🔥 THE CHAPLIN PARALLEL: A Cautionary Tale
1️⃣ Chaplin’s Fall – Praised U.S.-USSR alliance vs. Nazis → Branded a communist → Exiled.
2️⃣ WWII’s Irony – Despite McCarthyism, U.S. & USSR cooperated to crush Hitler.
3️⃣ Today’s Lesson? – Will anti-Russia hysteria doom potential U.S.-Moscow thaw?
💡 SUCHKOV’S KEY ARGUMENTS:
✔ "History Rhymes" – Demonizing Russia today mirrors Cold War blindness.
✔ "Enemy Myopia" – U.S. fixates on Putin but ignores bigger threats (China, global chaos).
✔ "WWII’s Legacy" – Even bitter rivals UNITED against existential threats. Could Ukraine war force a reset?
⚖️ WAR OR THAW? The Stakes Now
ESCALATION PATH → NATO-Russia clash, global famine, nuclear brinkmanship.
DÉTENTE PATH → Frozen conflict, sanctions relief, focus on China.
Biden’s Dilemma – Keep fueling Ukraine war or seek off-ramp before 2024?
#ChaplinLesson
#USRussiaThaw
#ColdWarRepeat
#MaximSuchkov
#WWIIParallels
#EnemyOfMyEnemy
#BidenPutin
#UkraineOffRamp
#McCarthyismReturns
#GeopoliticalCrossroads
1️⃣ Chaplin’s Fall – Praised U.S.-USSR alliance vs. Nazis → Branded a communist → Exiled.
2️⃣ WWII’s Irony – Despite McCarthyism, U.S. & USSR cooperated to crush Hitler.
3️⃣ Today’s Lesson? – Will anti-Russia hysteria doom potential U.S.-Moscow thaw?
💡 SUCHKOV’S KEY ARGUMENTS:
✔ "History Rhymes" – Demonizing Russia today mirrors Cold War blindness.
✔ "Enemy Myopia" – U.S. fixates on Putin but ignores bigger threats (China, global chaos).
✔ "WWII’s Legacy" – Even bitter rivals UNITED against existential threats. Could Ukraine war force a reset?
⚖️ WAR OR THAW? The Stakes Now
ESCALATION PATH → NATO-Russia clash, global famine, nuclear brinkmanship.
DÉTENTE PATH → Frozen conflict, sanctions relief, focus on China.
Biden’s Dilemma – Keep fueling Ukraine war or seek off-ramp before 2024?
#ChaplinLesson
#USRussiaThaw
#ColdWarRepeat
#MaximSuchkov
#WWIIParallels
#EnemyOfMyEnemy
#BidenPutin
#UkraineOffRamp
#McCarthyismReturns
#GeopoliticalCrossroads
Category
🗞
NewsTranscript
00:00Hello and welcome to Worlds Apart.
00:16When Charlie Chaplin started calling for the United States to help the USSR in the war against Nazism, it was the beginning of his downfall.
00:25Soon after he was accused of communist sympathies, the media turned against him and he was ultimately forced to leave the United States.
00:33Nevertheless, America did open up a second front and World War II ended with the defeat of the warmongering party.
00:41Can that offer any lessons for the present moment in the U.S.-Russia relationship?
00:47Well, to discuss that, I'm now joined by Maksim Suchpov, director of the Institute for International Studies at Mgimoy University in Russia.
00:54Maksim, it's amazing to see you again, to talk to you. Thank you very much for this opportunity.
00:58Thank you. Pleasure to be with you.
01:00Now, I chose to begin with this allusion to Charlie Chaplin because he wasn't afraid to risk the stardom, the social capital of his movie persona, accidentally called The Tramp, for what he believed in as a human being.
01:18We now have another person with a similarly sounding last name but with much greater powers attempting to do a similar fit.
01:27What do you make of Donald Trump's peacemaking efforts so far?
01:32Well, first of all, I think his genuine and his desire to, you know, settle the conflict.
01:37And I think we have to be realistic in saying that the conflict at the moment cannot be resolved and at best can be settled.
01:44And I think he's made some important moves as to how the United States policy evolved even, you know, within this like three to four months since he took office.
01:55But there are still important, you know, thundling blocks on the road and for the moment a lot of things that both the Trump administration and his envoys are talking about are not necessarily addressing the root causes of the conflict.
02:10And, of course, there's a lot of way to go.
02:12I mean, you mentioned Charlie Chaplin and I think Trump himself throughout his career has been in two worlds.
02:19The world of big money, you know, the businessman is an entrepreneur and the world of emotions and shows, you know, the world of media.
02:27And that actually demands from you different tactics and how you behave, how you do things.
02:33Can I ask you about that?
02:34Because I've long been fascinated by this role that big emotions, ostracizing emotions like fear, shame, embarrassment, scorn play in the American politics and American public life in terms of manufacturing the desired outcome, manufacturing consent.
02:52And it seems to take a very specific kind of person to be able to not only withstand this emotional pressure, but actually deal with it and sometimes deflect it back to their adversaries.
03:03What do you think is ultimately driving Trump?
03:06You know, Graham Allison, one of the patriarchs of American foreign policy, once noted that everyone is taking Trump literally but not seriously while it should be the other way around.
03:16People should be taking him seriously but not literally.
03:19And I think that's kind of a good formula to look at how Trump is moving on things.
03:24And when during the election campaign, I think the Democrats have exploited the emotion of fear and have to scare the American voters from the type of America that will be engulfed by Trumpism.
03:37Whereas the Trump supporters have exploited the emotion of anger.
03:42You know, Trump has eventually emerged as a candidate of angry white men predominantly in the first campaign.
03:49And then it became more kind of complicated during the second campaign.
03:53In the past campaign, the Democrats tried to infuse the idea of the future and joy.
04:00You remember all this kind of fake joyful campaign by Kamala Harris and Tim Walz.
04:04But they were not the right people that Americans did not believe that message.
04:08Now, Maxim, you have written before that Trump cares first and foremost about his own interests.
04:15But he's selfish in a new, more realistic, more pragmatic sort of way.
04:21And I think it's this pragmatism or I would even say literalism, this ability to ground discussions in something concrete that I think that's the quality that the Kremlin appreciates in the new administration.
04:37What do you think?
04:38I agree.
04:39I think this is the type of language that Kremlin has long, you know, wanted to hear from the West and from the United States leadership in particular.
04:48And some may say this is a language of the great powers that, you know, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump speak the same language in that stance.
04:56Others may think, well, that's a type of language that has, you know, helped both powers navigate their differences during the Cold War because, you know, everyone is talking about the Cold War 2.0.
05:08But this is actually a period of history where, you know, being able to speak in pragmatic terms enabled the two powers to do things and at the same time disagree on other things.
05:21So I think that type of language is exactly quite comfortable and understandable, at least for people.
05:27And I think it also has a sort of grounding and reality connecting strict to it.
05:35And Trump himself was very public about his disdain for freeloaders whom he thinks rip America off.
05:44But I think if we look at it in strategic terms, this tendency of the United States to subsidize and finance its allies did create a sort of moral hazard.
05:56Problem where countries like Poland, Estonia and Lettly, Ukraine act in not just belligerent, but far more reckless way than the immediate resources that the immediate circumstances or the size of their militaries allow them.
06:13And I wonder if that's one of the main problems, one of the main structural reasons for the downfall of the Western Latin order, this moral hazard problem embedded with it.
06:23There were two kind of streams of thought in the Russian thinking about the West-led order.
06:30One suggested that there was, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the so-called kind of manufactured consensus, imposed consensus that the United States elites imposed on the rest of the world to try to create the idea that there is a consensus and everyone agrees with whatever America is doing.
06:47Others thought that America was on top because it was able to create a number of incentives for a great number of its allies who are now running to defend Pax Americana, even when the United States seeks to amend it.
07:04And I think Trump is now offering a new type of dominance that is kind of nationalist as opposed to the globalist.
07:15But he's also did something very important, I think, for the first time, at least since the breakup of the bipolar system.
07:22He kind of separated the component of leadership and the controlment of dominance.
07:27He still wants the United States to dominate in some of the key areas, but he doesn't seem to want to take leadership on some of the entanglements that he believes did not serve America well.
07:38One of the very popular words in his vocabulary is real.
07:43And I think when we, if we take the concept of realism literally, both literally and seriously, what is ultimately to be in touch with reality?
07:53It's to coordinate your aims and your means to, because, I mean, we learn about reality from our immediate interaction with it.
08:00But if you are, you know, underwritten by, you know, a powerful ally, your perception of reality, your perception of yourself will be distorted.
08:12And somehow it escaped from, you know, the mind of strategic thinkers in either Ukraine or Poland or many other European countries.
08:22Do you think it's destined to come back or do you think they will attempt to sort of live in a world where their abilities are much greater than they are, like, in material terms?
08:34I think part of your question is answered by Secretary Rubio in one of his first interviews where he talked about this idea of multipolarity,
08:43where he thought or he kind of voiced whatever there is the consensus within the administration,
08:50that the previous era of US policy was actually serving too many players, too many allies without some specific real outcomes for the United States.
09:06So America was kind of burdened by a number of, you know, entanglements, obligations, you name it.
09:14That is somewhat different view from what Russia believes, because Russia, as we know, believes that since the 1990s,
09:21because there was no kind of counterweight to American dominance in the world,
09:25America thought, you know, they can do whatever they want without, you know, needing any.
09:30So this administration believes this was kind of unnecessary burden because there was no one else to share this responsibility with.
09:39The US kind of assumed the responsibility of a kind of world policeman, and now they want to reassess it.
09:45But like I said, it's a different type of leadership.
09:48It's kind of nationalist idea against the globalist idea.
09:52Maybe this policy will be too expensive.
09:55And, you know, in the next administration, in 10 years, some new American elites would come back and say,
10:01well, actually within the globalism actually served us well.
10:04Now, speaking about carrying the burden, Trump said the other day, very succinctly, I thought in relation to Ukraine,
10:10that, you know, you don't start a war against somebody who is 20 times your size and then ask people to provide you with missiles.
10:17And, you know, it's a very poignant statement because up until recently, you know, the whole argument in the West was centering around who started the kinetic phase of the conflict.
10:29But he's actually pointing the finger, not just at Ukraine, but he's accusing Ukraine of warmongering.
10:35He says that you don't start the war.
10:37He is not saying that Russia started it, actually.
10:40How do you think this will be received in Ukraine?
10:44Do you think there is any chance of the leadership in Ukraine assessing the situation around them and, you know, coming to some sense of not necessarily even reality,
10:55but what the immediate interest and possibilities are?
10:59Well, I think any departure from the previous U.S. position is painful to Ukraine.
11:05So that remark by Trump is a departure from the previous U.S. position.
11:10He made it clear during his meeting with Zelensky in the White House that he sees U.S. as in the middle as opposed to on the Ukraine side.
11:18And that's also a painful reality for Ukrainians.
11:22And I think since 2022, there was a key disagreement between kind of this information flows in the narrative that the Russia promoted and the West promoted,
11:32where Russia said it's basically a war of necessity for us, whereas the West said it's a war of choice.
11:39Hence, we hear these different rhetoric, you know, on Russia's kind of full-scale invasion as if, you know, it started all of a sudden,
11:45whereas Russia is telling you how it came to that point and how it's bad.
11:50So I think Trump's reassessment of that is also kind of getting more comprehensive of how things actually were in the past and how they are in the present.
11:59Speaking of which, John Meirsheimer, one of the top American political scientists, gave an interview recently,
12:05and he essentially made a similar point in relation to the European Union, rather,
12:13saying that Ukraine in continuing with this war is essentially a device for the EU to keep the bloc together.
12:21And his argument was that with America decreasing its services to Ukraine and without this externalized, concocted threat,
12:34the EU cannot stay as one piece because there is nothing to keep it integrated from within.
12:42There are multiple economic, social, what have you, challenges.
12:46And if the war is solved somehow, then the EU would inevitably disintegrate into some sort of squabbles,
12:56hopefully not fighting, not direct fighting.
12:59What do you think about it?
13:00Well, I think Professor Meirsheimer's argument speaks to a very important observation,
13:04which is neither Ukraine nor the European Union have a positive agenda,
13:09whereas the United States with Trump started to have a positive agenda.
13:13At least they are trying to build a new vision, a new reality for themselves.
13:18That would mean, you know, taking lead in AI, other things.
13:23They have agenda other than the conflict in Ukraine, whereas Ukrainians and Europeans do not have that agenda.
13:30And, of course, Ukrainians and the Zelensky cabinet and the Europeans have rallied around this Russia war thing,
13:41and they are now building their future around a conflict or the conflict with Russia.
13:47That is actually a bad thing in terms of it does not leave a lot of room for compromise.
13:51It actually makes Russia, leaves Russia with no other choice rather than, you know, try to put the lead on the system
13:58and make it boil with their own internal contradictions in the best hope that the warmongers will get evaporated in some point
14:05and new people come to power.
14:06We will take a very short break, but we will be back in just a few moments. Stay tuned.
14:10Welcome back to Worlds Apart with Maksim Suchkov, director of the Institute for International Studies at Mgimoy University in Russia.
14:24Maksim, let's talk about the ongoing U.S.-Russian negotiations.
14:27Steven Witkov, Trump's special envoy, has just had his third meeting with a Russian president,
14:34the one that lasted, I think, for approximately five hours.
14:38And knowing the habits of the Russian leaders, of the Russian leader, rather,
14:42I think we can say that whenever he invests that much time and effort into something that's not ceremonial.
14:51Now, given Russia's long-held grievances and Putin's long-held personal grievances against the West,
14:58you know, deceiving Russia on multiple occasions, why do you think he is so committed?
15:03Just this opportunity.
15:04I think two reasons.
15:05One is actually for the first time since late 1980s, early 1990s,
15:11there is this understanding within the Russian leadership that there is no collective West, as we came to call it here.
15:18That there is a real strategic difference, you know, the difference in the strategic vision between the Europeans and the Americans now.
15:27And since perhaps the late 1940s, there is an understanding that the American strategic vision is closer to the Russian than the European.
15:37And whether it takes, you know, five hours, ten hours, five meetings, ten meetings, anything is worth it as long as you are using this time to talk through your differences,
15:48to seek, you know, points of convergence and see how you can avoid the worst-case scenarios and move forward.
15:55Now, speaking about strategic, America's strategic interest, I mentioned John Meirshammer before, and he also made a very interesting point that,
16:04ultimately, one of the reasons why Trump seems to be so committed to this track is not because he is seeking, you know, a Nobel Peace Prize,
16:12but that the United States has a vested interest in having a workable, predictable relationship with Russia that actually goes far beyond Trump.
16:23And it's, you know, Washington needs it perhaps even more than Moscow.
16:27Do you agree with that assessment?
16:29Well, first of all, I don't think the Nobel Prize-seeking and, you know, serving your country's interest are mutually exclusive.
16:35But in seriousness, you know, any U.S. president acts in three kind of domains.
16:41As a bureaucrat, as a politician who seeks re-election and the best for his party, and as a commander-in-chief.
16:47So, as a commander-in-chief, I think there is this view within the Trump administration, with Trump personally,
16:55that good relations with Russia, or normalized at least relations with Russia, serve U.S. interests best, full stop.
17:03And then there is, you know, this whole architecture around how to normalize it, given a number of huge blocks on the way.
17:13Now, I also heard you say in a recent interview that this previous belief that, you know, somehow the U.S.-Russia or the U.S.-USSR relationship
17:25are the main one determining the nature of the international system, that that argument, many people thought that that argument was outdated.
17:35But apparently, you know, it's been buried prematurely because many countries to this point are watching the dynamic between Washington and Moscow
17:45and adjusting their own policies to that rather than trying to chart their own course. Why is that?
17:51Well, look, if we think of U.S.-China relations as kind of the centerpiece of the current world politics, as a lot of people think,
17:59it is about the future of the world, right? How the power balances would look like, how, you know, trade would look like,
18:07what type of AI would define how people work, live and interact with one another. So it is indeed about the future.
18:13U.S.-Russia relations are about whether the world would exist at all, given the number of war arsenals
18:21and the trajectory of escalation that the both countries were on the path for the past three years.
18:28You know, some who in the West argue that, you know, Russia would not dare to escalate
18:35are pretty much the same people who have been telling their audiences for the ten years that Putin would do nothing
18:40in response to NATO enlargement and would not dare to use force to defend its interests in Georgia and in Ukraine.
18:47So I would, you know, be careful thinking that Russia is not going to move there.
18:52But a lot of people actually learn from the crisis that there's so much connectivity both to Russia and Eurasia and U.S.
19:00and how these things work. So they really, you know, underappreciated a lot of things that Russia has been doing
19:06and the role of Russia in the world. And they're now learning again in a painful way to reassess that role
19:12and that relationship with the U.S.
19:14Now, speaking about practical or pragmatic implications of this thaw, one of the things that puzzled me a lot
19:22is all this squabble about Ukrainian resources, including the rare earth deal that is now under discussion.
19:30And what's notable to me is that the Kremlin is taking a back seat and seeing the West trying to sort of divide
19:39whatever is left of Ukraine rather than, you know, trying to get itself into the fray.
19:45How do you understand this posture on the part of Russia?
19:48Well, there was an article written by President Putin in 2021 on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians
19:54where among these arguments, and if you just forget for a moment about the, you know, Ukrainians and Russians are one people argument,
20:03it's the argument is pretty much that normal economic relations with Russia are the only plausible way for Ukraine to function as a normal state.
20:14Because in the other states, you know, Ukraine is such a huge country that it cannot live on Western donations.
20:20And we know that donations come with certain political price tag and economic price tag.
20:25Another option is it really becomes a resource appendage.
20:29And it's pretty much given its resources to others.
20:32So I think we're seeing somewhat, you know, similar to what with this deal.
20:37And the third one is you have to normalize economic and trade relations with Russia because no one needs your products in Europe.
20:44Look at the reaction of Polish farmers to the European initiative to, you know, help Ukrainian agricultural imports.
20:51This is, again, one of the painful realities that if you don't, you know, grapple with timely, you'll just have more problems with it.
21:01Do you understand your answer correctly that Putin is taking a back seat watching how the West is trying to divide Ukraine among themselves simply because he knows or he believes that, you know, reality and history will take care of it.
21:16And sooner or later, if Ukraine wants to be self-sufficient and sovereign and independent, it will have to come around?
21:23Maybe, but also I think there is some hidden element here.
21:27I think one of the reasons why Ukrainians are not really going forward with this rare earth metals deal with the Americans, my, you know, guess only is that either the British have already have that finger in that pie or the Ukrainians acting upon the advice from London to just weigh Trump out.
21:46And then, you know, give the resources and other things to the, you know, to the British or the French or other Europeans.
21:52Now, I also want to ask you about Greenland because Trump is very open that his national security claims on that land are driven by a desire to counter or augment Russia's dominance, absolute dominance in that region.
22:09And it seems that the Kremlin is quite undisturbed by that prospect.
22:13In fact, I think it's inviting the White House out and, you know, putting Arctic cooperation as one of the potential boons in mutual diplomacy.
22:24Why would Russia be interested in seeing more the U.S. presence in that region?
22:29Well, it depends on what type of U.S. we're talking about, right?
22:33If it's, you know, advocates a hostile vision, then of course, you know, more of the U.S. presence just creates another zone of geopolitical rivalry with the United States.
22:43If it's the United States that is seeing Russia as a natural and a partner in the further kind of multipolar world, then perhaps there is some pragmatic element here because the Arctic is huge.
23:03And obviously Russia, you know, it does have a fleet of icebreakers, but it also demands a lot of technology that the United States can provide.
23:13So there's a lot of potential for the peaceful discovery of the Arctic together.
23:19And perhaps it would make things easier in the Arctic Council if the U.S. kind of political weight is bigger.
23:26But then, you know, even if none of that materializes, I think there are some low-hanging fruits for Putin to pick from Trump's squabbles with his allies.
23:38Well, part of me thinks that the Trump administration may actually benefit from this idea of defending your national security interests by incorporating another country's territory.
23:54You know, if it becomes a little bit more widespread, then perhaps it would also help the Trump administration to realize its aspirations.
24:02Do you think that may have any implications for the solution of the Ukrainian crisis that the Americans may actually have an inherent interest in recognizing Russia's territorial, new territorial gains,
24:13because it would also make it somewhat easier for the United States to increase its sphere of influence?
24:18I think it will, and it already has.
24:20I don't think they will go as far as to legally recognize it as part of the Russian territory.
24:25I think they de facto have already recognized it.
24:28And, you know, Wyckoff and some of his interviews mentioned, you know, that prospect.
24:33I don't think they will recognize it legally because I think there is this kind of widespread consensus, including among some of the members of the Trump administration.
24:42The territories were not, you know, incorporated peacefully, so it will be too much for the U.S.
24:48But their own potential or possible incorporation of Greenland, I think they will try to make the case of how to incorporate territory through legalistic means and will, you know, create entire campaign of how to do it peacefully.
25:04Now, Maxim, we are approaching the end of our program, but I do want to ask one more question.
25:09You wrote recently that there is one other potential motivation for the two leaders to work together, and that would be the defense of Christian communities in the Middle East.
25:19Now, why would Trump or Putin be interested in something like that? Because it's not pragmatic. It's hard to achieve. And yet, do you think there's something in there?
25:28Well, I think 30 plus years of U.S.-Russia relations has been a constant quest for a solid footing in the relations and, you know, on what grounds the two countries can work together.
25:38You know, disarmament and nonproliferation was, I think, of late 1980s, 1990s.
25:45You know, in the 2000s, Putin thought it was counter-terrorism and, you know, fighting international terrorism.
25:51Then, you know, under Medvedev, they thought it was technological innovation that was crushed against the Arab Spring.
25:58You know, then Putin thought it would be, you know, fighting against ISIS. None of that worked.
26:04But all of these elements, you know, throughout this time, for this kind of 30-something years,
26:10the Christian community in the Middle East have been one of the most persecuted and disprivileged,
26:16and look at the terrible shape that they're in. Given the trends within the administration
26:23and what, you know, J.D. Vance was talking about, the National Catholic Breakfast and the number of evangelicals
26:29and how these people do not shy away from taking a solid stance on defending, you know,
26:35Judo-Christian values or the conservative values, and how this is a big thing for the Russian domestic politics
26:42and history and identity, even though, you know, a lot of people claim, you know,
26:47the Muslims and Hindu and Jewish and non-believers, it's still Christianity is 70-plus percent of the Russian population.
26:54It's an important political and cultural and identity issue. I think there is a lot of potential there
27:01because, again, and I'm speaking perhaps as a Christian, not as an analyst here, one day God will ask you,
27:07what did you do with that chance, whether you exploited it or you did not.
27:11And I think there is a moment now where there is a grave problem, and there is genuine interest in Washington
27:16and Moscow to pursue that, and maybe, you know, Orthodox Evangelicalists and Catholics can come together
27:22in defense of brothers and sisters of Christ.
27:25Now, very quickly, since you mentioned your position not as an analyst but as a Christian,
27:30do you think there is a potential of the two leaders cooperating on that issue, not as presidents but as human beings or as Christians?
27:39Because they, both of them, claim to be Christians.
27:41I do think so, or at least maybe I hope so.
27:44But I think that there is, it's morally right and politically advantages to do.
27:52Oh, that seems to be a good combination for the day. Thank you very much for being with us.
27:58And thank you for watching. Hope to see you again on Worlds Apart.
28:03Thank you very much.