Most Americans agree that the country's involvement in WWII was sparked by the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But there's a lot more to the tragic day than even history buffs know — and these are some of their burning questions.
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00:00December 7, 1941 is a date that will live in infamy, but there's a lot more to the tragic
00:05day than even history buffs know, and these are some of their burning questions.
00:09You know the basics. Japan had imperial expansion plans for the entire Pacific, and the U.S.
00:14was in the way, so the Japanese decided to bomb Pearl Harbor. Simple, right?
00:18But even within Japan, there was much back and forth prior to the strike. On one side,
00:23you had war-hungry nationalists favoring action, and on the other, there were more moderate
00:27voices expressing serious doubts. This last group included the commander-in-chief of Japan's
00:31Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who warned that an extended war would destroy
00:37Japan. Spoiler, he wasn't wrong. He said the only chance was an intense, sudden attack
00:41that would thoroughly destabilize the U.S. If his plan worked, the U.S. wouldn't retaliate.
00:47But after the attack, the U.S. declared war and officially joined World War II, so Yamamoto
00:51was extra wrong.
00:53The popular narrative of the Pearl Harbor attack is that it took everyone by surprise.
00:58Everybody was pretty much aware of Japanese expansionism and increasing tensions, but
01:02still, the idea of a sudden attack simply wasn't on most minds. Why didn't the military
01:06leaders read the writing on the wall and more obviously discuss how the U.S. was going to
01:10be drawn into the war?
01:11You want answers?
01:12I think I'm entitled to them.
01:14You want answers!
01:15I want the truth! You can't handle the truth!
01:18Okay, the truth is, well, complicated. Part of the problem was that the command, and therefore
01:24communication, was often divided. General Walter C. Short was in charge of the Army
01:28stationed in Hawaii, while Admiral Husband E. Kimmel commanded the Pacific Fleet. The
01:33two didn't always communicate for security reasons. This meant that when Kimmel's Navy
01:36intelligence lost track of a steadily growing Japanese fleet less than two weeks before
01:41the attack, he didn't let Short know.
01:43Neither of the two commanders were able to set up an effective cross-department communications
01:47network, leaving key radar stations short-staffed and poorly informed of Navy aircraft maneuvers.
01:52Even then, surveillance managed to pick up suspicious Japanese activity, including aircraft
01:56launches and the appearance of miniature Japanese submarines near Pearl Harbor shortly before
02:01the attack. Though slow communications and sluggish response times meant these early
02:05warnings made little difference.
02:07Even with the major miscommunications between military branches, it's hard to understand
02:11why both Short and Kimmel didn't do more to prepare for an attack. U.S. forces had received
02:15three warnings from their own government in 1941, on October 16th, November 24th, and
02:21November 27th. That last warning, which came barely a week before the December 7th attack,
02:26told Kimmel that, quote, this is a war warning. He was instructed to execute an appropriate
02:30defensive deployment, though the missive didn't contain details about dates or potential target
02:35sites. But this is the biggie. No one knew where the attack would take place.
02:40A declassified memo discovered in 2011 listed the West Coast, Panama, and the Territory
02:45of Hawaii as places to keep an eye on for an attack. So it's hard to prepare for an
02:49attack when you don't know where it's going to be. Also, do you know exactly where the
02:54Japanese attacked on December 7th? Do you? Keep watching. You might be surprised.
02:59By the time Japanese forces actually began moving across the Pacific towards Pearl Harbor,
03:06the attack fleet had grown seriously massive. It included six of the nation's best aircraft
03:11carriers and more than 420 planes. It was the largest attack force assembled by Japan.
03:16So how did it manage to make it 3,500 miles practically undetected?
03:21Part of the plan involved intense preparation, which included monitoring U.S. communications
03:25and military movements. Training areas were also closely guarded, with foreign vessels
03:30escorted out of sensitive areas while Navy-related news stories were censored.
03:34Admiral Yamamoto didn't even inform many of his military compatriots of the plan, either.
03:39The ships were then sent on a far northern route that was meant to keep them out of shipping
03:42lanes. For security reasons, no radio communications were allowed, leaving personnel on the ships
03:47to communicate via lights or flags. It also helped that the ocean is ginormous and contained
03:52plenty of room for Yamamoto and his associates to map a route that kept such a large force
03:56out of sight.
03:57The thing you probably didn't expect is that it's super easy to hide in the ocean.
04:02There was one key moment where a different decision could have changed everything, and
04:05it came at a mobile radar unit stationed on the northern coast of Oahu. There, Privates
04:10Joseph L. Lockhart and Georgie Elliott Jr. were told to sit inside the unit van between
04:144 and 7 a.m.
04:15The Lockhart was in charge of the unit's oscilloscope — that's a device that can pick up electric
04:19signals, like the kind from a massive formation of aircraft. Elliott briefly took over near
04:24the end of their shift for practice. Just after 7 a.m., he detected a blip on the scan
04:29that indicated — you guessed it — a massive formation of incoming aircraft.
04:33But with such technology still in its infancy, neither Private could tell exactly how many
04:37planes were approaching and where they were heading. Lockhart called the Army Information
04:41Center, where he reached Private Joseph P. McDonald. When McDonald consulted the lieutenant
04:46who was on duty, however, he was told just to ignore the signal, because it was probably
04:50just a group of American planes. The signal was a bit over 130 miles away when they spotted
04:54the formation. It could have been enough time to deploy proper defensive maneuvers.
04:59While the Pearl Harbor attack was devastating, it could have been far worse. But why wasn't
05:04it? It has to do with flares.
05:06Commander Mitsuo Fuchida was in charge of tactical decisions for the first wave. There
05:10were two possible plans — one if the Americans were surprised, and another if U.S. forces
05:15caught on before the attack. One flare would signal a surprise attack, and two indicated
05:20a more cautious no-surprise plan.
05:22Fuchida fired two flares — he should have fired one. In fact, he later claimed to have
05:26fired one, but, thinking it was a dud, set off another. Yet, given the complexity of
05:31loading and firing flare cartridges from the cockpit, Fuchida may have meant to fire two
05:35all along. It also could be that Fuchida lied because the attack became an uncoordinated
05:39mess that did not strike the Americans as hard as originally intended. In attempting
05:43to cover up for himself, he may have been trying to shift the blame for the mix-ups
05:46that day onto other commanders.
05:48Pearl Harbor was a devastating attack, but it could have been a lot worse if Fuchida
05:52only let off one flare.
05:542,404 people were killed on the U.S. side, including 68 civilians and 1,177 on the USS
06:01Arizona alone. Five battleships sank in the harbor, as well as three destroyers and a
06:06training ship. Many more suffered serious damage.
06:09The noise was unbearable. Planes were coming in from all directions.
06:13One of the most horrifying details of what happened to the bodies centers on those trapped
06:17and wrecked ships. Afterwards, some reported hearing the taps and bangs of sailors trapped
06:22inside. The salvage crew that raised what was left of the USS West Virginia reportedly
06:26found the remains of sailors, along with a calendar that marked off a chilling 16 days
06:30stuck inside.
06:31It took decades for the U.S. Navy to admit the details of the story to the sailors' families.
06:36But how could sailors be left inside a wrecked battleship for over two weeks? While crews
06:40worked desperately to save service members in the wreckage, they were presented with
06:43some seriously difficult choices. The area was often coated with fuel leaking from mangled
06:48ships, so cutting through metal decking could spark a deadly blaze. Likewise, creating
06:53an opening in the wrong spot could flood the interior. Over 900 bodies were left behind
06:58in USS Arizona and declared buried at sea.
07:01You've been waiting for this the whole video. Did the U.S. know the attack on Pearl Harbor
07:05was coming?
07:06In its most basic form, this conspiracy maintains that President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other
07:10high-level government officials knew darn well that Japan was going to rain down devastation
07:15upon Pearl Harbor. Yet, they said and did nothing, hoping both to bring the U.S. into
07:19the war and keep Britain in the conflict. Plus, with the U.S. officially in the war,
07:23it would be able to more publicly aid allies in the fight against the Axis powers.
07:28Sure, there are some elements of truth to it, including evidence that U.S. officials
07:31expected some sort of warlike action from the Japanese military. But the idea that Roosevelt
07:36would allow a highly destructive attack to hit a significant portion of the Pacific fleet
07:40simply doesn't make sense. Like we already brought up, they knew something could — keyword
07:46could — be coming, but no one really knew where. And don't forget that the Philippines,
07:51Wake Island, and Hong Kong, among others, were all attacked that very same day.
07:56The idea that Roosevelt wanted to fight the Nazis so bad that he was just going to let
07:59Japan attack is inconceivable. If we want to be really fair, yes, the U.S. knew something
08:04was afoot, and just had no idea where.