosphere grew increasingly chilly.
35:58Hitler didn't want to know about the enormous losses.
36:06Often he said,
36:08when he had closed the door,
36:10he said, my God, is that an idiot?
36:16I have often experienced, of course,
36:18that he also hit Hitler with his hand on the table
36:21and said, that's how it's done.
36:23In the end, Hitler mostly repeated what he wanted,
36:26because he was never sure that it would happen.
36:29But he could always be sure of Manstein.
36:33In the end, Manstein,
36:35as he normally was to a Prussian officer,
36:38because he always considered himself to be one,
36:41fulfilled his mission.
37:03His slogan was still,
37:05a war is only lost when you think it is.
37:13The dying went on.
37:17Hitler mistrusted his generals,
37:19especially Manstein,
37:21who argued and wanted too much power at the front.
37:26A time cover inflamed Hitler's suspicion.
37:30Goebbels called the Prussian Manstein,
37:32Marshal Retreat.
37:34He was not a Nazi, he could not be trusted.
37:37As yet, Hitler couldn't do without his most able general.
37:43March 44, the conflict escalated.
37:46Once again, a whole army was encircled.
37:49Once again, Hitler demanded they stand fast.
37:53Manstein insisted on breaking out,
37:55threatening to resign.
37:57Hitler gave in at the very last moment.
38:00The army barely got away.
38:02His last lost victory.
38:08Six days later, Manstein was summoned to see Hitler.
38:15His army group already knew about it.
38:18He would be asked to take leave to recover his health.
38:22March 31, 1944.
38:24The Obersalzberg.
38:26The final act.
38:28Hitler explained that everything depended on rigidly holding out.
38:33He probably praised him
38:35in relation to his strategic capabilities
38:38in attack operations,
38:40but he said,
38:42I can't use them in the south now,
38:45and Field Marshal Model will take over.
38:49Manstein replied,
38:51my Führer,
38:53you may take it from me
38:55that I use all the strategic means available to me
38:59to defend the ground
39:01where my son is buried.
39:05Hitler pretended that he still had full control over his army.
39:11He was the only one
39:13who could control the situation.
39:17Hitler pretended that he still had full confidence in Manstein
39:21and promised he would see action again later.
39:24But the fact remained
39:26that Manstein had been dismissed.
39:30A Field Marshal who no longer had a task.
39:33While Hitler wanted to hold his fronts
39:35in order to continue the war of annihilation behind them,
39:38Manstein lived in the illusion
39:40that his warlord could not do without him.
39:44Even as the front collapsed.
39:49In the west
39:51and in the east.
39:56He drove to the Army High Command in Zossen
39:59hoping to lead at least a battalion,
40:02but he was no longer wanted.
40:06At the end,
40:08the Field Marshal was put in prison.
40:11As a war criminal.
40:16In Hamburg in 1949,
40:18Manstein was the last general
40:20to face a British military court.
40:22The charges?
40:24Crimes committed in Poland and the Soviet Union.
40:27He didn't feel in the least guilty.
40:29He was concerned with more than his own fate.
40:32To him,
40:34he was not only defending himself,
40:36which of course is how you have to do,
40:40but he was fighting,
40:42I'm sure,
40:44for the honour of the German Army.
40:47The sentence?
40:4818 years in prison.
40:50After some protest, also by Churchill,
40:52he was granted early release in 1953.
40:55It had been decided that a new army was needed.
40:58Manstein was ready.
41:10Manstein was convinced
41:12that he had to be held accountable
41:15by advising and helping
41:18the re-establishment of new forces.
41:26Manstein unambiguously advocated conscription.
41:29The judgement about him remains ambiguous.
41:34I admire Manstein
41:37more than the greatest German strategist
41:40that the Wehrmacht ever had.
41:42He was a graceful expert,
41:44with a sharp mind.
41:46He was an excellent speaker,
41:48he could convince you.
41:52He was a musician,
41:54not a commissar at all.
41:56Quite the opposite of a commissar.
41:58He had a very strict self-discipline.
42:01He was a good chess player.
42:03I have to accuse him
42:06of not trying to end the war
42:08at the same time as the other commanders.
42:14A military genius,
42:16but a moral failure.
42:36To be continued
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