For educational purposes
Discover why the last major German offensive of World War Two so nearly succeeded and how heroic defensive actions by American GIs thwarted their plans.
Discover why the last major German offensive of World War Two so nearly succeeded and how heroic defensive actions by American GIs thwarted their plans.
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00:00You
00:30on
00:56the 16th of December
00:581944 the quiet Ardennes region of Belgium erupted to the sound of battle
01:14Over the front line poured a quarter of a million German troops backed up by hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles
01:21The fire from 2,000 artillery pieces supported their ferocious attack
01:28This attack came as a complete surprise to the Allies and in the first few days it almost succeeded
01:51Once the Allies gathered themselves together, the German offensive was doomed to fail.
02:02Shortages in fuel, difficult terrain and supply problems would help ensure the collapse of the
02:07last great German offensive operation in the West. The fact that this mighty force had been
02:14assembled in secrecy left the Allies with a few embarrassing questions to answer and showed that
02:20even as the Allied offense gathered pace, the ultimate defeat of Hitler would not be an easy
02:25task. Since the 6th of June 1944, when the Allies had gained a foothold in Normandy,
02:41they had pushed ever-increasing numbers of men and material through the beachhead. However,
02:48the closer the Allies got to the German border, the stiffer German resistance became,
02:53as the Allies fought intense and costly battles in the areas around Aachen and the Hürtgen Forest.
03:02Soon, the two main Allied lines of advance were moving in different directions.
03:07In between them lay the Ardennes region.
03:11The Allied troops involved in the recent battles at Aachen and the Hürtgen Forest
03:15were sent to this quiet sector to rest and refit. Allied confidence was high,
03:22and there were even hopes that the war was drawing to an end.
03:29After the fighting in Normandy in the summer of 1944, the Allies had really made spectacular
03:36progress. Although it had taken them seven or eight weeks to commence the breakout from the
03:40Normandy bridgehead, the next fortnight or so saw them travel virtually all the way to the German
03:45border. In the process, the German armed forces in Western Europe were largely destroyed,
03:51really no more than scattered remnants, by early September.
03:56The British were in Brussels by September the 3rd, liberated Brussels, and then September the 4th,
04:02they took Antwerp. And it was at that point that the British suffered a logistic crisis,
04:08and the advance ran to a halt. Now, at exactly the same time, the Americans had been advancing,
04:14but on a divergent axis, to the south. Patton's Third Army was on the Meuse by the 1st of September
04:191944, but then he too suffered a logistic crisis.
04:26Hitler did not want to relinquish the initiative to the Allies.
04:29He had to pull something out of this debacle, and as early as August 1944,
04:35he began to lay plans for a counter-stroke.
04:40Hitler felt that a well-executed offensive in the West at this stage
04:43could cause the Allies to rethink their position.
04:48So Hitler is going to attack through the Ardennes, the scene of the great German victory of 1940
04:55against the French. He's going to attack through the Ardennes, recreate the victory of 1940,
05:02and go on and split the Allies. By bringing upon them this surprise defeat,
05:10he hoped that politically that would be the end of the alliance. They would sue for peace,
05:16and he could then turn to the Russians, knowing that he was only fighting a war on our front.
05:21General Alfred Jodl identified the main problems that had to be overcome as
05:26the Allied air superiority, supply difficulties, and the need for secrecy.
05:34To counter the Allied air power, the date for the offensive was planned for late November,
05:39and then moved to mid-December. It was reasoned that the bad weather,
05:44usually prevalent at this time, would severely restrict the overwhelming air power of the Allies.
05:51The question of secrecy was the most critical aspect of the assault.
05:59Access to the plans was restricted to a few choice commanders,
06:04and informing the troops of the plans was left to the last possible moment.
06:10Alongside this, a deception plan was put in place that would, hopefully,
06:15fool the Allied intelligence services. Firstly, Field Marshal von Rundstedt,
06:22noted for his capabilities in defence, was recalled from retirement, and placed in the
06:27position of Commander-in-Chief of the German forces in the West. To the outside world,
06:32he replaced the more aggressive Field Marshal Modell. But Modell continued to work on plans
06:38for the attack. Gerd von Rundstedt was brought in on the 1st of September, 1944,
06:45to act purely as a figurehead, to lull the Allies into a sense of security, to believe that this
06:52old man of 69 couldn't possibly be involved in a major offensive. Von Rundstedt was known to be a
07:00solid defensive general. The Germans conducted deliberate deception. They had, for instance,
07:076th Panzer Army expose itself to Allied aerial reconnaissance in the area of Cologne.
07:16And then, once they knew that the Allies had pictures of 6th Army in Cologne,
07:21they moved it by night to its new jumping-off place for the attack.
07:28The plan itself looked flawless on paper. Hitler planned to push a strong,
07:35armoured lead force down the Armblieb valley, through the Allied-held positions,
07:40and on to Antwerp. By doing this, he hoped to split the Allied front in two.
07:47Antwerp was one of the major ports that the Allies were using to bring supplies in to
07:53Northwest Europe. Supplies were a big problem for the Germans, fighting on two fronts as they were.
08:00So the idea was that if Hitler could cut the Allies off from one of the main sources of supply
08:09that kept their armies going, then perhaps he could fight the Western Allies on more of a one-to-one
08:17basis. It was envisaged that these developments would show the Allies that Germany could snatch
08:24victory from the jaws of defeat.
08:35They got this operation, and Hitler titled it, the whole offensive was called
08:40Wacht am Rhein, which was Watch over the Rhine. So if the Allies were to get note of, or get
08:47information regarding this operation, this offensive, they would simply believe it was
08:50a defensive operation, moving troops about the border to try and prevent the Allies moving into
08:55Germany. If the plan looked good on paper, the reality was that it was far from flawless.
09:03The Ardennes of 1944 contained a very different enemy to that of 1940.
09:13The combined Allied forces that were situated in or around this area had been fighting the Germans
09:18for over five years in many different theatres. They had the confidence of a near inexhaustible
09:25store of supplies, and whereas Hitler had to scrape the barrel to assemble the forces necessary for
09:31the attack, the Allies could rapidly deploy forces to the Ardennes.
09:38In 1940, speed of advance was needed for this type of plan to work.
09:43In 1940, the route used had travelled in a south-westerly direction, and had made good
09:48use of the available roads. This time, the direction of the attack was north-westerly,
09:54and only a few roads were open. The Americans stemmed the flow of traffic by closing key roads,
10:01either temporarily or permanently. This caused traffic build-ups,
10:06and slowed down the advance of the vital armoured units.
10:12In addition, the Germans' resources were really inadequate to the task. Although some of the
10:17forces used by the Germans were very good, and were very well equipped, there were an awful lot
10:21of second-rate personnel. There was also a deficiency in artillery, in ammunition, in fuel.
10:29And the lead elements of this offensive are told that they have to capture their own supplies as
10:35they advance. So here we have an offensive which depends on the ability of the spearheads to
10:41actually capture their own fuel as they advance. These detours to find the lifeblood of the panzers
10:49would help to slow the advance. These delays would not leave much of a time window for the
10:56troops to reach their objectives. The weather was always going to be a problem. Hitler chose
11:03the winter months deliberately, because that was a time when the Allied air forces would be grounded
11:08by the weather. Perhaps what he didn't consider also was the fact that that weather was going to
11:14affect the movement of his troops. At that time of year he could expect snow, and for a heavy
11:2068-tonne Tiger tank to try and move in that weather was absolutely appalling.
11:26When any competent German general who had actually worked with troops in the field
11:32saw this plan, their instant response was, nope, this is not going to work.
11:38The only German generals who accepted this plan were people like Jodl, who were yes-men.
11:46Hitler surrounded himself with yes-men, and his yes-men saw this plan and said, yes, that'll work.
11:51Everybody else said that this plan was not going to work.
11:57It's worth quoting an excerpt from SS Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich's interrogation
12:02after the war, as it gives a good indication of the feelings of the generals at the time.
12:08He said, all I had to do was cross the Meuse River, capture Brussels, and then go on and
12:14take the port of Antwerp. All of this in December, January, and February, the worst three months of
12:20the year. Through the Ardennes, where the snow was waist-deep, and where there wasn't room to
12:26deploy four tanks abreast, let alone six armoured divisions. Although Field Marshal von Rundstedt,
12:34the overall commander of German forces in the West, and Field Marshal Modell, the commander
12:40of Army Group B that launched the Ardennes Offensive, disagreed about many things. About
12:44one thing they absolutely did agree, which was that Hitler's plan for an armoured thrust towards
12:49Antwerp was virtually impossible. Both of them believed that the Germans should have a much more
12:54limited objective, an encirclement still, but an encirclement not of all of the British and
12:59Canadian forces in northwest Europe, but simply of the US First Army, which was deployed north of
13:04the Ardennes sector. They believed that if the Germans tried to do this, and that they probably
13:10could do this, they could have beneficial results. Hitler's last gamble was now underway,
13:18but the desperate nature of the situation was already clear to see. On paper, the Germans had
13:25gathered together a strong attacking force spread across three armies. The Sixth Panzer
13:31Army under Dietrich had the northernmost advance route. They were to advance from their forming-up
13:39areas near Dahlem in Germany, and into Belgium around the town of Lozaim. Their objective
13:45was to cross the Meuse River just below Liege and advance into Antwerp.
13:56Alongside the Sixth Panzer Army was the Fifth Panzer Army under the command of Lieutenant-General
14:02Hasso von Manteuffel. Their objective was to move from Prum in Germany and on to Antwerp via Brussels.
14:16The Seventh Army under General Erich Brandenburger had the southernmost route into
14:20Luxembourg. This infantry-only formation were to move from Bitburg in Germany
14:26and engage the US Third Army, with the objective of tying down these forces.
14:37All of these forces were part of Army Group B, commanded by Field Marshal Model.
14:44It totaled over 250,000 men and almost 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns.
14:51It was to cause the Allies grave concern in the days to come.
14:56The German forces that were used to spearhead the Ardennes Offensive
15:00were of very varied quality. Although the SS and other panzer divisions that were used contained a
15:05cadre of experienced personnel, very large numbers of the personnel in those divisions were
15:11ex-air force or ex-navy personnel. So basically Hitler moved sailors into infantry divisions,
15:18he moved air force personnel into parachute divisions, and he formed a number of Volksgrenadier
15:24divisions, people that had been in other jobs elsewhere or they were young men or older men.
15:32The Germans were able to concentrate their combat power for the Ardennes Offensive
15:39by moving their units as though they were preparing for an Allied offensive,
15:48as though they were preparing a counter-stroke. So when the Allied intelligence analysts
15:55saw a movement of German forces, their preconceived notions were that the Germans are already beaten,
16:03that all they're doing is acting defensively, and therefore when they saw an elite German unit being
16:11brought back up to strength and being moved to face the the Western Allies in France,
16:16they assumed that it was just preparation for the inevitable Allied attacks across the River Rhine.
16:26Facing this imposing lineup was a variety of American units.
16:30The 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions were part of the US 5 Corps under Major General Gero.
16:37They were positioned opposite the 6th Panzer Army.
16:42Facing Manteuffel in the centre were the 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions
16:47who were part of Major General Troy Middleton's 8th Corps.
16:53In the south, facing Brandenburger's men, were troops from the 9th Armoured and the 4th Infantry
16:59Divisions. Most of these American units had recently been involved in heavy fighting and
17:05were in the area for a rest. These combined units totaled around 83,000 men, backed up
17:13with around 450 tanks and assault guns and around 400 artillery pieces.
17:19They were in a strange country, at a bleak time of year, and many of them were thinking of home
17:25and Christmas. Most of them had already suffered at the hands of the enemy and the last thing they
17:31wanted or needed was to be the subject of an attack of this scale or intensity.
17:40The Ardennes sector was being held by very weak American divisions. One was
17:44totally inexperienced, the 106th, never been in battle before, and the other two, the 28th
17:48Infantry Division and the 4th Infantry Division, had been knocked about up in the Hürtgen Forest.
17:53Then you got the 9th Armoured Division in reserve which, again, was not experienced,
17:57and a cavalry group that was in that area. But they were very thinly spread.
18:04However, unlike the Germans, they had many factors in their favour.
18:10Although initially outnumbered, the Allies had strong forces close by that could be called upon
18:15if needed. These included the battle-tested 3rd Army, under the command of General George Patton.
18:28At this stage, the Allied supply lines had been established,
18:31and the Allied supply lines had been set up.
18:34At this stage, the Allied supply lines had been established, and when the weather permitted,
18:39they had complete domination of the sky. They just needed to delay the Germans in the initial stages
18:46and be patient until the odds swung in their favour.
18:53One other significant danger for the Germans was the Allied ability to feed in extra reserves
18:59from both the North and South. To counter this, an attack by the 12th SS Panzer Corps was planned
19:07to coincide with the assault. But strong rumblings from the Eastern Front led to the cancellation
19:13of this operation. In consequence, the flanks of the German armies in the North would be at
19:19the mercy of British reinforcements under Field Marshal Montgomery.
19:24I think the morale and mood of the Allied forces in North-West Europe in Christmas 1944 or so
19:30was really one of grim determination. Quite clearly, the elation and the optimism of summer 1944,
19:37following the breakout from Normandy, when lots of people thought that the war would be over
19:41within a couple of weeks, even, perhaps, or certainly just a few months, had disappeared.
19:46As the weather got worse, as the rain sleeted down, a sense of ennui begins to grip many
19:52Allied soldiers. It affected the Americans particularly, not quite so much the British,
19:57because one must remember that Britain, and particularly London, was still being hit by
20:01V1s and V2s, and so this was a fairly powerful motivation for the British to press on and at
20:08least try and do as much damage as they possibly could to the Germans. But for a lot of the
20:12Americans, some of them had been away from the United States for more than two years,
20:17and this is, you know, their second, perhaps their third Christmas away from
20:21the folks at home, and there's a real homesickness amongst some of them.
20:28At 5.30am on the morning of the 16th of December,
20:32the German artillery opened fire along the front line, which was approximately 85 miles long.
20:47This intensive barrage lasted less than an hour, and was mainly designed to confuse the enemy and
20:53to disrupt their lines of communication. It was hoped that it would also open gaps in the lines.
21:03The Germans did make significant gains, breaking through and infiltrating some areas.
21:09The now isolated Allied groups were overrun and either killed or taken prisoner.
21:18Some groups resisted, but it was not enough to stem the avalanche of German troops.
21:33Further back in the Allied command positions and headquarters, various commanders tried to gain an
21:38accurate picture of events, but this proved impossible due to the severing of the lines
21:44of communication and the steady capture of the forward positions.
21:50It was several days before the US troops began to surrender,
21:54but when they did, so many of them surrendered that it still holds the embarrassing record
21:59of the biggest surrender of American soldiers in the history of her armed forces.
22:14Crucially, however, the US troops held on to places of strategic importance.
22:19The Elsenborn Ridge in the north, St. Vith in the center, and Bastogne in the south.
22:29The German attack was based on the idea that 6th Panzer Army, weighted as it was with lots of
22:37well-provisioned and well-trained Waffen-SS, were going to be able to hit the Americans.
22:43The Americans would disintegrate and the Germans could then just drive right on through across the
22:49Elsenborn Ridge and drive to the River Meuse. That didn't happen.
22:56What developed from here on was a race to the primary objectives. The Germans knew that time
23:02was not on their side and they must reach the targets quickly.
23:06From the outset, however, things began to go wrong for the German forces.
23:13In the north, the planned parachute drop around Elsenborn Ridge
23:20was made in strong winds and appalling weather.
23:25The Germans had to capture the Elsenborn Ridge very early on. Their ability to actually drive
23:32north and to reach the Meuse depended on securing this ridge, and this was the role of an airborne
23:38operation, and this was an utter and complete failure.
23:43The German paras were under the command of the experienced leader Colonel von der Heiter.
23:49They were dropped over a wide area and were unable to concentrate their efforts.
23:55Also, due to the lack of reconnaissance beforehand, they found that they had dropped
23:59into the positions of the US 1st Infantry and that the Americans were stronger than had been
24:05anticipated. After realizing that they could not meet their objectives, they tried to break
24:11through the American lines in force. After suffering crippling losses, the German paras
24:17retreated and then filtered through the American positions in small groups.
24:24This unit had started with 1,200 men, although less than 350 managed to fight together due to
24:32the dispersal. Less than 100 survivors made it back to their own lines, and von der Heiter was
24:39himself captured. The one success of this small but vital mission was in giving the Allies the
24:48impression they were fighting a far higher number of troops, and consequently they then
24:54committed large numbers of their own men to counter the supposed threat.
25:03If the advance of the 1st SS Panzer Corps had been more rapid,
25:07they could have taken advantage of this development.
25:11As it was, they had run into difficulties of their own. The newly arrived US 99th Division
25:18had defended itself well into the opening stages of the attack.
25:22The vital high ground remained in American hands. The lead force of the 1st SS Panzer Division,
25:29Kampfgruppe Peiper, continued the move to the west towards Honsfeld.
25:35The unit which has to succeed, for 6th SS Panzer Army to succeed, is a Kampfgruppe under the
25:41command of Jochen Peiper. And this unit has just 48 hours to get from its start line and reach the
25:49Meuse. And very, very quickly it begins falling behind schedule. Peiper is used to operating in
25:56the conditions of the Eastern Front. Wide plains, rolling hills. And when Peiper constructs his
26:03march formation, what he does is quite sensibly place his heavy vehicles, his Panzerkampfwagen
26:09Mark 6s, the Tigers and indeed the King Tigers, at the head of the columns. But what he doesn't
26:15calculate on is the fact that the low top speed of the Tiger will actually slow down
26:21the entire column. He was going through little roads over little bridges with these huge tanks,
26:27some of which were 68 tons. And as he progressed, small pockets of American resistance actually were
26:33thrown in in front of him and actually made him divert his route. He had to take several diversions.
26:38Hence Peiper had to start moving into territory that belonged to the central thrust.
26:44South of these actions, the 5th Panzer Army got off to a better start.
26:50Their advance was made against the thinly spread American 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions,
26:56who were not prepared for battle at this stage. The Germans pushed through these groups with ease.
27:03However, some of the American forces slowed the advance and managed to hold a number of
27:09the bridges in the area. At the end of the first day, Manteuffel's men did force crossings over the
27:16Aue River, and they wasted no time in pressing on towards Clervaux. The third thrust of the attack,
27:24Brandenburg's 7th Army, positioned further south, got off to a very poor start due to difficult
27:30terrain and determined American defenders of the US 109th Regiment. This American resistance
27:38and a combination of logistics and other flaws on the Germans' part, for example the fact that
27:42the initial attacks went in under strength, meant that the Germans' effort was really falling apart
27:47very, very quickly. Overall, although difficulties had been encountered, the 17th of December
27:55saw the all-important German Army committed in strength.
28:00However, the American high command was already beginning to move reinforcements to the area.
28:09Among these reinforcements were the 7th and 10th Armoured Divisions, together with the 101st
28:17Airborne Division. This latter unit was ordered to the town of Bastogne, which occupied the most
28:23important road junction in the whole region. It was now a race against time.
28:38In the north, the Germans continued in their efforts to reach the given targets.
28:45The commander of the 1st SS Corps was becoming frustrated at the slow pace of the advance.
28:51He moved the 12th SS Panzer Division, which was engaged in fighting around the Elsenborn Ridge,
28:57and pushed them in behind the 1st SS Panzer Division, who were moving towards the Amblive
29:02River. This was one of the first major mistakes made during the offensive, as it only succeeded
29:09in helping to relieve the pressure on the Americans who were defending the area. The
29:14Americans lost no time in turning this development to their advantage. They strengthened their
29:19positions to such an extent that the Germans found it impossible to take the area.
29:33Little American organizations like infantry platoons were holding out on these narrow
29:49mountain roads in the Ardennes region, and even though they themselves were not in contact with
29:55any higher authority, nobody was ordering them to do what they were doing, they managed to conduct
30:00a defense in depth. And this is very important. The only way you can stop a German armored attack
30:09is by defense in depth. That means you don't try to hold some kind of line of defense, you hold
30:16strong points, and you make the Germans fight for strong points, and if they bypass you then you can
30:22counter-attack. The Americans hadn't planned this kind of defense, it's just the way it worked out.
30:30As the 1st SS Division's advance continued, Kampfgruppe Peiper became involved in a small
30:36firefight near Bauniers. What followed has been the subject of many debates.
30:44What cannot be denied is that around 80 American prisoners of war were shot dead.
30:52The Americans claimed that this was in cold blood. The Germans claimed they were trying to escape.
30:59On the 17th of December, an American patrol came out and they discovered that the bodies of these
31:11American soldiers lying in the snow, clearly the result of a massacre. So here were the Germans,
31:16particularly the Waffen-SS, bringing the standards of war which had become common
31:21on the Eastern Front to the Western Front. And very, very quickly, and this always happens
31:27with immense rapidity in armies, the word went out. My guess is that within three to four hours,
31:34every American soldier in the Ardennes had heard that the Germans were not taking prisoners.
31:41And there are only two things you can do in that situation. One is that you can run, or if you can't
31:46run, then you've got to fight. So Kampfgruppe Peiper and other elements of the Waffen-SS
31:51had inadvertently increased America's fighting power enormously in the Ardennes.
31:58Wasting no time, Kampfgruppe Peiper quickly replenished the fuel tanks of the panzers
32:04and pushed on towards the town of Stavelo and its vital bridge.
32:12Here, however, the advance was held up for a number of hours when they came under attack.
32:17Peiper, who was unsure of the size of the attacking force,
32:20delayed further advances until the following morning.
32:24Stavelo was taken during the 18th of December, and the advance continued towards Trois-Ponts.
32:35Near Trois-Ponts were the bridges that crossed the Salme and Almblieve rivers. As Peiper's men
32:41approached, the American defenders blew the bridges to avoid their use by the Germans.
32:47The only option left open to Peiper was to move his column back. He tried to advance through to
32:55Chennault, where another bridge crossed the Almblieve, but came under attack from American
33:00aircraft. It was at this point that the main advance of the once-mighty 1st SS Panzer Division
33:10ground to a halt.
33:18The last offensive of the war in the West would end for the majority of Peiper's men
33:23in the small village of La Gliese as he ordered his men to set up defences.
33:31The critical fuel factor had played a significant part in the failure of this part of the German
33:36advance. By the time his men had reached La Gliese and the nearby Sturmung,
33:42the fuel tanks of their vehicles had been run almost dry.
33:49Much had been expected of the SS forces, and when news of the decision to stay in La Gliese
33:54reached the German commanders, there was no time to waste. The main emphasis of the offensive
34:00was shifted to the 5th Panzer Army's sector. They were making good use of the favourable terrain
34:06and the poorly prepared defenders of the US 106th Division.
34:11Now, 5th Panzer Army under Manteuffel, this is the Wehrmacht Army, was actually advancing with
34:17the grain of the country. It was using the main roads. And so now we have this situation where
34:235th Panzer Army is actually surging to the west, which is fine, it looks good on a map.
34:29The only problem is it's not where the Germans want to go. The Germans want to go north.
34:34They continued in their race to reach the objectives given,
34:38one of these being the key town of Bastogne.
34:43The town of Bastogne was crucial because three roads converged there,
34:47making it a local centre of communication.
34:51However, they'd been pipped to the post by the US 101st Airborne Division.
34:57These seasoned veterans of Normandy and Operation Market Garden set up all-round defences.
35:04When Manteuffel's men ran into these positions, they found it impossible to break through.
35:11Manteuffel ordered his forces to waste no more time,
35:14and they bypassed the town and continued their advance.
35:18This created a strong pocket of enemy resistance within the German-held positions.
35:26The attempts to eliminate this resistance
35:29would soak up considerable amounts of German men and material.
35:36The initial shock that had hit the Americans was over.
35:39Eisenhower reacted and within 60 hours had got troops moving in
35:43to blunt the offensive, to blunt the bulge.
35:46The northern shoulder and the southern shoulder were pushing in,
35:49and the Germans, within a matter of days really, although the offensive lasted for a month,
35:54within a matter of days it was actually grinding to a halt.
36:01On the 22nd of December, the Germans went to Bastogne carrying a white flag
36:06and the offer of surrender for the Americans.
36:08The garrison commander, General McAuliffe, gave a simple reply.
36:13Nuts.
36:18At the same time, further north,
36:19the Germans had eventually managed to take the town of St. Vith.
36:23This was particularly important because
36:25it was the other key road junction on the Germans' intended route of advance.
36:30They'd been bogged down around this town for days and, as in other areas of the battle,
36:35these delays allowed the Americans to build up defences further back.
36:44On Christmas Eve 1944,
36:46Manteuffel's forces reached an area just west of Selles.
36:51This would become the furthest point reached by the Germans during this offensive.
37:00Christmas Day 1944 saw the besieged town of Bastogne
37:04coming under increasing pressure from the Germans,
37:07but the Allies' massive air superiority meant the garrison could be supplied by air
37:12without fear of German intervention.
37:15The American defenders prepared to fight to the end.
37:20So
37:32elements of Patton's forces were moving closer and on Boxing Day, December the 26th,
37:37they managed to force an opening through the German lines and into Bastogne.
37:43With this relief action, the German situation became increasingly hopeless.
37:51By the last few days of December 1944,
37:53it was clear that the German offensive effort was largely exhausted.
37:56They'd used up large quantities of fuel, most of their ammunition reserves,
38:01and their spearhead formations had been severely attrited
38:04in bitter fighting against American forces.
38:07In addition, they'd failed to open up by far the most important lines of communication
38:12around the Elsenborn Ridge in the north and around Bastogne further to the south.
38:17The Americans had really solidified their positions.
38:20Although they had opened the line of communication through St. Vith,
38:23this in itself was simply not enough to allow the Germans to maintain their momentum.
38:28Furthermore, the weather was changing very much in the Allies' favour.
38:32During the early days of the Ardennes Offensive,
38:35the Germans had just the overcast and the snow that they needed
38:39to protect them from Allied air.
38:44However, starting on the 23rd of December 1944,
38:50the weather over the Ardennes becomes cold and clear,
38:56and the German protection from Allied fighter-bombers,
38:59and indeed heavy bombers, disappears.
39:03The Allied pilots would make their presence known over the battle zone
39:07and would help ensure the defeat of the German forces.
39:11They would achieve this by using very close air support
39:14and interdiction of German movement, especially supply columns,
39:18and by an aerial resupply of encircled US units.
39:28There now unfolded one of the most extraordinary events of the battle.
39:32Another key German unit committed to the offensive was the 150th Panzer Brigade.
39:38This force was under the command of Otto Skorzeny, a daring commando leader.
39:44For the Ardennes Offensive, they were ordered to act deep behind the enemy lines
39:48and cause panic and confusion.
39:52They also had the tasks of capturing vital river crossings
39:55and holding them long enough for the main force to reach them.
40:01They would make use of captured American jeeps and trucks,
40:04together with German tanks adapted to resemble American tank destroyers.
40:09A few individuals actually reached the Meuse River,
40:14but they did not have adequate support and had to abandon this position.
40:20Around the same time, groups of them began to get stopped and arrested
40:24by the Americans, who were growing increasingly suspicious.
40:28The rumours quickly spread that there were Germans operating behind the lines,
40:32posing as friendly forces.
40:34Skorzeny's commando is quite profound,
40:36because it leads to a feeling of something like panic at Eisenhower's headquarters.
40:40The news that Skorzeny has led commandos through the American lines
40:46begins to percolate around the American rear areas.
40:50So, at one level, Skorzeny's commando is not succeeding.
40:54At another, it is having a major effect, psychologically destabilizing.
41:01The psychological effect that this small force had upon the Allies
41:05far outweighed their small numbers.
41:08No-one escaped the paranoia,
41:10and even Eisenhower himself was confined to his headquarters for fear of assassination.
41:19Back in Lugliese, Peiper could see the hopelessness of the situation
41:23and the fear of being killed.
41:25Back in Lugliese, Peiper could see the hopelessness of the situation
41:30as his men were being shelled relentlessly by the American artillery and tanks.
41:35The American determination to defeat this force
41:38resulted in them firing over 58,000 shells into this area during the battle.
41:51Peiper was used to getting out of sticky situations,
41:53as he'd done many times before in Russia and Normandy.
41:57He gave the order that the tanks and half-tracks that were still serviceable
42:01were to be destroyed to prevent their use by the enemy.
42:04They were out of vital fuel, and there was no ammunition.
42:10He left a handful of his men behind to give the impression that they were still battling,
42:14and also to look after around 150 American prisoners they'd captured.
42:19He led a force of 800 survivors and made for German-held lines.
42:27Their attempts were risky, and more than once they became involved in firefights
42:32with American forces that were moving across Peiper's escape route.
42:36They did eventually reach friendly-held positions a few days later.
42:41Peiper had started with 5,000 men,
42:44and these losses in men and machines would be impossible to replace at this stage of the war.
43:00In Manteuffel's sector, the Americans slowly widened the corridor into Bastogne.
43:06The ferocity of the battles increased in intensity,
43:09as this area quickly became the focus of the entire struggle for both sides.
43:15The Americans pushed further reinforcements into the Bastogne area,
43:19including the 4th Armoured Division, the 26th Infantry, and the 80th Infantry Divisions.
43:25The Battle of the Bulge, as the Americans called the battle,
43:28was proving a very hard fight for both sides.
43:45As the Allies were able to push more forces into the area,
43:48they slowly succeeded in pushing the Germans back.
43:51By 2nd January 1945, the front line had been reduced by around 15 kilometres.
43:58It was also around this time that the British made their presence felt.
44:04In the early stages of the offensive, Montgomery had recognised the importance
44:08of the River Meuse to the Germans, and had placed strong British forces
44:12in a defensive position along the northern sector.
44:16He was also given command of some of the American forces.
44:19Eisenhower made a decision which politically could have been very, very dangerous.
44:24He actually appointed Montgomery as senior commander in the north,
44:29and that command actually took on quite a lump of the American army,
44:33and politically, from the American point of view, that could have been a bad move.
44:37But nevertheless, it was a good decision.
44:38Montgomery actually started to tidy up the front.
44:43Although very few British forces were actually involved directly
44:47in resisting the German offensive, the British role does warrant a mention.
44:52Certainly, the allocation of British forces to defend the Meuse river crossings,
44:57which was something that the British decided upon within a couple of days
44:59of the Ardennes offensive beginning, allowed the Americans to free up forces
45:04that could be used to advantage in the battle in the Ardennes itself.
45:08In addition, by putting Montgomery in charge of the American and British forces
45:14on the northern wing of the German penetration,
45:17this created a command and control arrangement that was much better suited
45:21to dealing with the German offensive
45:23than if the Americans had been in charge across the entire sector.
45:29When he felt the time was right,
45:31Montgomery launched a counterattack into the German lines
45:34with the objective of linking with the Americans further south.
45:39This objective was finally reached on January the 4th at the town of La Roche.
45:46This link-up put the river Meuse well and truly out of the reach of the Germans.
45:57Although the frontline German commanders and troops could see the hopelessness
46:01of the situation, Hitler could not.
46:04He ordered the advance to continue and achieve the original objective,
46:09but at this stage it was an increasingly difficult task.
46:16The Allied fighter-bombers rained their deadly blows down on the Germans,
46:21just as they'd done during the Normandy battles.
46:27A glimmer of hope appeared on the horizon for the Germans at the start of January
46:32when the Luftwaffe launched their own attacks.
46:35They committed around 1,000 planes and flew against Allied targets, including airfields.
46:41They managed to destroy around 300 Allied aircraft and damaged 25 Allied airfields.
46:48The cost, however, amounted to 100 aircraft and, more importantly,
46:53experienced pilots who could be ill-afforded.
46:56In total, the Germans lost 170 pilots and 67 were taken prisoner,
47:02so the Luftwaffe raid was ultimately a failure.
47:11Around the middle of January, some of the German units began to be withdrawn from the frontline.
47:17These withdrawals included the 1st SS Panzer Division,
47:21which had suffered badly during the operation.
47:24The remaining German units were placed under even more pressure
47:28due to this weakening of their overall forces.
47:38By the end of January, the front line was back to where it had been
47:42at the start of the German offensive six weeks earlier.
47:46The cost to both sides was high.
47:48The Allies lost around 75,000 men.
47:52The German cost stood at around 120,000 casualties
47:56and losses of considerable numbers of irreplaceable tanks and other vehicles.
48:04Hitler's last throw of the dice had failed.
48:48Thanks for watching!