For educational purposes
The great German spring offensive of 1918 was the Kaiser's last attempt to make a decisive breakthrough during World War I.
For a time, it seemed it would succeed, but the attack petered out through exhaustion and supply difficulties. Germany would never regain the initiative.
The great German spring offensive of 1918 was the Kaiser's last attempt to make a decisive breakthrough during World War I.
For a time, it seemed it would succeed, but the attack petered out through exhaustion and supply difficulties. Germany would never regain the initiative.
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LearningTranscript
00:00At precisely 4.40 a.m. on the 21st of March 1918, a single white rocket soared into the
00:11night sky above the town of St. Quentin.
00:16It was a signal for over 10,000 German guns and mortars to thunder into action.
00:23More than a million German soldiers were ready to follow in the wake of their thunderous
00:27bombardment.
00:29This was the Kaiserschlacht, the Emperor's Battle.
00:35The turning point of the First World War, its outcome would be fought for here, in the
00:41line of fire.
01:11By 1918, it was clear that the German nation could not stand another year of the defensive
01:36warfare which had been draining the lifeblood from the country since the terrible Battle
01:42of Verdun in the spring of 1916.
01:48The deadlock and stalemate of four years of static trench warfare had exacted a heavy
01:54price from all involved.
01:57Any vestiges of the martial arrogance displayed in 1914 had long since been lost.
02:06By the end of 1917, Germany as a nation and as a country is facing numerous dilemmas.
02:13Perhaps the one that loomed largest in the German civilian population was the impact
02:19of the Allied naval blockade.
02:22The Royal Navy had instituted a blockade of Germany two days before the outbreak of war
02:27in August 1914, and while this had taken years to have a real impact, by the end of 1917,
02:34the German people were really suffering real shortages of food, clothing, heating and lighting.
02:41The civilian population had become increasingly against the war.
02:46In the Easter of 1917, the German Reichstag, the Parliament, had passed a resolution calling
02:51for a peace on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities.
02:56So even the German elites were beginning to turn profoundly against the war.
03:01So there was a problem, and the unpopularity of the military domination of government also
03:08meant that Germany did need to do something at the end of 1917.
03:14Despite their desperate situation, there were some reasons for optimism on the German side.
03:20The Russians had toppled over into Bolshevism and revolution, and had completely withdrawn
03:26from the war.
03:29Furthermore, the Italians were routed at Caporetto in October 1917, essentially ending their contribution.
03:39However, these events were quickly overshadowed by another, greater development.
03:46There was a new player in the Great War – America.
03:53The immediate cause of the American entry was, of course, the unrestricted submarine campaign,
03:58which led to the deaths of many hundred Americans drowned when their ships were sunk, and the
04:04general barbarity of attacking ships, especially passenger ships, without warning.
04:09In addition, there was the very ill-advised German offer to Mexico of territorial gains
04:17at the expense of America, if they came into the war, and this outraged American opinion.
04:25In April 1917, the Americans were completely unprepared for a war, and all of the combatant
04:31powers realised that it would take at least a year for the American army to become proficient
04:37and in such numbers that it would actually influence the outcome of the war.
04:41That meant that the Germans had a window of opportunity.
04:45If they could actually beat Britain and France by roughly April-May 1918, then the Americans
04:51would be too late to influence the outcome of the war.
04:55To this end, the German staff worked feverishly over the winter to come up with a plan that
05:02could be sprung into action early in 1918.
05:08The brainchild of German General Ludendorff, the Kaiserschlacht, or Kaiser's Attack, was
05:15designed to use surprise, shock and speed to smash through the junction where the British
05:21and French lines met.
05:24The British army could then be rolled back to the channel.
05:28This could well be the last card in the dwindling German deck.
05:33By early 1918, it was unlikely that the Germans were going to win an outright victory.
05:39So what they aimed to do was to effectively knock the British out of the war, divide them
05:46from the French, get a negotiated peace to their advantage before the Americans came
05:50in.
05:51The idea was to strike the British and drive them in a north-westerly direction against
05:56the channel ports.
05:58This would either force them to contemplate an evacuation of their army, such as happened
06:02in 1940, or at the very least to reconstruct their supply system in a very big way.
06:09It would also, of course, create a great gap between the British and the French, because
06:14as the British withdrew towards the channel ports, the French would in all probability
06:19have to withdraw to cover Paris.
06:22So a great gap would open, and the hope, the intention, was that this would create a military
06:28situation so serious that the French would sue for terms.
06:36Although it had all the hallmarks of a final roll of the dice, the German high command
06:42was convinced it would be a success.
06:46On the 23rd of January, Kaiser Wilhelm was presented with the plans for what was codenamed
06:53Operation Michael, an operation soon named Kaiserschlacht in his honour.
07:00Tactics were fine-tuned and new intensive training planned for all participants.
07:07Thousands of soldiers would be moved from the now defunct Eastern Front to support the
07:12offensive.
07:13The Kaiserschlacht was most definitely a desperate gamble.
07:17Ludendorff had to achieve a decisive victory, a strategic victory.
07:23Local victories, such as the British had won at the Somme in 1916, would not do.
07:28He was using the last of the troops, and he had to get a big victory.
07:33The only other alternative really open to Germany is to sit and wait, to try and hold
07:39out against the Allies and wear them down through defensive warfare.
07:44But of course, a strategy of defensive warfare was exactly the policy adopted by Ludendorff
07:50in 1917, and the grinding battles of Third Ypres fought against the British during that
07:56year had ground down the German army to quite an extent, and Ludendorff at the end of 1917
08:03said that a defensive strategy simply wasn't an option, because the German army would not
08:08maintain its cohesion.
08:10Had the Germans been able to bruise, batter, and possibly force the British army into an
08:16evacuation, the French would have found it very difficult indeed to hold the line against
08:22the entire German forces.
08:24It should be remembered that the French army was in a very delicate condition.
08:28In 1917, there had been extensive mutinies, and these had only been saved by avoiding
08:34too much fighting.
08:36The French army and the French nation were profoundly tired of the war.
08:41So if the plan enjoyed maximum success, or near-maximum success, then the chances were
08:47good for Germany.
08:49The commander-in-chief of the British forces, upon whom the storm was about to burst, was
08:55Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.
08:59Much maligned and at loggerheads with Prime Minister Lloyd George, he was certainly a
09:05realist, and in early December 1917 instructed his army commanders to prepare their defences
09:13against a strong and sustained attack expected to come in the spring.
09:19Haig was very much a dyed-in-the-wool cavalryman, a professional soldier who saw things in military
09:25terms.
09:26He was Oxford and Sandhurst.
09:29He had connections with the Royal Family through his wife, and he was very much there for,
09:34if you like, the true blue soldier.
09:39His relationship with Lloyd George could probably best be described as poisonous.
09:45The two men hated one another cordially.
09:49Haig believed that Lloyd George was a typical, swindling politician of Welsh extraction,
09:56and Lloyd George believed that Haig was simply a butcher.
10:00Curiously, however, I'm not sure this greatly affected the conduct of the war.
10:05They both needed each other.
10:07Lloyd George would have sacked Haig if he could reasonably have replaced him with somebody
10:12else, but he couldn't, and so they had to achieve some kind of working relationship.
10:19The two commanders who would eventually face the Kaiserschlacht were General Sir Hubert
10:25Gough, whose 5th Army held 42 miles off-front on the British extreme right, and General
10:32Sir Julian Byng, whose 3rd Army held 28 miles below Arras, including the vulnerable Flesquier
10:41salient.
10:43The commanders drew up preparations for what was described as an elastic defence in depth.
10:52Elastic defence in depth was a technique which had been pioneered by the Germans in 1916
10:58and 1917.
11:01When the British and the French were attacking then, it was discovered that with enough artillery
11:06preparation the front, and indeed the 2nd and sometimes the 3rd lines, could always
11:12be taken because they were obliterated by the artillery bombardment.
11:17The logical response therefore was to thin out the front line, and so reduce the casualties,
11:23and extend the defence backwards for several miles towards the rear.
11:29This reduced the impact of the shelling, and indeed put many of the defenders outside the
11:34range of the artillery bombardment, and so defence in depth.
11:40The elastic bit is to have reserves nearby, so that when the enemy troops try to occupy
11:47the destroyed trenches, you can launch a counter-attack against them.
11:51So there is a sort of elastic reaction against them.
11:55You allow them into a certain amount of territory, and then with a counter-attack you bang them
12:01back.
12:03Three zones were to be readied.
12:06The front line was to be the forward zone.
12:10Containing a few strongly garrisoned redoubts surrounded by smaller outposts, this was intended
12:16only to cushion the initial impetus of an attack, resisting for up to 48 hours before
12:23giving way.
12:25With good reason, the men in this zone grumbled to themselves that they were serving in sacrifice
12:32units.
12:35The main fighting was designed to take place in the battle zone.
12:40Here were placed more troops, stronger defensive positions and most of the artillery.
12:46Further back was a rear zone, a third set of defences in case the battle zone fell.
12:53Unfortunately, the limitations of time and manpower saw little work completed on this
13:00much-needed scheme.
13:02In all sectors, work on the rear zone was barely begun.
13:07Furthermore, Goff's Fifth Army was in the process of taking over a long section of the
13:13line from the hard-pressed French and found its defences inadequate at best.
13:19Goff, who came in for an enormous amount of criticism during the Kaiserschlacht, argued
13:25later that only with a great wand, a fairy wand, could he possibly have achieved the
13:31defences that were necessary in the few weeks available to him.
13:35He calculated, for example, that he required 300 miles of trenches and barbed wire within
13:42his battle zone for it to be effective and it would have taken anything up to six months
13:47for the signalers to bury all the landlines, all the communications, so that they couldn't
13:52be hit by the artillery.
13:55These problems were compounded by a major reorganisation of the British army structure.
14:01The supply of fresh troops for France was dwindling, so Haig was forced to disband one
14:07battalion in four and allocate the men to the reinforcements.
14:13This meant that three battalions now had to do the work designed for four.
14:20This, however, was one of the few problems which the Germans did not encounter.
14:29Ludendorff chose three armies to carry out the attack, led by the cream of his officer
14:35cadre.
14:37From battlegroup Ruprecht were the 2nd Army under von der Marwitz, leader of the brilliant
14:43counter-attack at Cambrai, and to their north, the 17th Army.
14:49The latter were led by General von Bellew, the hero of Caporetto.
14:55To the south were the 18th Army, part of battlegroup Crown Prince Wilhelm, and commanded by General
15:03von Hutier, who had achieved glory at Riga against the Russians.
15:07There were several differences between the troops from the Eastern and the Western fronts.
15:13A principal one, perhaps, is that the troops in the East were more used to victory.
15:17They had been fighting the Russians and they generally had victories when they attacked
15:21the Russians.
15:22The problem with Russia was, of course, there was so much distance that it was hard to make
15:26the victory decisive, but the morale was good for that reason.
15:31This meant that their temperament was perhaps not suited to the Western front, where blows
15:37were much bloodier and battles tended to need sustained stamina, something that the troops
15:43in the East really hadn't experienced over the past three years.
15:47So there was an imbalance in morale, and also the troops in the East had been trained
15:54in the new breakthrough tactics.
15:56The ones in the West took a bit longer to adapt them to the new conditions.
16:01So this imbalance meant that in the spring of 1918, Ludendorff was almost welding two
16:07separate armies together.
16:10Seventy-four divisions were concentrated behind the 50-mile front, outnumbering the enemies
16:16by two to one.
16:19Training was intensive.
16:20Over 800,000 men had undergone three weeks of instruction on the tactics of the coming
16:27battle.
16:28They were led by special units given the very best training in mobile warfare, the elite
16:34stormtrooper formations.
16:41Units were divided into three categories – mobile, attack and trench.
16:48The mobile divisions were to spearhead the attack, breaking through the weakest points
16:54and pressing forward rapidly until exhausted.
16:58It was in these divisions that the new stormtrooper units were to be found.
17:04They were armed with the best weapons and were given extra rations.
17:13The attack divisions were to follow close in support, mopping up any pockets of resistance,
17:19and were similarly equipped.
17:22The trench divisions, intended only to hold the line, were stripped to the bone to ensure
17:28supplies for their comrades in the mobile and attack categories.
17:35German tactics had been evolving both on the Western Front and the Eastern Front over the
17:39past three years.
17:42But the first point that we can really identify as a real change, a real sea change in German
17:47tactics is the Battle of Riga in 1917, where the idea of infiltration tactics and hurricane
17:55bombardments are first used on a large scale.
17:59This meant that German artillery would be concentrated to blast a gap in the enemy's
18:05defences, which would then be exploited by the infantry.
18:09But the infantry, rather than using the relatively static and formal skirmish lines advancing
18:16towards the enemy, instead had been trained to operate in small groups of fast-moving,
18:23relatively lightly equipped men, certainly not carrying their packs, who would break
18:27through and infiltrate into an enemy position.
18:31The German infantry were trained to move as fast as possible, to move around strong points,
18:37to move around defended areas, and leave follow-up waves to knock them out.
18:42They had to penetrate as deeply as possible, as fast as possible, because that disorganised
18:47the enemy response, it disorganised the communications, and so forth.
18:52So speed of movement, and they carried lots of grenades, and they carried lots of light
18:58automatic weapons, submachine guns, heavy firepower for fast-moving troops.
19:04This was the basic procedure that they followed for the Kaiserslautern.
19:10The days immediately preceding the attack saw thousands of German troops move up to
19:16their starting positions.
19:19The morale was high, and they were convinced this would be the final push to victory.
19:26Misinformation had deliberately been allowed to pass into Allied hands via carrier pigeon,
19:31drifting balloons, and other diversionary ruses, which convinced the Allies that the
19:37French were about to be attacked.
19:41The Germans put a huge amount of emphasis upon surprise.
19:45The attack must come as a great surprise.
19:48And so artillery was moved up and ranged on to the British positions with great care,
19:53the troops were brought up with great care, great care was taken to avoid any reconnaissance
19:58photographs showing the movement, the direction, and indeed the imminence of the attack.
20:05The idea was to pack as many guns into as small a frontage as possible, and thus overwhelm
20:12the enemy's front-line defences with literally a hurricane, a torrent of shot and shell.
20:19At 4.40am on March the 21st, a single white rocket rose high in the sky above St Quentin,
20:29and all hell was let loose.
20:41On March the 21st, 1918, the German artillery was able to assemble what became known as
20:47Ludendorff's battering train, over 6,477 guns disposed over a 40-mile front.
20:56This meant that when the bombardment began, they rained down over one and a half million
21:00shells in just four hours, a quite unimaginable torrent of shot and shell on the British defence
21:08forward defences.
21:09They combed back and forth with the shells in the attacked area, from the front lines
21:15to the reserve lines to the headquarters and back again, seeking to destroy communications
21:21and headquarters as well as the troop lines.
21:25They used heavy mortars to attack the barbed wire and the trenches.
21:29A new view of the way in which you use artillery, very intense but very short, and intending
21:36really to stun the defenders rather than to kill them.
21:40Shell shock, disorientation and confusion was the aim of the bombardment, destroying
21:46resistance for the advancing troops.
21:50To facilitate this, 80% of the shells fired contained gas, chemical warfare on an unprecedented
22:00scale.
22:02The majority of this was Green Cross phosgene gas, which dispersed quickly, thus causing
22:09the German attackers no distress as they followed up on the heels of the bombardment.
22:17The lingering Yellow Cross mustard gas was used only on the Flesquier salient, which
22:23the Germans were hoping to outflank rather than assault head on.
22:29The Germans also made innovative use of tear gas, hoping the discomfort caused would make
22:35British soldiers remove their gas masks and fall prey to the deadly phosgene.
22:41Although soldiers on both sides were by now well used to wearing gas masks, they were
22:47still uncomfortable and extremely disorienting, restricting vision and communication.
22:54The confusion spread by a gas attack was a particularly effective way of softening
23:00up the enemy before an attack.
23:04There were two ways of using gas.
23:07One was by canisters.
23:08You simply opened the canisters and let the cloud come out.
23:12The disadvantage of that was if the wind changed, it came back into your own face and that wasn't
23:17terribly attractive.
23:18The more effective way of using gas was to use shells.
23:22The Germans used gas liberally, particularly mustard gas, almost as a defensive weapon.
23:28Mustard gas was what was known as a persistent agent.
23:31It would lie on the ground and remain active for a number of days after the guns had fired it.
23:37This made it very difficult for troops to take up positions there and to hold the ground,
23:42as mustard gas was a particularly nasty agent.
23:46It was an irritant and it attacked the eyes, the mouth, tongue and of course the lungs.
23:53And in the lungs in particular, it created a pooling of fluid which gradually rose until
23:59the victim literally drowned because of the fluid in their lungs.
24:04It could blind people as well.
24:06It was a terrible weapon.
24:09The ethical considerations of using gas seem not to have worried either side in the First
24:15World War.
24:16They simply saw it as a tool of war and while there had been cries of outrage when the Germans
24:21first used gas at Ypres in 1915, by 1916 both sides were using gas quite liberally.
24:31At 9.40am, the first waves of the infantry moved out.
24:38Advancing behind the creeping artillery barrage and aided by a thick, swirling fog that covered
24:44the battlefield, they made good progress, infiltrating deep into the forward zone within
24:50half an hour, penetrating quickly past the well defended redoubts, often unnoticed.
24:58The second attack wave was only 100 yards behind and soon took these in flanking movements.
25:07After only 90 minutes fighting, very few of the British redoubts designed to last 48 hours
25:13were still holding out.
25:18With the forward zone secure, the German troops quickly moved into the battle zone, a creeping
25:25barrage moving forward 200 metres every four minutes.
25:32Von Bellow's troops were able to push part of the Third Army to the rear of their battle
25:37zones and had made advances round the north of the Flesquier salient.
25:45However to the south, two Fifth Army divisions had held magnificently, maintaining the Epihe
25:52redoubt and stopping the salient from being surrounded.
25:57The salient had been saved, but the line was pulled back slightly to lessen the danger.
26:04To the south, whilst Goff's 16th division had been pushed to the back of its battle
26:09zone, XVIII Corps had held 6 miles in its entirety.
26:16Worst hit was the overextended III Corps south of St Quentin.
26:22By 5.30pm they were pushed out of their battle zone entirely.
26:28Goff reacted swiftly to this desperate situation.
26:32Trying to organise French reinforcements, and personally visiting his corps commanders,
26:38he threw in most of his reserves and gave III Corps permission to withdraw behind the
26:43Crozat canal.
26:49Haig meanwhile was abreast of developments and, aware of German intentions to push the
26:54British toward the north, felt the Fifth Army could be allowed to be pushed west, where
27:00they lost little of strategic value, but crucially, kept in touch with the French.
27:10By the end of the first day of Kaiserschlacht, Ludendorff had driven the British from 140
27:17square miles of French soil, at a cost of 40,000 German and 38,500 British casualties,
27:27of whom 21,000 were prisoners.
27:32Schools were closed in celebration and bells rang out across Germany.
27:37It was a remarkable triumph.
27:39At the end of the first day, the Germans had achieved, against the British Fifth Army,
27:45the greatest one-day penetration ever achieved during the First World War.
27:51They had achieved a stunning success.
27:54Goff's Fifth Army had been pushed basically almost entirely out of its defensive zone.
27:59It was just about outside of the area of elastic defence and depth.
28:05The problem with the British defence and depth was that they had not fully understood the
28:10German use of counter-attack to retake positions.
28:14The Germans had managed to advance over six miles in places, actually reaching the British
28:18gun line.
28:19Thus, the ferocity of the German attack had not been fully anticipated.
28:24Elsewhere, however, against the Third Army, for example, just to the north of the Fifth
28:30Army, the attack, though it had been successful, was less stunningly successful.
28:36Defence was working better there.
28:39And all over the battlefield, small parties of British troops were still fighting.
28:44There had not been a general panic.
28:47And already the alarm bells were beginning to be sounded and reserves were beginning
28:52to be alerted, beginning to be moved to contain the German penetration.
28:58So at the end of the first day, the advance was really, it was almost a draw, if you like.
29:05The Germans had not made the penetration, actually, that they wanted to make, because
29:10they had to keep impetus going.
29:13Without that impetus, then it would come to a halt.
29:17Even though they'd made inroads in the south, essentially it was still a draw, with the
29:20Third Army still holding firm.
29:24The subsequent two days saw further advances, but these generally came in the south, where
29:31Gough's Fifth Army was struggling to retreat in order and was losing touch with both the
29:36French on its right and Bing's Third Army on its left.
29:42Six promised divisions of French reinforcements began to arrive, but they got caught up in
29:48the general disarray.
29:51Thrown straight into the dogged fighting until they were overwhelmed, they soon started falling
29:57back with the British.
30:01The situation facing the better resourced Third Army seemed to stabilise.
30:08von Bailow made little progress, as the Third Army drew on reinforcements from the neighbouring
30:13British armies to the north.
30:16However, Bing was forced to relinquish much of his right wing, just to stay in contact
30:22with Gough's army and maintain the integrity of the British line.
30:29First Bapome, then Albert were given up, the soldiers reluctantly withdrawing over the
30:35devastated Somme battlefields they had gained at such cost in 1916.
30:42If the German pressure on the French increased, and indeed if the British and French armies
30:47were continued to pull apart, then a gap would emerge that the Germans could exploit.
30:54This had to be stopped at all costs.
30:57If any kind of gap emerged, the Germans could exploit, could flow through that gap and begin
31:04to turn the British flank.
31:05And in order to prevent a split from happening, it did not matter that much if the British
31:11retreated and gave up towns such as Bapome and Albert, which were synonymous with the
31:18Battle of the Somme.
31:20It would dismay the public, but surrender of territory was, by comparison with the possibility
31:26of a split opening, of far less consequence.
31:29And so to some extent, the British were willing to trade distance so long as they retreated
31:34in a direction that maintained contact with their French allies.
31:39All this time, the British rear had been a hive of activity, with busy soldiers rapidly
31:46constructing fresh trenches and strongholds.
31:50The army was falling back into a rear well stocked with supplies, and increasingly, reinforcements.
31:58Over 10,000 a day were pouring across the Channel.
32:03The Germans, however, were coming to the limit of their logistical abilities.
32:08The artillery was unable to keep pace with their infantry, and the exhausted soldiers
32:14were rapidly running out of food.
32:18The Germans were advancing over old, devastated battlefields.
32:21They were going through areas of rusty wire, old trenches, shell holes.
32:27It was very difficult going, very exhausting, very tiring, and it was very difficult for
32:33their supply columns to keep up with them.
32:35At the same time, the British, by going backwards, were actually going into friendly territory
32:41and their own ammunition and supply dumps.
32:44So for the British, in a strange way, retreating helped them.
32:49As the German soldiers advanced, they came upon Allied supply dumps, which had been abandoned
32:55in the chaos of defeat.
32:57They found beer, they found shoes, they found uniforms and clothing in profusion.
33:03And it's no wonder, then, that the German storm troops that came upon these items began
33:09to drink themselves silly, causing real discipline problems, and indeed believing that they could
33:15not beat the Allies.
33:17These were supplies which the German soldier hadn't seen for years.
33:22There were probably a few cases of this, but it's one of those very good stories which
33:27are endlessly repeated because they produce an amusing picture.
33:32But the reality was that that was much less important than the sheer problem of supplying
33:39the troops, and so keeping the momentum of the offensive going.
33:43Supply proved to be a very great problem for the Germans, and one indeed which they did
33:48not succeed in solving.
33:51While the war raged among muddy trenches and smoking ruins, a new battlefield had emerged.
33:59Aerial combat had reached new levels.
34:04Up to this point, most aerial fighting had been around photography, reconnaissance and
34:10spotting for artillery shelling.
34:12Each side tried to achieve aerial dominance so that its reconnaissance and spotting planes
34:17could operate unimpeded.
34:20But by 1918, aircraft had developed sufficiently for both sides to think about them as agencies
34:26of attack directly upon ground troops.
34:30And so both sides tried to use aircraft to bomb troops and to machine gun troops, both
34:36on the battlefield and in the areas, the roads, leading up to the battlefield.
34:42Very quickly, the RAF and the French air service were actually able to wrest control of the
34:48air from the Germans.
34:51Perhaps because they were actually, the British were retreating back onto their air bases,
34:56and because by this time, the Royal Flying Corps, and then as it became known, the Royal
35:00Air Force, were actually much stronger than the Germans in the air.
35:05And by wresting control of the air from the Germans, while the RAF wasn't able to prevent
35:11the German troops on the ground advancing, it certainly hampered and hindered their efforts.
35:17And on numerous days, low-flying British aircraft were able to straff large columns of German
35:24troops advancing.
35:26Thus, Allied air superiority was a key factor in slowing down and hampering the German advances.
35:34The strain of the battle began to test the nerve of General Ludendorff, which was not
35:39helped by the loss of his son on the first day of battle, nor by the symptoms of his
35:44exophthalmic goiter.
35:49Ludendorff was facing a dilemma – whether to continue his initial plan, or exploit the
35:56opportunities of breakthrough presented in the south, despite the lack of any clear strategic
36:01objective there.
36:03Believing the 5th Army to be routed, and hoping to take advantage of their perceived collapse,
36:10Ludendorff made the fateful decision to divide the thrust of his attack.
36:16The push against the 3rd Army would continue as planned, with Arras as its objective.
36:22However, Hutier would also continue his assault to the south-west, exploiting his successes
36:30there, rather than simply maintaining a supporting position as expressly intended.
36:37This would necessarily lessen the force of the thrust in the north, his forces pushing
36:42in different directions.
36:45Ludendorff would be criticised, of course, whichever direction he chose to move.
36:51If he persevered with the attack to the north-west, it would be said he lacked imagination, he
36:56could not adapt to the realities of battle.
36:59If he moved his forces strongly to the south-west, it would show that he lacked perseverance,
37:05that he lacked determination, that he was inconstant.
37:09In point of fact, he chose to put the principal thrust to the south-west on the reasonable
37:15proposition that he should follow the logic of the battle.
37:18This was not what he had intended, but opportunity occurs in a battle, as well as determined
37:25battle plans, and you should take opportunity when it knocks.
37:29And in that respect, possibly his experience as a battle commander was shown.
37:35At the same time, the French began to reinforce the beleaguered 5th Army.
37:41By the end of March, they had relieved Goff's men of most of their line.
37:46The 3,000 strong South African brigade fought a magnificent 8-hour stand against two entire
37:54German divisions 18,000 strong, with less than a hundred South Africans surviving to
38:00march into captivity.
38:03The 2nd Middlesex Regiment suffered 75% losses in a 12-hour defence of Brie Bridge.
38:13At this desperate juncture, Haig met with his French counterpart, Pétain.
38:19To Haig's surprise, Pétain suggested that the two forces should split, allowing the
38:25French to concentrate on defending Paris.
38:29It seemed that Pétain's resolve to carry on had simply crumbled.
38:35He appeared to have a mental breakdown.
38:39In order to combat this, Haig dramatically proposed that the more resolute General Foch
38:45be made a generalissimo, a unifying commander of the Allied forces.
38:50The appointment of Foch as supreme commander was tremendously important.
38:54The basic German plan was to divide the British and the French forces.
38:59By having one overall commander, you make it plain in a symbolic fashion that this is
39:04not going to happen.
39:06But you also make it possible to ensure practically that it doesn't happen, because one commander
39:12can coordinate the movement of reserves, can coordinate strategy, so that the division
39:18does not take place.
39:19It would be unthinkable to have anybody other than a Frenchman who was in charge on French
39:23soil.
39:24The choice was between Foch and Pétain, and Pétain had pessimistically said he felt that
39:30Haig was going to be beaten, and if Haig was beaten, it was a likelihood that the French
39:34would be beaten.
39:35Foch came up and said, not likely, I can actually win the battle.
39:41By agreeing to the appointment of a Frenchman, the British showed the French that they were
39:46committed to the war, that they would, to a degree, entrust their British forces to
39:52the command of a Frenchman.
39:54It was a way of bolstering French confidence in the British at a time when both sides were
40:00one worrying slightly about each other's commitment to the war.
40:05By the end of the 27th of March, the German advances had slowed down considerably.
40:11The strains of six days' continuous fighting were now taking their toll.
40:18Despite this, Ludendorff chose to continue the series of attacks, once again adapting
40:25his plans as opportunities presented themselves.
40:29The original grand strategy was now completely compromised in favour of far more limited
40:35tactical objectives.
40:40Still tempted by the southern sector of the front, Ludendorff ordered a frontal offensive
40:46on the city of Amiens.
40:50A vital rail and communications centre for the Allies, Amiens would certainly be a glittering
40:56prize.
40:58In reality, it was a costly distraction in terms of both men and munitions, especially
41:05as the long-planned Mars offensive against the British centre at Arras was scheduled
41:11to start at the same time.
41:14Ludendorff had tried and failed to drive the British from their central battlefields.
41:20Instead they remained steadfast.
41:22In fact the situation was considered secure enough for the King to visit Bing's army
41:27late on the 29th.
41:29Elsewhere, the battle continued, and raged as hard as ever in front of Amiens.
41:36The situation facing the 5th army there remained desperate.
41:41This was complicated further by the replacement of General Goff.
41:45A political scapegoat for the retreat, Goff was replaced by General Rawlinson.
41:53The Kaiserslaut was undoubtedly a major British defeat.
41:58It involved the British army in their biggest retreat of the war.
42:03There was no escaping this fact.
42:04The public could see it, you could not deny it.
42:07Somebody had to take responsibility for this major disaster.
42:12To have pretended that nothing much terrible had happened and to carry on regardless was
42:17impossible.
42:19Someone had to carry the can.
42:21It was impossible that it should be Haig.
42:25Perhaps he carried the major responsibility because he had inspected Goff's defences before
42:30the attack began and pronounced them satisfactory.
42:34But it was politically impossible to sack Haig.
42:38He was the British commander-in-chief.
42:40The message that this would send to the Germans, to the British public and to the allies of
42:45the British would have been impossible at this stage of the war.
42:49So it had to be a lower commander.
42:51Much later, Haig looked back and said that it was quite clear at that stage they needed
42:58a scapegoat.
42:59And he admitted freely that it was either him or Goff.
43:03And he said, perhaps arrogantly, that he had decided it was better for the army that
43:09he stayed on rather than Goff.
43:11So in the short term, it was Haig that sacrificed Goff, if you like, for his own military skin.
43:19Rawlinson inherited only six divisions still in line, with four on the move.
43:25The French had taken over some of the old line and Foch was busy organising a reserve
43:30of both forces to come to their aid.
43:33Goff, however, had established the Villiers-Bretonneux line, defences 15 miles to the east of Amiens.
43:43This was chiefly held by a ragtag bunch known as Carey's force.
43:50Under Major General George Carey, this improvised detachment included American engineers and
43:57an entire signals company, and was responsible for protecting the city.
44:03On 4th April, the city was saved from imminent capture only by a daring, last-ditch counter-attack
44:11led by the Australian 36th Battalion.
44:15Nonetheless, the British artillery began to withdraw.
44:19But a small force of Australian and British reserve troops emerged from the positions.
44:25Inspired by the leadership of Colonel J. Milne, they successfully pushed back a far
44:31greater force of the 9th Bavarian Division.
44:35This gave fresh hope to the other Allied troops, and further counter-attacks ensued.
44:41Ludendorff exhorted Marwitz's exhausted 2nd Army to one final push on 5th April.
44:49Supported by gas shelling and stormtroopers, the struggle was as fierce as ever, however
44:54once again the Allied line held, much of the strain taken up by a variety of Dominion
45:01forces.
45:02By the evening, it was clear that the offensive had failed, and Ludendorff ordered all attacks
45:09to cease.
45:10Kaiserschlacht had ended on its 16th day.
45:14As Ludendorff himself said, the enemy's resistance was beyond our powers.
45:21But at what price had this resistance come?
45:25The British alone had lost 178,000 casualties, of which 72,000 were now prisoners of war.
45:35The average daily loss had been three times that of the Somme.
45:41The 5th Army had been hit harder than the 3rd, and 3 Divisions had lost over 7,000 men.
45:49The French had also been significantly hit, suffering 77,000 casualties, 18,000 of whom
45:57were held prisoner.
45:59The Allies had given up 1,200 square miles of land.
46:06They had also lost 1,300 artillery pieces, 2,000 machine guns, 400 aircraft, 200 tanks,
46:16and countless armoured cars and horses.
46:20However, the Germans themselves had incurred 239,000 casualties.
46:29For a nation stretched almost to breaking point, these men and all the munitions expended
46:36were now impossible to replace.
46:39Kaiserschlacht had simply brought them a stage closer to defeat.
46:45While large amounts of territory had been taken, while the offensives had begun with
46:50much sound and fury, they had accomplished, in reality, nothing apart from the real destruction
46:56of the German army.
46:58Yes, the Allies had been battered, but at no point had the Kaiserschlacht really inflicted
47:05any strategic damage on either the British or French.
47:09On the strategic level, then, Kaiserschlacht was a complete and abject failure.
47:16At the tactical level, the Kaiserschlacht, however, displayed what the new tactics of
47:22modernity and, indeed, the combination of arms could actually achieve.
47:30Infiltration tactics became the basis for all infantry tactics of all armies throughout
47:36the world and have, in their essentials, remained the same to this day.
47:41So tactically, the Kaiserschlacht was very impressive, but the difference between tactical
47:47success and strategic success was one which Ludendorff couldn't bridge.
47:54Kaiserschlacht is not as renowned as other battles of the First World War, but the bravery
47:59of the men who fought on all sides was as remarkable as at any other.
48:06After only a few days of fighting, ten men were awarded the Victoria Cross.
48:12However, perhaps it is best to leave the last word to one who fought that day – W.W.
48:19Francis, 7th King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
48:25For God's sake and common humanity, do not write about honour and glory.
48:32There was none.
48:34War, especially ours, was a stinking, ugly, horrible business.