Mayday Air Crash Investigations - S09 E03 - Pilot vs. Plane
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00:00It's the first public demonstration of the world's most sophisticated passenger jet.
00:07Okay, you're at 100 feet there.
00:10The Airbus A320 is being introduced to the world.
00:14Mesdames et messieurs, votre attention s'il vous plaît.
00:17L'Airbus A320 Avenue.
00:19That introduction turns into a fatal calamity.
00:2230 feet.
00:2430.
00:26It could not possibly have come at a worse time for Airbus.
00:40The crash was a major embarrassment.
00:44There's enormous pressure on investigators.
00:48If Airbus is to survive, they must find the answer to one crucial question.
00:53Was it the pilot, or was it the plane?
00:57It's 2.30 in the afternoon on June the 26th, 1988.
01:27An unusual charter flight prepares to depart Basel-Moulouse airport in France, near the Swiss border.
01:36Captain Michel Asseline is one of Air France's most distinguished pilots.
01:43Though only 44, he's the head of pilot training for the company's newest plane, the Airbus A320.
01:52It's only the third of its kind to roll off the assembly line.
01:55Captain Asseline flew this very aircraft from the factory in Toulouse just two days earlier.
02:01I was in charge of the launching of the A320 in Air France.
02:04The company used me to promote the aircraft.
02:07Speeches to make was constantly on the television, on the newspaper.
02:12Air charter 296 would like to roll, please.
02:16Air charter 296.
02:17Asseline's first officer, Pierre Mazier, is also a senior Air France pilot.
02:21Air charter 296.
02:23He's invited two off-duty flight attendants to come along for the ride on this special flight.
02:28The aircraft is booked to perform a low-altitude flyover at a local airshow.
02:34There are 130 people on board this A320, which is unusual for an airshow demonstration flight.
02:44They have no luggage.
02:46For some, it's their first time on an airplane.
02:51There are even children, like seven-year-old Mariama Barry, unaccompanied by their parents.
02:58After the flyover, they will be taken on a sightseeing tour around Mont Blanc, the highest peak in Western Europe.
03:07Most got their tickets as promotional gifts from a local bank and newspaper.
03:15Marie Schreiber is a young reporter covering the launch of the new plane.
03:22As a journalist, I was thrilled to be on the flight, to have a chance to see how people reacted inside the plane.
03:34Another journalist aboard, Jean-Claude Bauche, has been busy recording the event.
03:42As I got on the plane, I thought, great, this is going to be an unforgettable experience.
03:46And it really was unforgettable.
03:52The A320 is the first civil aircraft to use fly-by-wire, a cutting-edge technology that computerizes flight controls.
04:00The system had previously mainly been used by the military.
04:04On the fly-by-wire system, the pilot essentially flies the computer, and the computer flies the aircraft.
04:15Fly-by-wire alters the relationship between pilot and plane.
04:20It gives computers the ability to override human inputs to prevent pilot error.
04:27The A320's flight computer won't let its human operators do anything it determines to be dangerous.
04:37Airbus has become the first civil aircraft maker to embrace this technology.
04:43It hopes this will give it an edge over its longtime American rival, Boeing.
04:50In its first public presentation, Airbus has a lot on the line.
04:56OK, tell me what you want in terms of speed and altitude.
04:59OK, then, take our right turn.
05:02We go nice and easy to find our thing.
05:04We tried to demonstrate the capability of this aircraft.
05:07To say we wanted to show off, not exactly.
05:10We wanted to make a good job, and we were sure to make a good job.
05:13Once we identify the airfield, we extend flaps to three.
05:16We'll do the flyover at 100, landing gear out.
05:21And you just leave it up to me.
05:23I'll give it alpha max.
05:26Done it 20 times.
05:28OK.
05:29Captain Asseline is planning a breathtaking maneuver.
05:33A low-altitude, nose-high flyby at alpha max.
05:38This is the slowest a plane can fly without stalling.
05:41Ladies and gentlemen.
05:45Hello, and welcome aboard this Airbus A320.
05:48Which was put into service just two days ago.
05:51We will soon be taking off for a short sightseeing flight,
05:55which will start from the Absheim Flying Club,
05:58and then we'll be flying around Mont Blanc.
06:00I wish you a very pleasant flight.
06:04That's done.
06:07ACF 296Q, clear for takeoff.
06:11runway 60.
06:14We're rolling.
06:19Takeoff.
06:20Go.
06:22Parameters normal.
06:26100.
06:27100.
06:28It's already requesting flight.
06:30You see that?
06:31Yes, that happens.
06:32I know the book.
06:34V1.
06:35Rotate.
06:36Gear up.
06:37Flaps 1.
06:38Have to take a checklist completely.
06:39It's only a five-minute flight to Habshaim Airfield,
06:42where the airshow is being held.
06:50For this sleepy Alsatian town, the airshow is the highlight of the summer.
06:59The airshow drew more than 5,000 people.
07:04There was significant interest from the public.
07:07The airfield is so small, its coordinates aren't stored in the plane's navigation database.
07:13So the pilots must find it by sight.
07:16You're at eight nautical miles.
07:18You'll soon see it.
07:19There's the highway.
07:20We leave the highway to the left, don't we?
07:21No, to the right of the highway.
07:22It's slightly to the right of the highway.
07:23It's slightly to the right of the highway.
07:26There's the airfield.
07:49You've got it.
07:50Have you?
07:55The pilots have spotted the airfield late.
07:58They will have to hurry to descend to the planned altitude for the flyover at the airshow.
08:04A crowd is forming at the runway.
08:09Air charter 296, good afternoon.
08:12App chime, hello. We are coming into view of the airfield for the flyover.
08:16Yes, I can see. We're cleared. The sky is clear.
08:21Gear down.
08:24Okay, we're going in for a low altitude, low speed flyover. 296.
08:31Roger.
08:33Flaps 2.
08:34Quebec November Hotel at Saint-Fontaineble, 984.
08:38Okay. 984. Put in 984.
08:45Flaps 3.
08:47Flaps 3.
08:50That's the airfield. You confirm?
08:53Affirmative.
08:54Flight 296 makes a gentle turn to line up with the runway.
09:01The pilots must now lose more altitude and speed to get into position for the flyover.
09:07200.
09:09200.
09:09200.
09:12Mesdames et Messieurs, votre attention, s'il vous plaît.
09:15L'Airbus A320 Avenue.
09:16Okay, you're at 100 feet there.
09:23Watch it. Watch it. Watch it.
09:26The aircraft is now at the planned altitude.
09:29For Asseline, this will be the most delicate part of the maneuver.
09:34He must keep the plane in a stable position with the nose up, but not too high.
09:38I looked at the ground and said, look, he's not high enough, because you can see the grass right out your window.
09:46At travers the hublot.
09:48Okay. I'm okay there.
09:51Disconnect after throttle.
09:52He disables one of the plane's safety features so that the computer won't speed up the slow-moving plane.
10:00Only now, Captain Asseline sees a danger that threatens the lives of everyone on board.
10:10The A320's low-speed flyover at the Habshaim airfield is suddenly not going according to plan.
10:17There's a forest in the path of Captain Asseline's plane.
10:20He selects the highest thrust setting and pulls back on the controls, expecting the aircraft to pull up.
10:28But the plane keeps dropping.
10:39I started to see through the window tree branches.
10:43I was astonished.
10:44You can imagine being on a trail in a large vehicle, a bumpy trail, driving at 80 or 100 kilometers an hour, and you're shaking from all sides.
10:52It was like that.
10:54I was saying to myself, the plane has to stay in one piece, because if the plane stays whole, we'll be okay.
11:00If it breaks up, we're done for.
11:14Still full of fuel, the right wing of the jet is sheared off.
11:21The fuel ignites immediately on impact.
11:23We stopped very quickly.
11:35And on the ground, I broke my seat, just because I was holding very firmly.
11:38I broke my seat, and I could see a lot of flames all over.
11:43About 20 meters of flames around the cockpit, smoke coming from everywhere.
11:47The first officer is badly injured.
11:49And there's a lot of blood, and even with the full harness, he hit something in front of him.
11:57What the hell have you done?
12:01I don't know.
12:03I don't understand.
12:05There was a moment of silence when the plane finally stopped.
12:11Incredibly, the fuselage is still in one piece.
12:15Everyone has survived the impact.
12:17But they're not out of danger yet.
12:23So I lean to the right, and I see red flames.
12:26The windows were red.
12:27And I think, we held together, but we're going to burn to death.
12:34Then we heard somebody say, get out, get out, there's a fire.
12:38Get out, get out, there's a fire.
12:40Get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out, get out.
12:47Only two exits can be used for evacuation.
12:50The rest are engulfed in flames.
12:53But thick branches block one of the doors, making evacuation difficult.
12:57In the chaos of the cabin, some passengers struggle with their seatbelts.
13:07Marie-Francoise Frosch is one of the last passengers to leave her seat.
13:12She comes across Mariama Barry, who's trapped in her seat.
13:15Mariama Barry, she was seven, eight.
13:23After the accident, people pushing toward the exit pushed on the backs of the seats,
13:28the backs that folded over her, and then she was trapped by her seatbelt.
13:33No one saw her.
13:34She was forgotten.
13:35We didn't see her, we didn't forget her.
13:40But it's too late.
13:42Both are overcome by smoke before they can get off the plane.
13:45In the cockpit, Captain Asseline struggles to get his injured first officer out of the burning aircraft.
13:56I took them from the seat and built them, carried it, I don't know how, and I put it in a slide.
14:04When the passenger, all of them, the last one, was out of the plane, I saw my crew.
14:10They told me, Captain, Captain, they are all out.
14:15I couldn't believe it.
14:26But the crew is wrong.
14:29Not all the passengers have made it out.
14:31Marie-Francoise Froche, Mariama Barry, and another young boy are dead.
14:45In addition to the tragic loss of life, the accident is a PR disaster for Airbus.
14:57The crash could not possibly have come at a worse time for Airbus.
15:07They were trying out this new concept, which they had touted very widely as a new level of safety for civil flight.
15:17And here's a pilot going and crashing one.
15:22For those who actually saw the accident, and it was broadcast on the news media throughout the world the same evening that it happened, there was amazement.
15:32The crash was a major embarrassment.
15:45Investigators from France's Accident Investigation Bureau are on the scene of the crash within hours.
15:50They need to know why this demonstration flight ended in disaster.
15:58They recover the plane's data and voice recorders.
16:07Claude Bechet will head the investigation.
16:10Was it the pilot or was it the plane?
16:14We need to know.
16:15Like the pilots of flight 296, he also works for Air France as an airline captain.
16:20Let's get to work.
16:22Which is unusual for a state investigator.
16:25At that time, I was still an airline pilot.
16:30And I was in New York when the accident happened.
16:32And they sent me a telegram to ask me to come back to Paris as soon as possible.
16:39Apart from the flight recorders, investigators have a remarkable piece of evidence to consider.
16:48A high-quality video of the accident has been recorded by a French cameraman.
16:53It was the first time we had a video of an accident, you know.
16:58Normally, an accident happens in the middle of nowhere.
17:03Nobody is there with a camera to film it.
17:05The tape clearly shows the plane flying right at the trees at the end of the runway.
17:11It doesn't seem to be climbing at all.
17:19The cockpit voice recorder offers a confounding clue.
17:27Take off. Go. Run. Power.
17:2930. 30.
17:32It's clear the crew had no idea there was an obstacle at the end of the runway.
17:45Investigators are puzzled.
17:47How could a forest take a pilot by surprise?
17:56Bechet brings Captain Asseline in for questioning about the flyover at Habshaim.
18:00They need to know what his plan was.
18:04My intention was to carry out a flyover at slow speed.
18:09As a qualified A320 pilot, Claude Bechet is familiar with the plane's capabilities.
18:14Over the airstrip and we go to Alpha Max.
18:17Very good.
18:18He sees nothing wrong with Captain Asseline's plan.
18:22It was not bad.
18:23Making a slow pass was well planned.
18:26And he seemed to me to be very open and very ready to help to work with the investigation commission.
18:39Investigators turn their attention to how Air France prepared the flight crew for the airshow.
18:44They discover a memo setting out the rules for all airshow flights.
18:51What draws the attention of investigators is the minimum altitude Air France had selected for airshow flyovers.
18:58100 feet.
18:59It was in violation of national regulations.
19:03It should have been at 500 feet, as a matter of fact.
19:09But there was, they had at that time a tendency for pilots who were making airshows like that
19:16to go a little bit lower and sometimes much lower.
19:21Chief investigator Claude Bechet now wonders if there were any other mistakes in the planning of the flight.
19:26He soon learns that Air France's flight division didn't start drawing up a flight plan for the demonstration
19:37until less than 48 hours before the airshow.
19:41An Air France employee had prepared maps of the airfield for the crew of Flight 296.
19:49Investigators find a serious problem.
19:52The forest around Habshaim airfield did not show up on the photocopies.
20:03The employee who had put together the flight package didn't have an opportunity to discuss it with the crew.
20:10You were using an avocation shaft?
20:11While questioning Asseline, Bechet discovers that the pilots were also given little time to prepare.
20:18Here's the flight package.
20:20That's highly unusual for an airshow.
20:25My copilot told me, okay, we make a flight around Mont Blanc,
20:29and then we have to make two low pass of a small airport Habshaim.
20:34Told me there is nothing special.
20:35So for me it was a normal flight, a normal day.
20:40That preparation had not been complete,
20:43and there had been no briefing of the crew by the staff.
20:51Investigators then make an intriguing discovery of the crash site.
20:55They measure the height of the trees hit by Flight 296.
21:04They discover the average height of the forest to be only 40 feet.
21:11This poses an urgent question.
21:16How could an Airbus that was supposed to be flying at 100 feet
21:20hit trees less than half that height?
21:25It is clear to investigators that Flight 296 fatally deviated from its original flight plan,
21:36losing altitude before plunging into a forest.
21:40But only the black box data can help them understand how and why this had happened.
21:47Information from the A320's flight data recorder is recovered within hours of the crash.
21:52The device records information about 200 aircraft functions.
21:59It paints a detailed picture of how Flight 296 was operating in the final minutes of its journey.
22:08We could reconstruct the entire accident.
22:14We could live with the crew as the accident was happening.
22:27Investigators make two striking observations from the data.
22:30The first is that Flight 296 suffered no mechanical breakdowns.
22:39The second is that the A320 followed a very different flight path than the one Captain Asseline had planned.
22:48Instead of maintaining a stable airspeed and altitude,
22:52Flight 296 had slowed down and lost altitude as it performed the flyover.
22:56As the A320 crossed the Habshaim airfield,
23:02its speed dropped to only 112 knots.
23:05That's about as slow as an A320 can fly.
23:12The plane's deceleration was so dramatic,
23:15it was even visible on the video.
23:19Michel Asseline was one of Air France's top pilots.
23:22Claude Bechet is hard-pressed to understand how he could have mishandled such a high-profile flight.
23:32Pressed further, Asseline explains how the trouble started.
23:35You were using a navigation shaft?
23:38Yes.
23:38We had some difficulty locating the airfield.
23:44We leave the highway to the left, don't we?
23:47No, to the right of the highway.
23:49It's slightly to the right of the highway.
23:52There's the airfield.
23:53You've got it, have you?
23:55They spotted the airfield too late.
23:58So when they did,
24:00they reduced the power
24:01and they descended.
24:03So they rushed their descent
24:05in order to get into position for the flyover.
24:09And they were still slowing down
24:11when they reached the airfield.
24:14That's the airfield.
24:15You confirm?
24:17Affirmative.
24:18But then another problem emerged.
24:22The spectators were lined up on a different runway
24:25from the one the crew was heading for.
24:27The crew of Air France Flight 296
24:31is ill-prepared for their demonstration flight.
24:34In planning for the airshow,
24:35Air France only provided the crew
24:37with information for runway 2,
24:39Habshaim's only paved airstrip.
24:42But Captain Asseline sees the crowds aligned
24:44on a much shorter adjacent grass field.
24:47I was expecting a normal runway.
24:51But at the latest moment,
24:53I saw that it was a grass runway.
24:55Captain Asseline lined up with the grass strip.
24:58I had no idea that at the end of the runway
24:59it was a forest.
25:01For me, it was bushes only or something.
25:05Okay, you're at 100 feet there.
25:08Watch it.
25:09Watch it.
25:10Because they had to rush their descent,
25:12by the time Flight 296 got to the airfield,
25:15it was flying too fast.
25:17To lose speed, Captain Asseline kept the thrust
25:20on its lowest power setting,
25:22well below the setting pilots normally use
25:24for Alpha Max flight.
25:28But another serious problem was developing.
25:31The aircraft had dropped below 100 feet
25:34and was continuing to fall.
25:36And the crew didn't seem to notice.
25:40I'm okay there.
25:41Disconnect out of throttle.
25:43In a matter of seconds,
25:44the altitude had fallen to only 30 feet.
25:49What was extremely clear
25:51is that airplane
25:52was flying at approximately
25:5530 feet above the ground.
26:00Regardless of any other data,
26:02this data was extremely important.
26:04Take off. Go around power.
26:05No airplane of that size
26:08or of any other size
26:09should make a flight past that claw.
26:14The data is clear.
26:16You were at 30 feet, not 100.
26:19I believed I was at 100 feet.
26:22Claude Bechet is still uncertain
26:24how the A320 ended up
26:26so dangerously close to the ground.
26:28Captain Asseline insists his instruments failed him.
26:32Flaps 2.
26:33Quebec, November, hotel.
26:34I'm saying, Fox, Echo, 984.
26:38Okay.
26:399-8-4.
26:40Captain Asseline was relying
26:41on his barometric altimeter.
26:43It uses air pressure
26:45to measure the plane's distance
26:46from the ground.
26:47It had to be set
26:49to local atmospheric pressure
26:51to be accurate.
26:53Quebec, November, hotel.
26:55I'm saying, Fox, Echo, 984.
26:58Okay.
27:009-8-4.
27:01Put in 9-8-4.
27:01The cockpit recorder proves
27:03that the tower provided
27:04the pressure reading
27:05and the crew set their instrument.
27:08But Asseline insists
27:10the altimeter was giving him
27:11a false reading.
27:13I tell you,
27:15the altimeter said
27:16the plane was at 100 feet.
27:19Michel Asseline stated
27:21that the barometric altimeter
27:24was, in fact,
27:26to be precise,
27:2767 feet out.
27:29And that is something
27:31that he claims
27:32led him to be flying
27:34at 30 feet
27:36instead of at 100 feet.
27:39Investigators are skeptical.
27:41Asseline had more than one instrument
27:43to give him altitude information.
27:44The A320 has a second altimeter
27:49that uses radio waves
27:50to calculate the plane's distance
27:52from the ground.
27:55That altimeter displays the altitude
27:57on a digital display.
28:00But Captain Asseline claims
28:01it was difficult to read.
28:03We could not use
28:05the radio altimeter
28:06because this radio altimeter
28:08is digital
28:09and nobody can fly
28:10by reading numbers.
28:11because I try that
28:12later on the simulator.
28:13I never succeed to do it.
28:15But the radio altimeter
28:16has another way
28:17of alerting pilots.
28:19OK, there.
28:20A digital voice call-out.
28:22Disconnect out of throttle.
28:24But Asseline claims
28:25he and his first officer,
28:26Pierre Mazier,
28:27could not hear it.
28:28Some people say
28:30that you could have heard
28:31the radio altimeter
28:33saying 30, 30,
28:3450, 40, 30.
28:36No, because at that time
28:37this aircraft
28:37was very, very noisy
28:39and we have the headsets.
28:41And we have demonstrated
28:42at that time
28:43that the radio altimeter warnings
28:45or the radio altimeter call-outs,
28:47they were not going through
28:48the headset.
28:50Despite Asseline's defense,
28:52investigators are certain
28:53that the crew of Flight 296
28:55mishandled a risky maneuver.
28:59Bechet has more questions
29:00for Captain Asseline.
29:02What did you do
29:03when you saw the trees?
29:06I did what any pilot would do.
29:09I tried to climb over them.
29:11Investigators learned
29:12that in the final moments
29:13before the crash,
29:14Captain Asseline applied
29:17full throttle.
29:21It's when I was waiting
29:22for the engine to spool up
29:24that I realized
29:25in front of me
29:25there were trees
29:26and I was waiting,
29:28waiting, waiting, waiting.
29:30But he claims
29:31the engines did not respond.
29:34And when they finally kicked in,
29:36it was too late.
29:39I tell you,
29:40the engines did not come on
29:42when I gave it full throttle.
29:43Captain Asseline's testimony
29:45raises a troubling prospect.
29:48If there was a prolonged delay
29:50in engine response,
29:51it could indicate
29:52a critical problem
29:53with the A320's turbojets.
30:02Captain Asseline is convinced
30:04the engines didn't respond
30:05quickly enough
30:06in the final seconds
30:07of the flight.
30:10He makes it his mission
30:11to prove it.
30:14He uncovers an Airbus document
30:16warning of a defect
30:17on the A320.
30:20It says the plane's engine speed
30:22could stagnate
30:23at low altitude,
30:25a condition caused
30:26by poor airflow.
30:28When this occurs,
30:29the engine cannot accelerate.
30:34But investigators
30:35can find no evidence
30:37of such a failure
30:37in any of the data
30:39from the plane.
30:39In the five seconds
30:45after Captain Asseline
30:46applied full power
30:47on the thrust levers,
30:49the A320's twin engines
30:51had begun to spool up.
30:53They reached 84% thrust,
30:56close to full power,
30:57just before the plane
30:59hit the trees.
30:59When you put
31:01from idle
31:02to full power,
31:05you have the impression
31:05that nothing happens
31:06for a few seconds,
31:09and then the power comes.
31:11That was normal,
31:13exactly as predicted
31:14by the certification.
31:17Investigators
31:17are increasingly certain
31:19the engines
31:19on flight 296
31:21didn't fail.
31:22They find a novel way
31:24to verify the data.
31:27Video of the crash
31:28picked up
31:29the distinctive sound
31:30of the A320's
31:31engines accelerating.
31:43By studying that sound,
31:46engineers can determine
31:47how much power
31:48the engines were generating
31:49in the final seconds
31:50before the crash.
31:52We were able to compare
31:54the RPM of the engines
31:56from that film
31:57and from the flight
32:00data recorder.
32:02There was nothing wrong
32:03with the engines,
32:04any of the two engines.
32:07Chief investigator
32:08Claude Bechet
32:09has a new headache.
32:11Captain Asseline
32:12is convinced
32:13there is a conspiracy
32:14against him.
32:15He cuts off
32:16all cooperation
32:17with the investigation.
32:19Investigation committee,
32:20I tried to cooperate
32:21with them,
32:22but I began to be suspicious.
32:23and the press
32:24each week
32:24the aircraft
32:25is good,
32:26the aircraft
32:26has nothing,
32:27pilot error,
32:28pilot error,
32:28pilot error.
32:29All that was a big,
32:30big, big cover-up,
32:31my opinion.
32:35Captain Asseline
32:36begins a campaign
32:37to challenge
32:38the French investigation.
32:41He appears
32:42on British television
32:43to make a dramatic
32:44assertion.
32:44When I pull the stick
32:47to up position,
32:49the flight control,
32:49the elevator control
32:50go to down position.
32:52So on any aircraft,
32:54if you ask up,
32:56following the order
32:56of the pilots,
32:57the elevator control
32:58goes to up.
32:59And not that on that one,
33:01it went to down.
33:02Why?
33:03That would be
33:03the good question.
33:05His accusations
33:06go to the heart
33:07of doubts
33:08about the aircraft.
33:09The DARE bus
33:11fly-by-wire system
33:12had given the A320's
33:13computers
33:14too much control.
33:20Asseline's claim
33:21that the plane
33:22didn't follow
33:22his instructions
33:23is supported
33:24by data
33:25from the plane's
33:26flight recorder.
33:27The black box
33:29recorded every movement
33:30of the pilot's
33:31side stick controller.
33:33It does show
33:34that seconds
33:34before the crash,
33:36Captain Asseline
33:36pulled it back
33:37to get the plane's
33:38nose up.
33:40Investigators compare
33:41it with what the plane
33:42did in response.
33:44They make a perplexing
33:45discovery.
33:46He's telling the truth.
33:47The elevator
33:48moved down.
33:49In the final seconds
33:51before the accident,
33:52the pilots
33:53had desperately
33:54tried to pull up.
33:56The side stick
33:57controls the plane's
33:58elevator.
33:59Pulling back on it
34:00should raise the elevator
34:01and pitch the plane
34:02upwards.
34:06But that's not
34:07what happened
34:07on this flight.
34:09One of the strange
34:11things about
34:12the crash flight
34:13which became apparent
34:14when the digital
34:16flight recorder
34:17was analyzed
34:19was that during
34:20the last few seconds
34:22prior to contact
34:23with the trees,
34:25the pilot
34:25was dragging back
34:27on the stick
34:28as hard as he could.
34:30But the
34:31flight surfaces
34:33were moving
34:33into a position
34:34to put the nose
34:35down.
34:37Captain Asseline
34:38believes the plane's
34:39descent
34:39triggered an automatic
34:41response by the
34:42flight computers.
34:44Asseline inadvertently
34:45brought his plane
34:46to within 30 feet
34:47of the ground
34:48with his landing gear
34:49down and his flaps
34:50extended.
34:51investigators now wonder
34:53if the plane's
34:54computer determined
34:55that Asseline
34:56was landing
34:57and initiated
34:58the necessary steps
34:59to accomplish that.
35:00As the plane
35:02leveled up
35:03with the
35:04airfield,
35:05it overflew
35:06a little
35:07copse of trees
35:08which took
35:09the radar
35:10altitude
35:11momentarily
35:12below 30 feet.
35:14That would have
35:15been sufficient
35:16to trigger
35:17the flight control
35:18system
35:18to enter
35:19landing mode.
35:23It's possible
35:24that in spite
35:25of what Captain
35:25Asseline
35:26was commanding
35:27the plane
35:27to do,
35:28the computer
35:29brought the
35:30plane's nose
35:30down for landing.
35:36Investigators
35:37must try
35:37to determine
35:38whether the
35:39A320
35:39overrode
35:40its pilot
35:41at a critical
35:42moment.
35:46They analyzed
35:47the data
35:48from the
35:48flight recorder.
35:54Stop it there.
35:56But to their
35:57disappointment,
35:58So was the
35:59plane in
35:59landing mode
36:00or not?
36:01the flight
36:01data recorder
36:02can't confirm
36:03if the plane
36:04went into
36:04landing mode.
36:06The A320
36:08systems are
36:08so advanced
36:09that the
36:10recorder can't
36:11track all
36:11of the
36:12plane's
36:12functions.
36:15Investigator
36:15Claude Bechet
36:16comes up with
36:17another way
36:17to find out.
36:20He replicates
36:21Asseline's
36:22approach to
36:22the Habshaim
36:23airfield
36:23to see how
36:25the A320
36:26responds.
36:26Okay.
36:28Let's start
36:29the descent.
36:31Power to
36:31flight
36:32idle.
36:36Now put it
36:37into Alpha
36:37Max.
36:39That's it.
36:41Gently.
36:43I replayed
36:44the accident,
36:46but on the
36:48longest runway
36:50in Toulouse.
36:52Altitude,
36:5440 feet,
36:5535 feet.
36:57We replayed
36:58the accident
36:58exactly what
36:59it was.
37:01Bechet's plan
37:01is to descend
37:02to 30 feet
37:03as Asseline's
37:04A320 did.
37:06Now pull up
37:07slightly to level
37:08off.
37:09Hold it there.
37:10Bechet wants
37:18to see if
37:19the flight
37:19computer puts
37:20the plane
37:20in landing
37:21mode.
37:22Okay,
37:23now full thrust.
37:29Did you feel
37:29that?
37:32Alpha protection.
37:33The test flight
37:34has triggered
37:35a nose-down
37:36response from
37:36the plane's
37:37computers,
37:38like the
37:38crash of
37:39Flight 296.
37:44But the
37:45plane hadn't
37:46gone into
37:46landing mode.
37:47Instead,
37:48the flyover
37:48had activated
37:49one of the
37:50A320's
37:51main safety
37:51features,
37:53stall
37:54protection.
37:55Due to a
37:56lack of airflow
37:57over the
37:57wings,
37:58flying slowly
37:59in a nose-high
38:00position can
38:01cause a plane
38:01to lose lift.
38:04The A320's
38:04computer has
38:05been programmed
38:06to bring the
38:06plane's nose-down
38:07when it gets
38:08close to
38:09stalling.
38:10This means
38:11that in theory,
38:12as long as the
38:13flight control
38:13system is in
38:15operation,
38:16the pilot cannot
38:17stall the plane.
38:20Bechet concludes
38:21the flight computers
38:22did override
38:23Captain Asseline's
38:24command.
38:25But he believes
38:26that by doing so,
38:28it had prevented
38:28the plane from
38:29stalling and
38:30crashing just
38:31short of the
38:31treeline.
38:32That airplane
38:37didn't stall
38:38and, let's say,
38:41landed on the
38:43trees.
38:44The investigation
38:46into the crash
38:47at Habshaim
38:47is coming to an
38:48end.
38:50Claude Bechet
38:51prepares to
38:52deliver his
38:52verdict.
38:54The conclusion
38:55of my report
38:56was that the
38:57airplane was
38:58too low,
38:59too slow,
39:01and with
39:02not enough
39:02power.
39:11As far as
39:12Claude Bechet
39:13is concerned,
39:14the report is
39:15the final word
39:16on the Habshaim
39:16tragedy.
39:18The case,
39:19however,
39:20is far from
39:21over.
39:22The French
39:23justice system
39:24is moving towards
39:25a judgment
39:25of Captain
39:26Asseline.
39:30He is charged
39:31with involuntary
39:32homicide in the
39:33deaths of three
39:34passengers and
39:35faces the prospect
39:36of a long
39:37prison sentence.
39:40But Captain
39:41Asseline believes
39:41he has found
39:42evidence that
39:43will exonerate
39:43him.
39:45He is convinced
39:46there was a
39:46conspiracy to
39:47tamper with the
39:48plane's black
39:49boxes, to
39:50conceal problems
39:51with the A320's
39:52fly-by-wire
39:53technology.
39:55There has been
39:56a cover-up
39:56with some
39:57funny recorders.
39:59That's the
40:00first point.
40:01The second point,
40:02they have been
40:02changing the
40:03content of the
40:04recorders.
40:06It all begins,
40:07according to
40:07Asseline,
40:08at the crash
40:09site.
40:10An employee
40:11of France's
40:12Civil Aviation
40:13Authority is
40:14photographed
40:14carrying the
40:15A320's flight
40:16recorders from
40:17the scene.
40:19Those same
40:20black boxes
40:21are presented
40:22as evidence
40:22at Asseline's
40:23trial.
40:25But inexplicably,
40:26they look
40:27different.
40:31I had a chance
40:32to see the
40:33black boxes
40:33held by the
40:34court.
40:35But when I see
40:36the state
40:36they're in,
40:37they're old
40:37boxes, full of
40:39scratches, dusty,
40:40with chipped
40:40paint.
40:41I think, wait,
40:43these can't be the
40:44boxes from the
40:44crash.
40:45The plane was
40:46new.
40:46They're not the
40:47right ones.
40:47Captain Asseline
40:52hires a Swiss
40:53criminology
40:54institute to
40:55compare the
40:55two photographs.
40:57Its conclusion,
40:59they're not the
40:59same flight
41:00recorders.
41:05Captain
41:06Michel Asseline
41:07claims the
41:07black box data
41:08from his flight
41:09has been tampered
41:10with.
41:11But investigator
41:11Claude Bechet
41:12rejects the
41:13accusations as
41:14outrageous.
41:16They were
41:17trying to
41:18prove that
41:20the tapes
41:20had been
41:22tampered with,
41:24which we
41:25could not
41:25understand,
41:26because every
41:27recorder expert
41:28knew that it
41:30was physically
41:31impossible.
41:34But there is
41:35one expert who
41:36believes the
41:36black boxes are
41:37suspicious.
41:39Ray Davis is
41:40a former head
41:41of flight recorder
41:41analysis at
41:42Britain's Air
41:43Accidents
41:43Investigation Branch.
41:46He has been
41:47hired by
41:48British Television
41:49to review the
41:49French
41:50investigator's
41:50work.
41:52It was a
41:53little bit of
41:53an eye-opener
41:54in a way,
41:55in that prior
41:56to reading
41:57the report,
42:00I had a
42:01totally different
42:02impression of
42:03the possible
42:04causes of
42:05this accident,
42:06whereas when I
42:06read the
42:07report, there
42:08were so many
42:09anomalies and
42:10questions raised
42:11by the report
42:12that my
42:14whole attitude
42:15towards the
42:16accident changed
42:17completely.
42:19Davis discovers
42:21evidence that
42:21could vindicate
42:22Asseline.
42:24It raises
42:25questions about
42:25when the crew
42:26applied power to
42:27try to overfly
42:28the trees.
42:2930.
42:3130.
42:3230.
42:3330.
42:3330.
42:3330.
42:3330.
42:3330.
42:36While studying
42:37the black box
42:38data, Davis
42:39comes across a
42:40curious inconsistency.
42:43French investigators
42:45had synchronized the
42:46black boxes with a
42:47transcript of air
42:48traffic control
42:48communications.
42:51Davis examines the
42:53last conversation the
42:54pilots had with the
42:55tower before the
42:55crash.
42:56It was recorded by
43:01both air traffic
43:02control and the
43:03plane's own black
43:04box.
43:17Ray Davis discovers
43:19a time discrepancy
43:20between the two
43:21recordings, amounting
43:22to a loss of several
43:24seconds.
43:27According to the
43:28black box data, the
43:29aircraft was five
43:30seconds from impact
43:32with the trees when
43:32Captain Asseline
43:33commanded full thrust
43:34from the engines.
43:38But according to Ray
43:39Davis' analysis, this
43:41actually took place
43:42four seconds earlier.
43:44This four-second gap
43:46dramatically changes the
43:47calculus of the
43:48accident.
43:49It's the difference
43:50between a normal delay
43:51in engine response and
43:52a serious malfunction.
43:56Asseline claims that
43:59on this particular
44:00occasion, the delay
44:02was more than he
44:03expected.
44:04And depending upon
44:07which side of the
44:08argument you come down
44:10at as to whether or not
44:11the four-second delay
44:13in the digital flight data
44:14recording was real or
44:17not, then he's either an
44:23idiot or he's right.
44:26The French justice system
44:28does not believe that
44:29Asseline is right.
44:32After multiple appeals,
44:34Michelle Asseline is
44:35convicted of involuntary
44:36homicide and sentenced to
44:38ten months in prison.
44:42Still, the controversy
44:44over the black boxes and
44:45the missing four seconds
44:46lingers on.
44:47It promises to forever
44:51cloud the results of
44:52Claude Bechet's
44:53investigation.
44:56The public opinion
44:57thought probably, oh,
45:00well, there was so much
45:02at stake, you know.
45:04It was the future of all
45:05European aviation industry
45:10which was at stake.
45:11So they managed to
45:13tamper the tapes so
45:16they could blame the
45:18pilot and not the
45:19airplane.
45:20But this is just
45:21impossible.
45:23The investigation into
45:24the Habschaim accident
45:25made several
45:25recommendations.
45:28It calls for passengers
45:30to be banned on all
45:31demonstration flights.
45:34It also calls for
45:35better reconnaissance of
45:36airfields by flight
45:37crews.
45:38And they want
45:40airline procedures
45:41to be reviewed to
45:42ensure they conform with
45:43official regulations
45:44concerning altitude.
46:03Michelle Asseline went
46:05on to a career as a
46:06teacher and inventor in
46:07the aviation industry.
46:10He continues to appeal
46:11his conviction and has
46:14devoted much of his life
46:15to clearing his name.
46:18The tragedy at Habschaim
46:20would have little impact
46:21on Airbus industry.
46:25The A320 would go on to
46:28become one of the most
46:29successful commercial
46:30aircraft in history,
46:32selling over 750 planes
46:34in its first 10 years.
46:36and fly-by-wire technology
46:39would be safely adopted
46:40by a new generation
46:41of passenger aircraft.
46:43and the other.
46:44And the other.
46:50The A320 will continue to
46:51scale ahead of the
46:51next day.
46:51The newẹ is a
46:52new generation
46:53of aircraft in the
46:53hard-based aviation
46:54of aircraft.
46:55And the then
46:56another.
46:56I'm doing
46:57the two.
46:57And the third
46:58of the aircraft
46:58would have been
46:59added to the aircraft.
47:00And the third
47:01with the aircraft
47:01of aircraft.
47:02And the second
47:02with the aircraft
47:03of aircraft.
47:04And the third
47:06is also
47:07a pc.