Air.Disasters.S17E01.Holding.Pattern
Air.Disasters.S17E01.Holding.Pattern
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00:00No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
00:12Security footage of fly Dubai flight 981 captures its final moments.
00:18I was diving hard.
00:20The level of violence to the impact was catastrophic.
00:2362 people are killed in the fatal dive.
00:27As we soon discover, the pilots had aborted two landings.
00:32We're going around.
00:33A go-around is done just when conditions are not perfect.
00:36Did they say why they were going around a second time?
00:39They just said going around.
00:41Check your speed.
00:44The next thing I knew, the plane was diving towards the runway.
00:48Investigators needed to find out how the two go-arounds were different.
00:52One turns to disaster.
00:54Why?
00:55I don't know.
01:22Fly Dubai flight 981 closes in on Rostov-on-Don International Airport in southwest Russia.
01:32Rostov Tower, SkyDubai, 981, we're at 2,600 feet.
01:362,300 feet is our next target altitude.
01:41Eleven miles out, Captain Aristo Sokratos and First Officer Alejandro Olava Cruz prepare
01:47the Boeing 737-800 for touchdown.
01:53Both pilots had a pretty good amount of flying hours in the 737 specifically.
01:58These were experienced pilots.
02:00Flight 981, Rostov Tower.
02:05Wind 240 degrees, gusts 30 knots.
02:08You're cleared to land on runway 22.
02:12The controller reports the weather conditions at the airport.
02:17Thick clouds cover Rostov-on-Don.
02:20High winds are battering the runways.
02:23The weather in Rostov at that time was pretty low cloud with wind gusts.
02:31It was typical for that time of year for Rostov.
02:35If you look at the geography with the sea and the hills around it, then yes, you can
02:41expect some challenges.
02:43FlyDubai flight 981 departed Dubai International Airport at 10.37 p.m.
02:50It's a four-hour flight northwest to Rostov-on-Don.
02:55It's a bumpy ride for the 55 passengers on board.
03:00The flight is expected to land in minutes.
03:04150 knots.
03:08Eight miles out, the pilots reduce speed as they begin the final descent.
03:15On approach, pilots know exactly what the airplane is doing, they know the conditions
03:18that they're flying in.
03:19Flaps 30.
03:20Flaps 30.
03:21They're going to drop the flaps bit by bit when they drop their landing gear.
03:28It's a very gradual process.
03:31It should be a bit bumpy and then later should be calm.
03:34The pilots expect turbulence on approach, but anticipate a smooth landing.
03:42The runway is just four miles away, but there's a threat ahead.
03:47Go around, wind shear ahead.
03:50The onboard radar has detected dangerous winds.
03:54Wind shear ahead.
03:58Wind shear is a rapid change in direction and speed of wind.
04:03If a pilot experiences a strong headwind that suddenly changes to a tailwind, the aircraft
04:09might not have enough lift to remain airborne, especially at low altitude.
04:14The wind shear alert is built into the aircraft's avionics to tell you you're going into wind
04:19currents that could be problematic.
04:22Wind shear ahead.
04:23Wind shear, go around.
04:26Just 1,000 feet above the ground, landing at Rostov-on-Don becomes too risky.
04:34Rostov Tower, this is Niner Eight One.
04:37We're conducting a go around due to wind shear.
04:40The pilots abort their approach.
04:44Every pilot is prepared to make a go around on every approach.
04:49It's something that pilots do off the top of their heads.
04:52There's no manual involved.
04:55They have no limit to the amount of approaches that they can try as long as they have enough
04:58fuel.
04:59So why not go around and just try it again?
05:02Flight Niner Eight One, copy.
05:06Flight Nine Eight One is one of four incoming flights controllers are managing as high winds
05:11delay landings.
05:14Aeroflot 1166, be advised, Sky Dubai Niner Eight One reports wind shear on landing.
05:21The air traffic controller's workload was definitely increased in this environment and
05:24they have to start juggling all those cards in the air.
05:28As Flight Nine Eight One climbs.
05:32Aeroflot 1166, you're cleared to land on runway two two.
05:37An Aeroflot flight prepares to land.
05:44Captain Sokratos pays close attention to its communications.
05:48I want to see what this guy will do.
05:51The crew at this point is hoping that the crews of other flights are able to give them
05:55some information that they might be able to use to make some decisions about what to do
05:58next.
06:01That flight can't land at Rostov-on-Don either.
06:05Aeroflot 1166, we're going around due to wind shear.
06:11The Aeroflot pilots also encounter wind shear on final approach.
06:15They're forced to abort.
06:18That kind of seals the deal.
06:20Sky Dubai is going to have to either wait or they're going to have to go to an alternate
06:23airport.
06:25High over Rostov-on-Don, passengers on Flight Nine Eight One are restless.
06:33The pilots are holding at 15,000 feet, circling near the airport, waiting for a chance to
06:38land.
06:41The pilots sit in a holding pattern since they had enough fuel to be able to do so,
06:44to wait for weather conditions to improve.
06:47The other planes are also in a holding pattern.
06:51The storm pounding Rostov-on-Don isn't passing.
06:54Aeroflot 1166, we're diverting.
06:58Sky Dubai, Nine Eight One, for your information, previous traffic went to alternate airports.
07:12All the other flights decide to divert to alternate airports instead.
07:17The problem with diverting is that it's expensive and it's inconvenient.
07:25The passengers don't end up at the destination.
07:27They have to be put up in hotels.
07:30And with a low-cost airline, it's the last thing it wants.
07:36Captain Sokranos continues monitoring the weather radar.
07:39Finally, he spots a clearing.
07:41I think I'd like to give it a try.
07:43I agree.
07:44Let's try.
07:45It's not unusual for crews to take advantage if there happens to be a break in the weather
07:52pattern that provides safe conditions to land the aircraft.
07:57Sky Dubai, Nine Eight One, request descent for another approach.
08:0115,000 feet over Rostov-on-Don, the pilots again prepare to land.
08:09Sky Dubai, Nine Eight One, Rostov Tower, you're cleared to land on runway 22.
08:14Good evening, Aeroflot officer here.
08:18We will be landing shortly.
08:20Once again, we apologize for the delay.
08:2413 miles from runway 22, the pilots line up for a second approach.
08:30Be advised, low altitude headwind, 53 knots, light icing.
08:37Even though winds are strong, controllers aren't reporting wind shear at the runway.
08:42Flaps 30.
08:47Flaps 30.
08:49But as they approach, they soon realize something's not right.
08:53Check your speed.
08:57Okay, go around.
09:02The pilots execute another go around.
09:15Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.
09:18Just 2,000 feet in the air, Captain Socrates is wrestling with the Boeing 737.
09:25Seconds later.
09:37Flight Nine Eight One is diving straight at the runway.
09:47Oh my God.
09:55Fire and emergency crews rush to the end of runway 22.
10:04Aircraft punched a crater in the runway about a meter and a half deep with wreckage,
10:10wreckage thrown everywhere.
10:15Firefighters battle the flames through the night.
10:21But there's no one to be rescued.
10:25All 62 people on board Flight Nine Eight One are killed in the crash.
10:32Grieving families and the world demand answers.
10:39Flight Nine Eight One
10:45Hours after Fly Dubai Flight Nine Eight One crashes on the runway at Rostov-on-Don,
10:51investigators from the IAC, the Interstate Aviation Committee, arrive on the scene.
10:59The IAC is the lead air accident investigation agency,
11:04not just for Russia, but for several of the former Soviet states.
11:09The IAC must find the cause for the horrific tragedy.
11:15Okay, that's great. That belongs over here.
11:21Wreckage from Flight Nine Eight One is laid out in a nearby hangar for closer inspection.
11:27A team from the United Arab Emirates assists in the investigation.
11:35So how fast did the plane hit the ground?
11:44The size of the debris would tell whether there's a high-speed impact, whether there's a low-speed impact.
11:50There are clues in pieces of wreckage.
11:55There's not much left of it.
12:00It was all small pieces.
12:02It describes a very high-speed and violent impact with the ground.
12:10It makes us question what really happened.
12:16Let's see it.
12:19Investigators wonder how the plane could have gathered so much speed during an attempted landing.
12:26I was diving hard.
12:28Footage gives them a look at the last moments of Flight Nine Eight One.
12:39Flight Nine Eight One's angle of descent leads investigators to wonder
12:43if the pilots were having problems controlling their plane.
12:46Maybe it's their flight controls?
12:49No, I've seen it before.
12:53Boeing 737 flight controls have a problematic history.
13:02March 3rd, 1991.
13:05United Airlines Flight 585 banks hard right and crashes while attempting to land, killing all on board.
13:13Three years later, it happens again.
13:16US Air Flight 427 rolls left and crashes near Pittsburgh.
13:23Investigators were tearing their hair out trying to figure it out.
13:27Two years pass without incident.
13:30Then, while on approach to land, the pilots of East Wind Airlines Flight 517 lose control.
13:37This time, the pilots regain control of their plane and land safely in Richmond, Virginia.
13:46The plane is intact.
13:48Investigators get their best lead yet.
13:51After a five-year investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded
13:57that a power unit in the rudder had been responsible for what's called a rudder hard over.
14:04The rudder had moved to one side and that caused the aircraft to roll over and then dive into the ground.
14:14Movements of rudder and other control surfaces occur when pilots push their rudder pedal or pull the yoke.
14:21Power control units turn those commands into actual movements of the control surfaces.
14:27It's similar to the power steering on a car.
14:33Hey there, did you recover the PCUs?
14:38Investigators want to know if any of Flight 981's control units failed.
14:44Yep, they're here.
14:46Great, we need to test them.
14:48Much of the Boeing 737 was destroyed during high-speed impact.
14:52But two of the power control units have survived.
14:55They could provide crucial information.
14:59PCUs are the heart and soul of the flight controls of the airplane.
15:03And one of the first questions if you have an airplane that came screaming out of the sky at a 50-degree angle is,
15:08did we have a PCU problem in the flight controls?
15:14Investigators carefully examine the PCUs of Flight 981.
15:20They look for signs of a malfunction.
15:30Nothing wrong with the PCUs.
15:33They were extensively examined and found to have had absolutely no connection to what brought this airplane out of the sky.
15:41With flight control issues ruled out, the team turns to the controller for insight.
15:48Take me through what you saw.
15:50They were on final approach.
15:56Flight 981, Rostov Tower, you're cleared to land on runway 22.
16:03Then they aborted their first attempt to land.
16:08They reported wind shear.
16:11Rostov Tower, this is 981. We're conducting a go-around due to wind shear.
16:17SkyDubai, 981, make holding pattern at your convenience.
16:22They climbed and began holding.
16:24How long were they holding?
16:26For a long time.
16:28Investigators learn that the pilots held for almost two hours waiting for the weather to improve.
16:36SkyDubai, 981.
16:38Request descent for another approach.
16:40Then they asked to land.
16:43But something went wrong when the pilots made their second approach.
16:48Rostov Tower, this is SkyDubai, 981. We're going around.
16:53Did they say why they were going around a second time?
16:56No. They just said going around. That's all.
17:01The next thing I knew, the plane was diving towards the runway.
17:10Did they report any problems with the plane?
17:12No. Nothing.
17:16IAC investigators still can't explain why flight 981 suddenly banked and then dived into runway 22.
17:25Something had gone wrong on the second go-around, but investigators didn't know what.
17:29Was there a problem with the airplane? Did the pilots make a mistake?
17:33There's no knowing it yet.
17:36Okay. Two go-arounds. One turns to disaster. Why?
17:44Let's take a look at the first one.
17:46Investigators turn to FDR data to better understand why FlyDubai flight 981
17:52performed one successful go-around but crashed during the second.
17:57Investigators need to figure out how the two go-arounds were different from each other.
18:01Zoom in a bit.
18:06Look.
18:08They confirm the pilots reacted to a wind shear alarm during the first approach.
18:15And how did they respond?
18:17Thrust jumps up to 102.
18:20And how did they respond?
18:22Thrust jumps up to 102.
18:31So he applied max power. What about the flaps?
18:35Flaps at 30.
18:38And gear will remain down.
18:50Textbook wind shear go-around.
18:53If a pilot encounters wind shear, he'll typically perform what's called a wind shear escape maneuver.
18:59And that involves increasing the engine power to a maximum.
19:03You leave the flaps down. You leave the gear down.
19:06Wind shear ahead.
19:08Wind shear go-around.
19:10The first go-around was pretty routine.
19:13They responded appropriately. They did exactly what they should have done.
19:20This is the second go-around.
19:25Investigators analyze the second attempt at landing, focusing in on the last moments before the crash.
19:32Now did they get another wind shear warning the second time?
19:36No. Nothing.
19:38Look. There's a leap in airspeed from 153 to 176 in seconds.
19:45Ten seconds before the pilots aboard, a sudden increase in the plane's airspeed was recorded.
19:51Investigators saw the airspeed fluctuating for more than 20 knots within a few seconds.
19:58It's a pretty strong gust of wind.
20:00And they can see that on the flight data recording.
20:03Investigators determined that a strong gust of wind struck the plane.
20:08You can feel the wind increase on the nose of the airplane.
20:12It's probably also moving the airplane a little bit left or right.
20:15It's not a pleasant position to be in.
20:19How did the pilots respond this time?
20:21Let me see.
20:25Well, they added maximum speed.
20:27How did the pilots respond this time?
20:29Let me see.
20:32Well, they added maximum speed.
20:35Okay, go around.
20:43And what about the flaps and landing gear?
20:46Flaps are retracted.
20:50Gear, retracted.
20:54The data reveals that on the second go-around, the pilots performed a different procedure.
21:02They didn't fly the windshear escape maneuver during the second go-around.
21:06Well, it looks like they were doing a standard go-around.
21:11On a standard go-around, the flaps and landing gear are retracted.
21:16Except they did it at max power.
21:20Given how streamlined the aircraft is with the landing gear up and the flaps largely retracted,
21:25the use of maximum power is very much overkill.
21:30Investigators conclude that on the second attempt, the crew flew a hybrid of two procedures.
21:40They used the power of a windshear escape maneuver with the gear and flap settings of a traditional go-around.
21:50So, what would that do to the plane?
21:55We need to take a look at all the factors at play.
22:03They were holding on for nearly two hours. That's four tons of fuel they burned.
22:11The weight of the Boeing 737 is a critical factor in the plane's performance.
22:16Adding the weight of the plane.
22:22Total weight, that's 54 tons.
22:28That's a light plane.
22:30Yeah.
22:33At this weight, you know, the crew would feel a faster acceleration.
22:38Max power, no drag from flaps or landing gear, low weight.
22:47This plane could have been accelerating dangerously fast.
22:51This is really an accelerated situation.
22:54This is a very powerful airplane doing something that feels like you just went into afterburner.
22:59How much quicker did this plane pick up speed on the second go-around?
23:08We need to do modeling on this.
23:12It was really incumbent upon the investigators to look further into the question of the acceleration.
23:20Investigators turned to the Boeing 737.
23:23Here's all the data for the first and second go-around.
23:25Yeah.
23:27How did the rate of acceleration differ at the start of the two attempts?
23:38First go-around, speed increased by 17 knots.
23:45First go-around, speed increased by 17 knots.
23:51And the second?
23:59Second go-around, 25 knot increase.
24:04That's the difference of 8 knots between the two go-arounds.
24:07Yeah.
24:08That's the difference of 8 knots between the two go-arounds.
24:10Yeah.
24:12It was a key part of the findings when they realized that over 40% difference existed between the acceleration from the first go-around to the second go-around.
24:22Could the increase in acceleration have affected the pilots themselves?
24:27They calculate the impact of the second go-around.
24:36Wow.
24:37Look at the backward force experienced by the pilot.
24:41That faster acceleration on the second go-around would have pushed him back into the seat.
24:47The team also examines the impact of vertical acceleration.
24:57G-force would have lifted the pilots upwards.
25:02The pilot would have felt a slight unweighting. He would come up out of the seat.
25:06So, sudden acceleration like this, both horizontal and vertical, that'll play tricks on your mind.
25:17Were Captain Socrates' senses his worst enemy?
25:22Maybe he experienced a semantographic illusion.
25:28Check your speed.
25:32Okay, go-around.
25:33A semantographic illusion is a dangerous form of spatial disorientation.
25:39When a plane accelerates quickly with no visual reference of the horizon, the gravitational forces cause a pitch-up illusion in the inner ear.
25:48The little hairs in the inner ear bend backwards, tricking the brain into thinking the head is tilting up.
25:56You might be going level, but if you cannot see outside, that sensation on your vestibular system is overwhelming and, you know, you would really feel that you're climbing up.
26:08A semantographic illusion is one of the most lethal traps in aviation.
26:13Keep the nose up. Fifteen degrees.
26:16It's an extremely convincing illusion.
26:26What was the actual pitch of the plane after it accelerated during the second go-around?
26:32Almost 20 seconds after the actual pitch was 8.8 degrees nose up.
26:40Investigators look for evidence that the pilots of Flight 981 became severely disoriented in the dark.
26:48If you imagine that this glass of water represents the fluid in your ear, if you accelerated this along a smooth surface, the water would be pushed up against the back of the glass, very much like this.
27:02In other words, it's the same effect as if you simply tilted the glass.
27:07If you take visual information away, what tends to happen is that the pilot forgets about the acceleration and assumes that everything he's feeling is due to the pitch.
27:21And what was the pilot's perceived pitch?
27:25Combining the horizontal and vertical acceleration experienced by the pilot, we can calculate the pitch that is perceived by the pilot.
27:34This is called the illusionary pitch.
27:37The pilot's perceived pitch was 21.6 degrees.
27:42They compare the plane's actual pitch to the pilot's illusionary pitch during the second go-around.
27:50Ten seconds later, the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees.
27:54Ten seconds later, the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees.
28:04And the pilot perceived it to be 26.7 degrees nose up.
28:18Wow, that's a huge difference.
28:25This puts the captain into a situation that he potentially will be experiencing a somatogravic illusion.
28:33The captain is feeling one thing, but the aircraft is doing something else.
28:37Get this. Near the end of the flight, the actual pitch is 7.6 degrees.
28:48And the perceived pitch becomes well over 40.
28:54Investigators discover three instances where there was a dramatic difference between the plane's actual and the pilot's perceived pitch.
29:04Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.
29:07It's evidence that the pilots may have experienced a somatographic illusion during the second go-around.
29:14Could the feeling of the rapid acceleration have affected how the pilots flew the plane?
29:21They dig deeper into the flight data.
29:24Oh, the captain pushed forward on the yoke.
29:27He was trying to pitch the plane downward.
29:30That's what his senses were telling him to do.
29:34The captain, responding more to his feelings than to what he was seeing on any instrumentation in front of him,
29:40he decides that he needs to push the airplane forward and counteract this massive pitch-up.
29:45He's trying to save them by pitching down.
29:48Wow, check this out. He pushed the stabilizer trim down.
29:55From the data, investigators see the captain didn't just push the yoke.
30:00Be careful!
30:02The captain applies the stabilizer trim because he's pushing, trying to push the nose of the aircraft down.
30:10For how long?
30:16Yeah, he held the trim switch for 12 seconds.
30:20Holding the switch for 12 seconds is unheard of.
30:24That should never be held for that amount of time.
30:27The team discovers that instead of pitching the plane up to climb,
30:32the captain is pitching the plane towards the ground.
30:35No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
30:38Eventually putting the plane into a fatal dive.
30:43The sudden change in direction is jarring.
30:46At that time you would feel like you're on a roller coaster.
30:49You know, when you're coming up to the peak as you're diving at speed, it's similar to that sensation.
30:55The pitch down has another disorienting effect on the pilot's senses.
31:01Pitching down of the aircraft would have caused both the captain and the first officer
31:06to experience a dramatic change in the G-forces.
31:09Oh my God!
31:12That would increase the confusion in the cockpit.
31:14That would increase the confusion in the cockpit as to what's going on.
31:19Investigators conclude that the various G-forces on Captain Socrates
31:24caused his complete spatial disorientation.
31:28The captain pushing and pulling on the yoke, stomping on the rudder.
31:32In the dive, you know, that shows confusion.
31:35He's probably disorientated.
31:37Oh my God!
31:39You know, he's trying desperately to get out of that sensation that he's feeling.
31:45But there's one question that still troubles investigators.
31:49Was the first officer feeling the illusion as well?
31:53Even though the accelerations experienced by both pilots was the same,
31:59the perception of what is happening can differ.
32:03And that can be due to many different factors.
32:06Expectation, what are they looking at, their age, their experience.
32:12Start it at the second go around, please.
32:15The cockpit voice recorder could tell investigators
32:18if the first officer was also under the influence of the somatographic illusion.
32:24Okay, go around.
32:28Be careful.
32:33No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
32:36Don't, don't do that.
32:38He sees something wrong.
32:41No, pull it, pull it, pull it.
32:44He's telling him to pull back the yoke.
32:46Pull it!
32:48If he's feeling the same illusion as the captain,
32:51it sure doesn't seem like he was affected by it.
32:55The first officer knew how much trouble the aircraft was in.
32:58He knew the captain wasn't responding the way he should.
33:01Oh my God!
33:02Pull it up, pull it up.
33:08Investigators are left wondering why the first officer didn't intervene.
33:16You look at this first officer trying his best and wonder,
33:19why didn't you just take control?
33:21I say, I've got the airplane.
33:33He's been flying the 737-800 for nearly two years.
33:36He's fully certified.
33:38Investigators look into the first officer's background
33:41to understand why he didn't take control of flight 981
33:44when he saw that the captain was making grave mistakes.
33:48Look, his trainer wrote notes on his assessment.
33:52And this one's telling.
33:54He's got the plane.
33:56He's got the plane.
33:58He's got the plane.
34:00And this one's telling.
34:02They find notes left by one of his flight instructors that alarm them.
34:07One thing that could have possibly saved this aircraft
34:10was discovered in a note that was left behind by a flight instructor.
34:14He needs to be a bit more assertive in what is needed from the captain.
34:18And he continues.
34:20Tell him what you want done
34:22and do not wait for the captain to inquire with you
34:25or direct you in this regard.
34:26in this regard.
34:30He's not the type to take control.
34:35No, pull it!
34:36Pull it, pull it, pull it!
34:39The first officer could see
34:41that the captain was experiencing
34:43enormous problems trying to control the go-around.
34:46He really should have taken some decisive action
34:48and intervened.
34:50Oh, my God!
34:51I still don't understand something.
34:59Why did they try to land the plane in the first place?
35:02The big mystery was, why was this crew
35:05so determined to land at Rostov-on-Don
35:07when every other flight had already diverted?
35:10A storm was pummeling Rostov-on-Don airport.
35:14His flight 981 circled above.
35:16Why didn't the pilots divert to another airport?
35:22Investigators look for answers in the cockpit voice recording.
35:26Sky-Dubai, 981, for your information,
35:30previous traffic went to alternate airports.
35:33Two other flights diverted?
35:35There's no need.
35:37I'm going to keep flying.
35:40Investigators just couldn't understand
35:43why they wanted to fly in circles for almost two hours.
35:47I'm going to try this approach.
35:50I'm going to try this approach, and if I can't make it,
35:52I'll have a go around,
35:54and I will head to Minerali Vodi, okay?
35:57Okay, Captain. Understood.
35:59Who's he talking to?
36:00The dispatcher in Dubai.
36:02Investigators finally get an indication
36:05of the captain's rationale for attempting another landing.
36:09As the captain decides whether to divert,
36:11he contacts FlyDubai's flight dispatcher
36:14in the United Arab Emirates.
36:16We would like to recommend you hold max
36:18as possible.
36:21Dispatchers manage the entire fleet's operation
36:24for a specific airline.
36:26The dispatcher and the captain are co-equally responsible
36:29for the safety of the flight.
36:31There is a very delicate dance that goes on
36:34between and among the dispatchers and the captains.
36:37The captain follows with the dispatcher's recommendation.
36:41Minutes turn to hours
36:43as the pilots wait for a chance to land.
36:46I don't know, man.
36:48I'm sure we're gonna exceed our flying hours.
36:54What are you looking at?
36:56Maximum duty hours.
36:58He's calculating his duty hours.
37:01Regulations limit how many hours
37:04pilots can fly during a duty period.
37:07We've been in the air for five and a half hours now.
37:11The team learns that the pilots were concerned
37:14they might exceed their duty hours.
37:17Stop.
37:19Roll the map.
37:22They've been flying for at least five hours.
37:25It'll take another hour to reach the alternate airport,
37:28wait out the storm.
37:30Then they still have to get back to Rostov-on-Don
37:32before returning to Dubai.
37:34Diverting would put them over their duty hours for the day.
37:36Right.
37:38Look, I think it'll be clear by the time we do this approach now.
37:41And even if we start now,
37:43I think we'll be good.
37:45We'll be good.
37:47Okay.
37:49Is he landing because it's clear
37:51or because he wants to get on the ground?
37:55The conversation on the flight deck
37:57before the second approach clearly showed
37:59that they weren't really thinking so much
38:01about the safety of the landing,
38:03just the fact that they wanted to land.
38:06I think I'd like to give it a try.
38:08I agree. Let's try.
38:10Stop the recording.
38:15So they decide to circle for two hours
38:18after a four-hour flight in the middle of the night.
38:26Did the long flight affect the pilot's ability
38:29to land the plane safely?
38:32Two hours a whole, six hours total time.
38:34Aren't we seeing a decline
38:36in the decision-making capabilities because of fatigue?
38:39Tired?
38:41No.
38:46As investigators break down Flight 981's journey
38:50from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don,
38:53they identify a glaring problem.
38:55They were actually in the air for more than six hours.
38:58It's almost 5 a.m. their time when they're landing.
39:02The circadian rhythm is the body's natural alignment
39:07with the day-and-night cycle.
39:09The quiet period is roughly for a four-hour period
39:12between 2 in the morning and 6 in the morning.
39:15That's the point at which your mental ability
39:19is pretty much at its lowest.
39:21I think I'd like to give it a try.
39:24I agree. Let's try.
39:28Investigators determine the crew was suffering
39:31from operational fatigue as they launched their second approach.
39:37Good evening. Your first officer here.
39:39You will be landing shortly.
39:41Once again, we apologize for the delay.
39:43The decision to make a second attempt
39:46to land at Rostov-on-Don
39:48triggers a chain of events that ends in catastrophe.
39:53Check your speed.
39:55As the aircraft is hit by this sudden wind,
39:57the crew is forced into executing another go-around.
40:01Okay, go-around.
40:03And this time, it was all gonna go wrong.
40:06Captain Socrates executes a wind-shear go-around,
40:09pushing the throttle to maximum power.
40:11The first officer performs a standard go-around,
40:14retracting the flaps and raising the landing gear.
40:18Both pilots were essentially flying
40:21two different airplanes from there.
40:23It's plumbed the factors heavily
40:25into the catastrophe that followed.
40:27Flight 981 climbs from Rostov-on-Don at high speed.
40:32When you're light on fuel and you put the maximum thrust,
40:35you will accelerate.
40:37It's what happened in the last few seconds
40:39that doomed flight 981.
40:44Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.
40:46At this moment, Captain Socrates fights an inner battle.
40:50Acceleration of the aircraft makes the captain feel
40:53as though the aircraft is pitching up
40:56a lot more than it actually is.
40:58His spatial orientation deteriorates rapidly.
41:02Your vestibular senses and your middle ear
41:04are all telling you the wrong thing.
41:06The captain counters the pitch-up feeling
41:09of a somatographic illusion by pushing the yoke forward.
41:15The captain has lost touch with the reality
41:18of what's happening to the airplane.
41:20Then, the final blow.
41:22The captain holds that stabilizer trim button down
41:25for about 12 seconds.
41:27And then he pulls it out.
41:29With the sudden forcing of the aircraft's nose down
41:32and stabilizer trim,
41:34the aircraft transitions from a climb
41:37very suddenly into a dive.
41:40The aircraft is now in a very dangerous situation
41:43which the captain is unable to overcome.
41:46My God!
41:48They're accelerating rapidly,
41:50and the first officer finally gets the hang of it.
41:54He's got the hang of it.
41:56He's accelerating rapidly,
41:58and the first officer finally gets on the yoke
42:01and tries to pull,
42:03but the controls on the left side govern
42:06where the airplane is.
42:08And you get to a certain point,
42:10and there's no recovery.
42:12Nose-diving at full throttle towards the runway,
42:15Captain Socrates is completely disoriented.
42:18When he adds rudder at the last moment,
42:21he's lost all awareness of how the plane is flying.
42:26Aah!
42:32Pilots in this case were conducting the flight very well
42:36right up until those last few moments.
42:39And then it all really just fell apart.
42:48The IAC investigation into the crash of Flight 981
42:52is a landmark case of how spatial disorientation
42:55can end in disaster.
42:57This accident is a wake-up call for the industry.
43:00This is one of the accidents that paved the way
43:03into increased training in spatial disorientation.
43:08In their final report,
43:10investigators blame the captain's string of errors
43:13on his diminished psychological state.
43:16The IAC recommends that Fly Dubai provide better training
43:20on the manual operation of stabilizer trim
43:23so their pilots don't make the same mistake again.
43:27Research into human factors,
43:29including situations like this
43:31where disorientation likely occurred,
43:33is at the forefront of aviation safety research.
43:36We are training our pilots on simulators
43:39to experience these illusions
43:41before they experience them in there
43:43so they can recognize those situations.
43:48I think the Fly Dubai accident
43:50shows how quickly your senses can overtake you.
43:55And one of the key lessons
43:57is for pilots to trust in their instruments,
44:01to take a step back
44:03from what they may think they're experiencing.
44:06To actually understand what the airplane is doing,
44:09you've got to keep the airplane flying.