On 6 September 1985, the right engine of Midwest Express Airlines Flight 105 explodes shortly after takeoff from General Mitchell International Airport. The aircraft banks to the right and crashes into an open field in Oak Creek. All 31 people on board are killed.
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00:00I remember being amazed how quickly the accident took place.
00:05They were fine, and the next thing you know, the airplane's lost.
00:11Midwest Express Flight 105 crashes.
00:14Seconds after taking off from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, all 31 people on board are killed.
00:21And what do you say to the public about the crashes that we've been having?
00:251985 becomes one of the deadliest years in civil aviation.
00:30It's up to investigators to put the public at ease.
00:33This is how the plane hit the ground.
00:36When they examine the engines, they find a component prone to failure.
00:41Well, when we heard that this part had failed 45 times before, it's a big deal.
00:47But the flight data turns the investigation on its head.
00:51The ruptured red engine didn't bring down this plane.
00:54It did not.
01:00There are 27 passengers boarding Midwest Express Airlines Flight 105, a cross-country commuter flight
01:26from Milwaukee to Atlanta.
01:28Many are employees of the manufacturer Kimberly Clark.
01:33Midwest Express Airlines used the slogan, best care in the air, and they really meant it,
01:38because they had as close to an all-business aircraft as you could have.
01:43And they also baked fresh cookies on board and made the place smell amazing when you walked on.
01:59Mid-X 105 requesting IFR clearance to Atlanta.
02:03Both pilots on this flight are captains with the airline.
02:08They've already flown two flights together today.
02:15Mid-X 105, clear to Atlanta.
02:17Climb and maintain 5,000.
02:20Climb and maintain 5,000.
02:22Mid-X 105.
02:23For this leg of the flight, Danny Martin will be the acting captain and Bill Weiss, the first officer.
02:30We had two captains, and they literally could switch seats because of that.
02:36And they did do that over the course of two days, flipping out who was the pilot flying and who was the pilot not flying.
02:44Our alternate will be DCA if we can't make Atlanta.
02:46There are thunderstorms in Atlanta, so the crew has taken on additional fuel in case they have to divert to another airport.
02:57Takeoff weight is 771, 22 pounds, set stab trim, 2.2.
03:06Just past three in the afternoon, the pilots start the engines.
03:14Starting number one.
03:16The DC-9 used for today's flight is powered by two Pratt & Whitney engines, mounted on the fuselage at the rear of the plane.
03:28Because the engines were in the back, they were close together, which made for a little bit easier flying in emergency situations.
03:37Second of all, for the passengers, it's quieter.
03:44Can I put that up here for you?
03:49The plane is loaded and ready to depart on schedule.
03:57Airspeed bug, 1.33 set, and 1.9 on the EPR.
04:02Okay.
04:02Ladies and gentlemen, we are number one for departure, so we should be airborne within one minute.
04:16Flight attendants, please be seated.
04:23Mid-X 105, clear for takeoff.
04:27Mid-X 105.
04:28Here we go.
04:35It's pulling up.
04:39This was a very normal morning for a very normal flight.
04:44It was a gorgeous blue sky, September day.
04:48There was a little bit of gusty winds, but it was nothing for Milwaukee.
04:53The pilots need to reach a speed of 127 knots for takeoff.
05:04At 3.21 in the afternoon, flight 105 begins its journey.
05:19The flight plan calls for the plane to climb to an altitude of 33,000 feet for the two-hour trip to Atlanta.
05:28The pilots lose power in one of the engines.
05:35You're up.
05:35It's a critical situation because if you don't do something about it immediately, you won't have time to do anything about it.
05:59Altitude is your friend.
06:06Mid-X 105.
06:08Turn left heading 175.
06:12What do we got here, Bill?
06:16Here.
06:17Mid-X 105, Roger.
06:20The plane begins rolling to the right and dropping.
06:35Oh, crap.
06:37The DC-9 is stalling.
06:42Get your heads down.
06:44Hats down.
06:53Hats down.
06:56Less than a minute after takeoff, flight 105 is diving towards the ground at more than 170 miles an hour.
07:03The plane hits the ground, less than 1,700 feet from the runway.
07:22A DC-9 has crashed southwest of runway 19 right.
07:26All 31 people on board have been killed.
07:43The crash of Midwest Express Flight 105 is the third major accident in the United States this year, and the eighth accident worldwide.
07:53With more than 1,200 people killed, this is becoming one of the deadliest years in the history of civil aviation.
08:01Passengers are unnerved.
08:04Everyone says, my God, another one.
08:06What do you say to the public about the crashes that we've been having?
08:09Well, insofar as the National Transportation Safety Board is concerned, we are sparing no effort to determine the cause of each one of them,
08:15and we will make the necessary recommendations to keep any repeat of any one of them from happening.
08:19And what do you tell them about...
08:20Can you show me where it started at a bank?
08:27Investigators from the NTSB begin by interviewing witnesses of Midwest Express Flight 105's fatal dive.
08:35They either came forward or we tracked them down.
08:38We ended up making out a questionnaire with 40 or 50 questions on it to kind of cover all the bases.
08:43Okay, got it.
08:51While the witness accounts differ in detail, they all describe more or less the same thing.
08:58I saw a couple puffs of black smoke come out, and I just figured that they had gunned the engines a little bit.
09:04Instant later, the left wing rose up, and it tipped over and went nose first into the treasurer.
09:11Most of the witnesses agree that takeoff appeared normal until the airplane was about 300 feet off the ground.
09:22Almost all report smoke and fire coming from the right engine.
09:27Several remember hearing loud bangs.
09:29Most said that the plane then rolled abruptly into a steep right bank, went into a nose-low spin, and crashed.
09:36The value of having so many witness statements to look at, they gave us a picture of what happened right at the end.
09:48A loss of control, fire, and, of course, the impact itself.
09:54Investigators must now determine what could have caused such a catastrophic loss of control so soon after takeoff.
10:02I think the whole length of the impact site was about 295 feet, not much more than two times the length of the airplane.
10:32So, the airplane hit pretty steeply and didn't go very far.
10:37Right wing tip here, and the horizontal stabilizer here.
10:45This is how the plane hit the ground.
10:48A 90-degree right roll and a right yaw.
10:56Can you grab the picture?
10:58Okay.
10:58The wreckage path confirms eyewitness reports.
11:03Right.
11:04It very definitely indicates right up front that you've got a lost control.
11:09It doesn't suggest why you had the lost control.
11:11It kind of opens the door to a lot of different investigative avenues.
11:14Yeah, it's fire damage for sure, but it looks like all the pieces are here.
11:24Investigators study the plane's control surfaces, starting with the ailerons.
11:30The ailerons on each wing direct the plane's roll.
11:33If an aileron malfunctions and gets stuck in one position, it could cause a devastating lack of control.
11:44Control tabs are in place.
11:46They seem to be intact.
11:49We didn't find a problem with other components that are part of that system.
11:54With the ailerons ruled out, investigators turn their attention to the rudder system.
12:03Dampers are still working.
12:05Hinges are intact.
12:08The fractures look like overload, not stress.
12:13I don't think the rudder is our culprit.
12:15We didn't find anything wrong with any of the control systems based on that preliminary look-see.
12:25Could the engines provide insight into the crash of Midwest Express Flight 105?
12:31If the engines were, well, obviously banged up, they were fire damaged,
12:36and they were along the wreckage path, which is always good,
12:40that means they didn't fall off somewhere earlier.
12:46There's a spacer missing here.
12:53Most of the blades from this stage are gone.
12:57The team finds damage inside the right engine that could not have been caused on impact.
13:04The missing engine pieces include a spacer
13:07and the compressor blades from the 9th and 10th compressor stages.
13:12They're found more than half a mile from the main wreckage site.
13:18Finding any part of the airplane short of where the airplane had crashed
13:23was a suggestion of a malfunction or failure that had occurred in flight
13:27and required further investigation.
13:30The engine and the pieces are moved to a nearby warehouse where they can be more closely examined.
13:38In the end, we ended up finding about 90% by weight of the spacer,
13:43so that was a big boon to the investigation.
13:47Investigators study the recovered spacer
13:49to determine why it failed on Midwest Express Flight 105.
13:53All on the pedestal here, it's definitely not overstress.
14:03They discover a telltale crack on the spacer
14:06that appears to have spread over time, what's called progressive cracking.
14:11There may be stress marks, there may be cracks,
14:16there may be things that suggest a direction of failure
14:19and a time frame where the fracture would have occurred.
14:23It doesn't occur all at one time.
14:25Can we determine how long that crack has been spreading for?
14:29I'll see what I can do.
14:32We became interested not just in detailing that,
14:36but trying to find whether this was a fracture
14:39that could have been detected previously.
14:42A closer look at the crack on the steel spacer
14:45reveals it's filled with nickel.
14:48A lightweight nickel coating is applied to certain vital engine pieces
14:52like the compressor spacers and blades to prevent corrosion.
14:58The compressor was brought in to be refurbished in 1981.
15:03Coating stripped, spacer examined, and...
15:06Oh, here we go.
15:09It's replated.
15:11That was four years ago.
15:13The maintenance records tell investigators
15:16that work had been done on the spacer
15:18that failed on Midwest Express Flight 105.
15:22Nickel-cadmium plating
15:24is the last step of the refurbishment process
15:28that would have been done by the maintenance facility
15:31that was involved with, essentially, the overhaul of that part.
15:34Four years before the accident,
15:37the spacer was removed from the engine,
15:39stripped of its coating, and examined for cracks.
15:43The inspector reported no cracks
15:45and sent the part to be replated with nickel.
15:48Since nickel was found inside the crack,
15:51it must have been present when the nickel was applied.
15:54The DC-9 flew about 2,500 flights over the next four years
16:03with the damaged spacer
16:05until it finally ruptured on Flight 105.
16:08It should have been caught during an overhaul,
16:14but it wasn't.
16:15And so the crack kept growing and growing
16:18until it finally hit its failure point.
16:22Investigators wonder what caused the crack
16:24to form on the spacer in the first place.
16:26These spacers have been used inside the JT-8D
16:30for more than 20 years.
16:32This can't be the first one to break.
16:37There are identical spacers
16:39in more than 14,000 JT-8D engines
16:42used on airplanes around the world.
16:45Is there any history of similar failures?
16:49It turns out that Pratt and Plain were well aware
16:51of spacer failures that occurred before.
16:54So we started to wonder,
16:55what have they done about it?
17:02Seems to happen a lot.
17:05While researching spacer issues in other aircraft,
17:09investigators uncover 45 similar failures
17:12prior to Midwest Express Flight 105's accident.
17:16Well, when we heard that this part
17:18had failed 45 times before,
17:20we kind of looked askance a bit at the manufacturer.
17:24That's a big deal.
17:26But of all the failures uncovered by the NTSB...
17:30Not a single loss of aircraft
17:33or even a single injury.
17:35Well, that says something.
17:38In every previous incident,
17:40the plane landed safely.
17:42So why did the rupture of a spacer on Flight 105
17:45caused the plane to become uncontrollable and crash?
17:48Well, we knew that none of the previous failures had led to an accident.
17:54So one of the questions was what made this one different.
17:58Let's see what got hit.
18:00Investigators consider the possibility that pieces of the ruptured spacer on Flight 105
18:08punctured the plane's fuselage and damaged vital control systems,
18:12such as cables or hydraulic lines.
18:15When a part like a spacer or a fan disc breaks under a lot of stress,
18:24it's almost like a small explosion going off.
18:27You have fragments of metal flying at very, very high speeds.
18:32Okay, let's see eight, nine, four.
18:38They studied the location and pattern of all the puncture marks found on the skin of the plane
18:44to see if any were near vital control links.
18:47There are many critical pieces of the plane that have not been recovered
19:13or are too badly damaged to study.
19:17Is it possible to figure out if they could have been hit by the engine pieces?
19:22We have what we need to run a trajectory analysis.
19:27All right.
19:28We were looking at could these parts that have left the engine
19:32strike a control surface or the hydraulic system
19:37or anything else where they could have done secondary damage
19:41that would have compounded the situation the pilots were facing.
19:44Knowing the plane's velocity, angle of ascent
19:49and the wind speed at the time the engine failed,
19:52the team calculates the path of debris ejected from the engine.
19:58The smallest piece we found was about half an ounce.
20:01The largest piece was just over a pound.
20:04So everything moves away from the plane, nothing hits it.
20:07The trajectory analysis tells investigators that none of the ejected engine pieces
20:13would have struck the airplane with enough force to cause substantial damage to the control systems.
20:19The analysis indicated that it was so unlikely that we considered it an impossibility,
20:27that those parts leaving the engine in the direction they went
20:31and the size that they had could have caused secondary damage,
20:35they would cause lost control.
20:37If spacer fragments didn't hit vital components and cause the loss of control,
20:44perhaps the initial explosive force opened the cowling or engine cover,
20:50affecting the plane's aerodynamics.
20:51If the cowling had been blown open, it would cause a lot of drag,
20:58it might cause the airplane to roll,
21:00it might cause the airplane to become uncontrollable.
21:04There's a hole in the cowling, looks to be about two square inches.
21:08The team finds evidence that the cowling was pierced by fragments ejected from the engine.
21:14But all four latches, one, two, three, four, they're all latched.
21:22Can't have opened in flight.
21:25They found them all either latched or fully intact with no damage at all.
21:30So that scenario kind of went out the window.
21:35So the ruptured red engine didn't bring down this plane?
21:38It did not.
21:39Well, reasonably early in the investigation,
21:45the team figured out that a spacer had failed and the engine had failed.
21:50And now we had the rest of the accident to figure out.
21:53Why would that cause a crash?
21:59Investigators examine Midwest Express Flight 105's flight data recorder
22:04in hopes of understanding how the loss of the right engine
22:07caused the death of 31 people.
22:11Doesn't give us much, but it's all we've got to work with.
22:14It was only recording four flight parameters.
22:17It had airspeed, altitude, heading, and vertical acceleration.
22:23Right here, a sudden deceleration at 450 feet.
22:28This must be where the right engine failed.
22:29Well, that's consistent with what the witnesses told us.
22:32The engine failure we know occurred above the airport,
22:39so the airplane had only been airborne for a few seconds.
22:44But the heading doesn't change when the engine fails.
22:47They must be applying left rudder to compensate.
22:51Oh, dead right engine, left rudder.
22:53That's the right move.
22:54When the right engine fails,
22:59the remaining engine should force the plane to the right.
23:03To counteract that,
23:04a pilot would apply left rudder
23:06to keep the plane flying straight.
23:14What the hell was that?
23:16The data shows that's precisely what Captain Martin did
23:20in response to Flight 105's engine failure.
23:24After a few seconds,
23:25they start this yaw to the right.
23:27So, right rudder?
23:31Four seconds after the failure of the right engine,
23:35the FDR data indicates
23:36that the pilot moved the rudder
23:38from left to right.
23:40That forced the plane into a sudden yaw to the right.
23:46He's in a side slip.
23:47And he's deviating further and further to the right.
23:53Then he starts to lose altitude.
23:57Huh, 148 knots.
24:00He's in a high-speed stall.
24:04How'd they let that happen?
24:07You went into a right skid
24:09and then followed by an abrupt right turn and dive.
24:13That would be consistent with a stall,
24:15but the air speeds indicated
24:17were high enough
24:19that you wouldn't normally have
24:21a stall at those speeds.
24:24Clearly lost control of the plane.
24:26Five seconds later, they hit the ground.
24:30The flight data tells investigators
24:33that it took only 10 seconds
24:35for the pilots to lose control of the plane
24:37after the failure of the right engine.
24:40I have never seen an accident sequence
24:45that brief
24:46before or since.
24:49So, he responds correctly at first
24:55with left rudder and nose-down pitch.
24:58Then he inexplicably switches to right rudder?
25:01And that's what leads to the yaw,
25:02the right roll, and the eventual stall.
25:05Right rudder, it makes no sense.
25:08It was clear from all the data
25:10that the pilot didn't understand what happened.
25:12He responded inappropriately.
25:16And within seconds, the airplane was lost
25:17and everybody on board
25:19was killed in the accident.
25:21Was there something about the DC-9's
25:24handling characteristics
25:25that led the pilot to input the right rudder?
25:29So, it was relatively easy to control then?
25:34Just with the control wheel?
25:36Investigators interview DC-9 pilots
25:41to determine how the plane handles
25:43with only one engine.
25:45The DC-9 pilots that we talked to,
25:46it was overwhelmingly described
25:48as a very easy, docile aircraft
25:50to handle in those situations.
25:53Oh, this has been extremely helpful.
25:55Thanks.
25:55Okay.
25:56Bye.
25:58They all say the same thing.
26:00It's no big deal with one engine.
26:02Because the DC-9's engines
26:07are mounted on the fuselage
26:09instead of the wings,
26:10when one engine fails,
26:12it does not force the plane
26:13into a severe turn.
26:15DC-9 is almost a centerline thrust aircraft.
26:18So, if you lose one engine on either side,
26:22there's not that much excess yawing
26:26or controllability problems at all.
26:28How easy is it to handle a DC-9
26:33in the situation the pilots
26:34of Flight 105 found themselves in?
26:38It was valuable to do a simulation
26:42or test flight to get a better idea
26:44of exactly how the airplane
26:46performed under the circumstances
26:49of the accident,
26:50but at a higher altitude.
26:51Okay, when we get to 10,000 feet,
26:57I'm going to cut power to the right,
26:58leaving the left at takeoff power.
27:01Keep the flaps at 20.
27:02Target speed is 170 knots.
27:05They tried to match the parameters
27:07of the airplane in terms of the flaps,
27:09gear, and airspeed,
27:13and then proceeded to cut the engine power.
27:18Okay.
27:19Cutting power.
27:19Okay.
27:21Let's go around for another.
27:34Flight demonstrations showed
27:35that the pilot didn't have to
27:37input rotor at all.
27:39If he had only used the ailerons,
27:41he could have safely fallen out of it.
27:44Okay.
27:45This time, no reaction.
27:47Let's see what the plane does.
27:48With no input from the pilot
27:51after the loss of the right engine,
27:54the plane rolls right
27:55and the nose drops.
28:00Okay.
28:02You can recover?
28:05Even with no immediate action,
28:07the pilot is easily able
28:08to recover the plane.
28:10Okay.
28:14I think we have what we need.
28:17That may have actually been the best thing to do,
28:19was to do nothing,
28:21watch the airplane's response,
28:23understand the airplane's response,
28:25and respond appropriately
28:26to the nature of the emergency.
28:27If the DC-9 is so easy to control,
28:37why were two experienced pilots
28:39unable to recover from the loss
28:41of their right engine?
28:47Okay.
28:48We know they were both captains
28:49with the airline,
28:50but how much experience
28:51did they actually have?
28:52Investigators look into the backgrounds
28:55of the pilots
28:56of Midwest Express Flight 105
28:58to understand why they didn't recover
29:01from a single engine failure.
29:03Neither had a lot of turbojet experience.
29:06One was upgraded to captain
29:07with 600 hours on the DC-9,
29:10the other with only 500.
29:12Doesn't seem like a whole lot.
29:15Advancement to captain happened
29:16within a year
29:17for both of these pilots
29:19at Midwest Express Airlines.
29:21at that time.
29:23And the reason why
29:25was it was a small airline,
29:27it was growing quickly,
29:29they were adding airplanes.
29:31They consult large U.S. airlines
29:34to determine their qualifications
29:36for an upgrade.
29:38Okay, thanks.
29:42That's the same for both airlines.
29:44Ten years seniority
29:45and 7,500 hours
29:47as DC-9 first officer
29:48to be considered for an upgrade.
29:49Yeah, these guys
29:51weren't anywhere near that.
29:54While the pilots
29:55may have been experienced,
29:57neither had spent much time
29:58piloting the DC-9
30:00before they were promoted
30:01to captain.
30:02The more experience
30:04someone has
30:04exercising command,
30:05the more likely they are
30:07to exercise that command
30:09in situations
30:09that call for calm thinking,
30:11for rational response,
30:13and so on.
30:13So how much training
30:17did these guys get
30:18on engine failures?
30:20To understand
30:21why the pilots
30:22of Flight 105
30:23were not able
30:24to control their plane
30:25following an engine failure,
30:27investigators look
30:28at their training records.
30:29What was their experience?
30:32What kind of pilots
30:33were they?
30:33How did they respond
30:34to unusual events?
30:36Did they seem self-confident?
30:38How well did they work together?
30:42Okay.
30:43So,
30:45the captains
30:46practiced 12
30:48engine failures
30:49on takeoff
30:49in the simulator.
30:51First officer,
30:5315 sessions.
30:55They discover
30:56that both pilots
30:57had been extensively trained
30:59to cope with
31:00engine failure
31:00on takeoff.
31:03Precisely the type
31:04of emergency
31:04they faced
31:05on Flight 105.
31:06But what exactly
31:08were they taught?
31:11We looked very closely
31:13at the training
31:13these pilots received
31:14and interviewed
31:16the flight instructor
31:17who oversaw
31:18their training
31:19in the DC-9
31:19from Indus Express.
31:22Tell me
31:23what you can remember
31:24about Captains
31:25Martin and Weiss.
31:29They were both
31:30excellent pilots.
31:32Trained in proficiency.
31:34Lots of
31:35simulator training
31:37on engine failure.
31:38You bet.
31:39We ran them
31:40through all sorts
31:41of scenarios.
31:44Let's focus
31:45on takeoff
31:46with simulated
31:47engine failure.
31:48What were they taught?
31:55Pay attention
31:55to your yachts,
31:56your best cube.
32:00You're going right?
32:02Flying left rudder?
32:03Control wheel
32:05as needed.
32:06Keep the plane
32:06level.
32:08Nice and easy.
32:10It's a good job.
32:11Got it.
32:13Captain Martin
32:14was trained
32:15to pay close attention
32:16to the plane's
32:17yawing motion
32:18when identifying
32:19and correcting
32:19an engine failure.
32:22Looks like
32:22they had
32:23excellent training.
32:25Thanks for the insight.
32:25We found the instructor
32:30to be very capable
32:32and very dedicated
32:34and we found
32:34the simulators
32:35to be okay
32:36for that time.
32:40If Captain Martin
32:42was extensively
32:43trained to cope
32:44with engine failure
32:45on takeoff,
32:46why didn't he do
32:47what he was trained
32:48to do?
32:48Most of their training
32:53was for an engine
32:54failure at takeoff.
32:56Pretty easy to identify
32:57which way you're yawing.
32:59Yeah.
33:00Investigators consider
33:01the timing
33:02of the engine failure.
33:03If you're closer
33:04to the ground,
33:05there are much more
33:05visual cues available
33:07from the ground
33:08to see what the
33:09airplane is encountering.
33:11Not so easy
33:13when you're already
33:14in a steep climb.
33:15Right.
33:16As flight 105
33:19was climbing,
33:20only blue sky
33:22would have been
33:22visible to the pilots,
33:24making it more difficult
33:25to identify
33:25the direction
33:26of the yaw.
33:31What the hell was that?
33:33With no outside
33:34visual cues,
33:36investigators believe
33:37Captain Martin's
33:38initial response
33:39was a spontaneous
33:40reaction to the
33:41plane's changing motion
33:42and not the result
33:44of an analysis
33:44of the situation.
33:46But what triggered
33:47the incorrect
33:48rudder application
33:49a few seconds later
33:50that resulted
33:51in a total loss
33:52of control?
33:55All right.
33:56Let's see what
33:56these guys are doing.
33:57need X-105.
34:04Clear for takeoff.
34:06Med-X-105.
34:08Here we go.
34:13Investigators
34:13pin their hopes
34:14on the CVR
34:16to explain
34:16Captain Martin's actions.
34:20Spilling up.
34:22Power normal.
34:23mid-X-105.
34:26100.
34:31V-1.
34:33Rotate.
34:37You're up.
34:38Mid-X-105.
34:45Turn left heading
34:47175.
34:48What do we got here,
34:49Phil?
34:50Here.
34:52Mid-X-105,
34:53Roger.
34:54We got an emergency
34:55here.
34:58Mid-X-105,
34:59Roger.
35:00Oh, crap.
35:01Head stop.
35:03Head stop!
35:04I've never heard
35:12an accident unfold
35:13so quickly.
35:15Holy smokes.
35:17And I remember
35:18just being amazed
35:19how quickly
35:20the accident took place.
35:22It was like
35:23they were flying.
35:25You hear the engine fail.
35:28And the next thing you know,
35:29the airplane's lost.
35:32Okay.
35:32So what did we hear?
35:35It sure happened fast.
35:37Yep.
35:3815 seconds
35:39from the sound
35:39of the engine
35:40exploding
35:40to the end
35:41of the recording.
35:43Astonishing.
35:49What else?
35:51What was that?
35:52What have we got?
35:53The captain seemed
35:54uncertain.
35:57Agreed.
36:02What have we got here, Bill?
36:05Well, it was clear
36:05from the cockpit
36:07foreshare quarter
36:08that the pilot
36:09didn't recognize
36:10what had happened.
36:12He articulates that.
36:13What was that?
36:14What do we got here, Bill?
36:18What was that?
36:20The sound of the engine,
36:22the sensation
36:22of the right yaw,
36:24and the instruments
36:25should have told
36:26Captain Martin
36:27that he was dealing
36:28with a failure
36:28of his right engine.
36:30anything else
36:33on that tape?
36:35Not a lot
36:36of troubleshooting
36:37or communication
36:38between them, really.
36:41Actually,
36:42none.
36:49What have we got here, Bill?
36:53Here.
36:55Mid-X 105, Roger.
36:56We got an emergency here.
37:00Investigators hear
37:01Captain Martin
37:02asking his first officer
37:03for assistance
37:04in assessing the situation.
37:06But First Officer Weiss
37:07never replies.
37:09That was troubling to me
37:11because I would have expected
37:14that in an emergency situation
37:16and especially
37:17when asked
37:18for help
37:20that the other crew member
37:22would have helped
37:23if he could.
37:23so
37:25it prompted
37:26some further
37:27investigation.
37:30Okay,
37:30let's start with that.
37:32Why was the captain
37:33confused about
37:34what had happened?
37:35It should have been obvious.
37:404,600 flight hours
37:42but he's never experienced
37:43an actual engine failure.
37:45NTSB investigators
37:46looking into the crash
37:47of Midwest Express
37:49Flight 105
37:49have learned
37:50that Captain Martin's
37:51only experience
37:52with a single engine failure
37:54was in a simulator.
37:56Yaw and deceleration
37:57don't feel the same
37:59plus all the sounds
38:00are different.
38:01It's not the same
38:01as the real thing.
38:03It was a kind of
38:03catastrophic engine failure
38:04where they had thrust
38:05and then they didn't.
38:06It was immediate.
38:08I don't think
38:09they were trained
38:10in that kind of scenario.
38:13What do we got here, Bill?
38:15The limitations
38:16of the simulator
38:17may explain
38:18Captain Martin's
38:19initial confusion
38:20but it does not explain
38:22the first officer's
38:23unusual silence.
38:26Let's have another listen.
38:29They return
38:31to the cockpit
38:31voice recording
38:32to better understand
38:34how first officer Weiss
38:35reacted to the emergency.
38:37How was that?
38:42That's one.
38:436-105
38:43Turn left heading
38:45175
38:46What do we got here, Bill?
38:48That's two.
38:49Here.
38:50That's three.
38:54He asked for help
38:55three times
38:56but the FO says
38:57absolutely nothing to him
38:58the entire time.
38:59Not even
38:59I'm not sure
39:01or I don't know
39:02not a word.
39:03In this situation
39:06seconds were critical.
39:08Had he said
39:09right away
39:09I don't know
39:10then the captain
39:12would immediately
39:13have tried to rely
39:14on his own understanding
39:15of the situation
39:15rather than expect
39:17the first officer
39:18to come up with
39:19an explanation
39:19of what he had.
39:22What could have caused
39:24the first officer's silence?
39:28Hang on.
39:30What altitude
39:31were they at
39:32when the engine failed?
39:35450 feet.
39:37This could be it then.
39:40Pilots say
39:40they were taught
39:41not to make call-outs
39:42or even verbalize
39:43the nature
39:44of an emergency
39:44after 100 knots
39:46before reaching
39:47800 feet.
39:50Let me see.
39:58Not even to identify
39:59a failed engine.
40:00no communication
40:02at all
40:02until 800 feet.
40:05I couldn't imagine
40:06a management team
40:08at Midwest Express
40:09thinking this
40:11silent cockpit business
40:12made any sense.
40:14It just flies
40:15in the face
40:16of communication
40:18which is kind of
40:19the fabric
40:20that holds
40:21a safe flight together.
40:22So it just
40:23blew my mind
40:25frankly.
40:25What the hell
40:31was that?
40:33Investigators
40:34think
40:34First Officer
40:35Weiss
40:35may have been
40:36following a
40:36Midwest Express
40:37unwritten rule
40:38of not discussing
40:40emergencies
40:40until the plane
40:41reaches 800 feet.
40:43It's important
40:44during an emergency
40:45for people
40:46to talk to each
40:47other
40:47because they both
40:49may not be
40:50looking at the
40:50same instrument.
40:52They both may not
40:52be looking at the
40:53same thing outside.
40:54You have to talk.
40:55You have to talk.
40:57One last thing
40:58troubles investigators.
41:00In spite of his
41:01first officer's
41:02silence,
41:03Captain Martin
41:03could have easily
41:05identified which
41:06engine had failed
41:07simply by looking
41:08at his instruments.
41:08Both pilots
41:10had visual information
41:11from the engine
41:12flight instruments
41:13the turn indicator
41:14and so on
41:15that would have
41:16told them
41:17what was going on
41:19in terms of
41:20the loss of thrust.
41:22I don't think
41:23either of them
41:23were scanning
41:24the instruments.
41:25Agreed.
41:26They never saw
41:27which engine
41:27had failed,
41:28the direction
41:29of the awe
41:29or the severity
41:30of the roll.
41:32The NTSB
41:33concludes that
41:34the pilots'
41:34failure to monitor
41:36their instruments
41:36contributed to
41:38Captain Martin's
41:39incorrect rudder
41:40application.
41:41With the lack
41:41of visual cues,
41:42the only sure way
41:44they would have
41:44had to recognize
41:46which engine
41:46failed would be
41:47to look at
41:48the instruments.
41:50The pilots'
41:51lack of awareness
41:52ultimately led
41:53to the stall
41:54that brought down
41:55flight 105.
42:02Up until here,
42:03he should be fine.
42:05But then there's
42:06no communication
42:07and no instrument
42:08scanning.
42:10And this,
42:10this is what
42:11dooms them.
42:12He puts in
42:13right rudder,
42:14which sends them
42:14into a side slip,
42:16an extreme right
42:17roll,
42:18and a stall.
42:20If they had
42:21talked to each other,
42:22scanned their
42:22instruments,
42:24you don't get
42:25this accident.
42:27The reality
42:28of the situation
42:29is the mismanagement
42:31inside the cockpit
42:32caused the accident,
42:34accident, not the
42:36engine failure.
42:37The NTSB's final report
42:39makes several key
42:40recommendations to
42:41prevent this type of
42:42accident from happening
42:43again.
42:44They recommend a
42:45directive requiring
42:47airlines to replace
42:48the existing spacers
42:49with a new type of
42:50spacer, which is less
42:51likely to fail.
42:53They also recommend
42:55that airlines are
42:55advised to teach
42:56their pilots to
42:57communicate during
42:58onboard emergencies.
42:59It should never be
43:02overstated the
43:03importance of
43:04crew coordination.
43:05Every crew member
43:06has something
43:07valuable to add.
43:08Anything that is
43:09an abnormality
43:10needs to be
43:12discussed at the
43:15proper time.
43:16They also suggest
43:18that airlines review
43:19their simulator
43:20training to ensure
43:21pilots are taught
43:22to use their
43:23instruments to assess
43:24the nature of
43:25engine failures.
43:27I think this
43:28accident still has
43:29an impact today
43:30because it's such
43:34a clear illustration
43:36of what happens
43:38when you don't do
43:39what you should do
43:41in an emergency.
43:42Anytime there's an
43:44emergency, you should
43:45have the exact same
43:47procedures and you
43:48should run right to
43:49them.
43:51Midwest Express
43:52Airlines continued to
43:54operate until 2009.
43:56It merged with
43:57Frontier Airlines in
43:582010.
43:59into the