CNN Cold War Set 2_05of14_Good Guys Bad Guys 1967-1978
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00:00As the colonial era drew to a close, the Soviet Union believed the world would turn to socialism
00:22and preached that message in its propaganda.
00:26The United States was concerned.
00:28The feeling was very strong in Washington that the Soviets were pursuing a policy of
00:34expansion into the Third World.
00:37And our objective was to prevent that.
00:58Nikita Khrushchev and Gamal Abdel Nasser changed the face of Egypt.
01:26After the West had refused a loan for a dam across the Nile, the Soviet Union took over.
01:43The emerging nations used the Cold War to get money and arms.
01:54The developing world was being courted.
02:03In Europe, the borders were set in stone, and there was no opportunity of expansion
02:07there for either side.
02:10It would have started a new world war.
02:15Where could the hunting take place?
02:18To be rather crude, in those areas where there was still prey.
02:22That was the Third World, and each side tried not to miss a chance.
02:33In the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union backed two rival and opposed regimes.
02:39For America, this was evidence of Soviet expansion.
02:46In Angola, thousands of Cubans poured in to fight South African troops backed by the United
02:52States.
02:58In Egypt, the Soviet Union supplied arms cheaply and on credit.
03:07But President Nasser wasn't easily influenced.
03:16One shouldn't think of our relations with Nasser as the relations of master and servant.
03:22Nasser always pursued his own policy.
03:28He was able to understand the global strategy, and now we can benefit from the disagreement
03:39between the Soviet Union and between the United States and the West, and make benefit of this
03:46situation, to raise our capabilities militarily and economically.
03:59Nasser was the hero of the Arab world.
04:03The Egyptians rallied for war.
04:11Nasser and the Arab states wanted to destroy Israel.
04:15Moscow did not.
04:21In 1948, the Soviet Union had supported the creation of the State of Israel on Arab lands.
04:33By 1967, Israel's two and a half million Jews were surrounded by 90 million hostile Arabs.
04:42Israel felt insecure.
04:47The threat from Egypt became intense.
04:50Israel had America's political backing, but not her weapons.
04:57Would Israel get America's support for a surprise attack?
05:02President Johnson asked us to bring Israel's foreign minister to the family quarters of
05:06the White House, and to speak rather crudely about it.
05:10The intent was to work him over, to persuade him, is perhaps a more polite term, to avoid
05:20a preemptive attack.
05:22We thought we had persuaded him.
05:34Israel struck first.
05:35In less than three hours, 90% of the Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground.
05:48The Israelis seized East Jerusalem.
05:50Jews were able to pray at the wailing wall again.
05:57The Israelis pressed on.
05:59In six days, the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were routed.
06:09The map of the Middle East was transformed.
06:14Israel had trebled its size.
06:18In the contest between Russia and America, in the Cold War, in the Middle East, Israel
06:24was an automatic ally of the West.
06:28Since the Six-Day War, this automatic ally became a strategic asset.
06:34America became Israel's principal source of arms.
06:43In the occupied territories, a million Arabs fell under Israeli rule.
06:50It was a devastating blow to Arab morale.
06:54The Soviets counted the cost.
07:04Our weapons turned out to be less effective than we calculated.
07:10We felt that it was our duty to compensate, to supply more arms, and looking at the wider
07:17context, not to let the West win.
07:27September 1970.
07:28Grief in Egypt at the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
07:38The developing world mourned an outstanding leader.
07:41So did Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin.
07:46The mourners were uneasy, as were the Russians.
07:50Who could follow Nasser?
07:53I shall do my best to follow the policy of my late president, my dearest friend, President
08:02Gamal, but no one will capitulate here in this country.
08:10I am not ready to capitulate or to surrender one inch or a bit of sand.
08:24At the Moscow summit of 1972, the superpowers agreed on a code of conduct, detente.
08:32Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev agreed not to seek advantage at the other's expense.
08:40Nasser's ties with America outweighed Moscow's commitments to the Arabs.
08:45This angered Sadat because he felt that they were giving priority to detente with the Americans
08:51rather than helping Egypt wage a war.
09:00But detente didn't stop American efforts to extend its influence in the Middle East at
09:04Moscow's expense.
09:08Our policy in 72 was really to try to minimize and reduce the role, I'll go further, to
09:16keep the Soviets out of the situation.
09:19We established the policy then that we would thwart any move backed by Soviet arms until
09:29some Arab leader would become so frustrated that he would turn to us for diplomacy and
09:35then we would try to take as even-handed a position as we were capable of developing.
09:44In Egypt, as in many other developing nations, the Soviet presence was huge.
09:50In July 1972, Sadat told the 15,000 advisors and their families to pack up and go.
10:02It was a bold power play.
10:04Sadat's move boosted his popularity and showed how little control the Russians really had.
10:12By October 72, they decided to come back to the support of Egypt.
10:21And then Sadat makes benefit from that, he says, well, I expel them to express power
10:28so that they would give us what we need.
10:31And strange enough, we had arms deal after October, which was one of the biggest arms
10:38deal we've got with the Soviet Union.
10:43Sadat needed the arms.
10:45He was planning to end the uneasy peace.
10:50He wanted to go to war.
10:51He needed to go to war.
10:52He felt he couldn't do otherwise.
10:54He considered that negotiations were impossible without some heating of the whole process,
11:00I mean, some shock therapy.
11:07Yom Kippur, Israel's most holy day.
11:104,000 Egyptian troops and tanks surged over the Suez Canal.
11:20We'd been waiting for this moment for five years, the moment of crossing the canal.
11:27Our cries shook the ground under the Israeli enemy.
11:40The cry of God is great made all our hair stand up on end.
11:54The Egyptian army sped ahead, eager to retake lost territory.
12:04American Jews demanded immediate help for Israel.
12:08Washington was in a dilemma.
12:14Supplying its ally Israel risked sacrificing Arab goodwill.
12:19The State Department stalled.
12:22There was an argument as to whether transport was available.
12:27And the Pentagon suggestion was that private transport be leased.
12:39We were very disappointed and angry that supplies were arriving so slowly and only on El Al
12:43Plains.
12:45The air convoy was delayed again and again.
12:53The Egyptians kept up their attack.
12:56The United States began to understand that we were in a serious situation when we suddenly
13:03changed our tune from this very blithe, typically Israeli self-confidence, to a report that
13:12as a result of what happened, we were losing our lifeblood.
13:22Sadat was triumphant.
13:23He had regained land Egypt lost in the Six-Day War.
13:31But the Russians sensed disaster ahead.
13:33They urged Sadat to accept a ceasefire.
13:38He would benefit from a ceasefire, otherwise he'd be forced to retreat.
13:42But Sadat wouldn't listen.
13:49In Washington, President Nixon ended the delay over the arms shipments.
13:55Nixon said when the option was brought to him to send two, three American planes, he
14:00said, let's send a lot, because we are going to be criticized anyhow.
14:04And we will be criticized for whatever we do, for one plane or two planes, for 40 planes.
14:09So let's do it in an effective way.
14:16The airlift put the world's largest power publicly alongside Israel.
14:23Now it was Moscow's allies that faced defeat.
14:32Now the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt.
14:38Soon most of the Egyptian army would be stranded in the Sinai.
14:48Then Sadat got terrified.
14:51He spoke on the phone directly to Brezhnev.
14:54I was there.
14:55I remember him begging, save us, save us from these Israeli tanks.
15:15Cut off in the desert, the Egyptians faced defeat.
15:20Moscow called for a ceasefire.
15:24They realized that the greater the military victory on the part of the Israelis, the greater
15:30defeat of Soviet supply and a general weakening of the Soviet position in the entire region.
15:42The Soviets and Henry Kissinger rapidly agreed proposals for a ceasefire.
15:51As Kissinger arrived in Israel to break the news to the Israelis, the superpower's ability
15:56to restrain their allies would be tested.
16:00He had made commitments, which some of our leaders, especially Golda Meir, our prime
16:07minister, believed to have been rather rash.
16:10And when he landed, he said, I'm going to be chastised for this.
16:17Israel wasn't yet willing to end the war.
16:20Kissinger explained what happened.
16:23And he vowed to continue to help Israel in case there is a renewal of fighting.
16:36With America's connivance, Israel stepped up its onslaught.
16:41The Soviets were outraged.
16:45Brezhnev wrote a letter to Nixon saying, how is it when we've agreed to act jointly that
16:49the Israelis are continuing to advance?
16:53It is undermining all our attempts to make peace.
17:01We suggested that both the Americans and the Soviets send troops to the Middle East to
17:05make Israel accept the ceasefire.
17:10But there was also a sentence that said, if you won't do it, we will have to consider
17:17unilateral action.
17:21The Soviet leaders had every reason to look at this as if it had been some sort of a plot.
17:28And they reacted very violently, and they sent us an extremely tough note saying that
17:32they want to join the American-Soviet intervention.
17:37And if not, they would act unilaterally.
17:42Kissinger deliberately upped the ante.
17:46Seeking to forestall any Soviet intervention in the Middle East, he placed American nuclear
17:50forces on heightened alert.
17:56The basic purpose was to generate a lot of traffic that the Soviet Union would pick up
18:03before they received our reply to know that this was getting serious.
18:11Moscow didn't react to the alert.
18:13They had already abandoned the idea of unilaterally sending troops.
18:18That was clearly a political victory for the United States, a major political victory that
18:23had repercussions in a Cold War far beyond the Middle East.
18:33Under American pressure, Israel allowed food and water to reach the trapped Egyptian army.
18:39Kissinger wanted Egypt defeated, but not destroyed.
18:50With the Israelis just 100 kilometers from Cairo, the Egyptians were forced into their
18:55first ever face-to-face talks with Israel.
18:59Moscow was not involved.
19:01The Egyptians saw that the vehicle for getting on with what subsequently became disengagement
19:11agreements between Egypt and Israel, that it was the United States that carried all
19:16the cards.
19:20Henry Kissinger became the world's most famous frequent flyer.
19:26Shuttle diplomacy gave him easy access to Sadat.
19:31The relationship had fundamentally changed.
19:33I mean, since the war, Sadat believed that the main global party he should woo was the
19:42Americans.
19:45Kissinger's travels didn't bring about permanent peace.
19:50They showed America was winning the Cold War in the Middle East, but there was a price
19:54to pay.
20:01These events unfavorably affected the process of détente.
20:07They strengthened the mistrust of the Soviet Union towards the United States.
20:20Africa 1975.
20:23The last colonial empire was dying, and the people of Angola reached for freedom, fresh
20:29hunting grounds for the Cold War superpowers.
20:36As Portuguese troops pulled out of Angola, three groups jostled for power.
20:45America's fears were aroused.
20:49When Bill Colby, the CIA director, went to brief the National Security Council in the
20:54White House the first time on this, his briefing was literally, gentlemen, this is a map of
21:01Africa, and here is Angola.
21:06Now in Angola, we have three factions.
21:09There's the MPLA, they're the bad guys.
21:12The FNLA, they're the good guys.
21:14And there's UNITA and Jonas Savimbi, we don't know too well.
21:18And that was to get the National Security Council involved in this thing.
21:27The popular movement for the liberation of Angola, the MPLA, the largest group, was left
21:33wing.
21:35Based in and around the capital, Luanda, its multi-ethnic membership was led by Agostinho
21:39Neto and Lucio Lara.
21:43In the 1960s, it had received training from Cuba and arms from Moscow.
21:53The National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the FNLA, operated largely in the north of
21:59the country.
22:00Its leader, Holden Roberto, a strident anti-communist, had close links with neighboring Zaire, which
22:06supplied him with outdated American arms.
22:16The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, was
22:22based in the south of Angola.
22:25A charismatic leader, Savimbi decided that American backing was the key to power.
22:37At Alvor in Portugal, the three rival groups got together.
22:41They agreed on arrangements for independence and elections.
22:46The United States scotched that, absolutely.
22:52Our solution was the CIA, without approval from the National Security Council, delivered
22:59$300,000 to Holden Roberto and ordered him to send his people into northern Angola.
23:11We weren't worried about receiving American aid.
23:15We knew that the Soviet Union was supporting the MPLA, and we had no possibility of countering
23:20that.
23:25Secretly channeled through Zaire, American money helped pay for Roberto's war on the
23:30MPLA.
23:35His side was always the bloodiest, the most violent.
23:39They went down and promptly killed 15 MPLA political activists.
23:44And from that time on, it was all cast, you know, the fate of Angola was cast, it was
23:48written in blood.
23:55The Americans were not sure that Roberto's troops could defeat the MPLA.
24:00The Central Intelligence Agency sent John Stockwell to investigate.
24:05Roberto said he had 30,000.
24:08I had trouble counting 30 badly armed, disorganized, kind of rabble kind of troops.
24:16And he was a cocktail party cowboy, he'd spent his whole career politicking in Kinshasa.
24:21He knew nothing of military operations or logistics or organization.
24:30Then Stockwell went south to UNITA's headquarters.
24:40Stockwell met UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi.
24:44I found a different kind of a revolutionary.
24:47He'd spent the entire time inside Angola, 20 years.
24:52He had led the guerrilla fighting himself.
24:55Whatever the consequences, whatever the results, we will continue to fight because we don't
25:01want to be slaves of Russia in Angola, in our own country.
25:08South Africa was now backing two of the three independence movements.
25:17Washington ruled out intervention in Angola with American troops, instead it turned, secretly,
25:23to South Africa.
25:24The United States at the highest level requested assistance, or rather requested South Africa
25:32to go in and assist UNITA.
25:35We did maintain a position of disapproval, of apartheid.
25:44But on the other hand, the South African government was extremely powerful.
25:53South Africa was isolated.
25:56Although it was done secretly, it was good for South Africa to be cooperating with a
26:00big force like the USA, even though it was clandestine.
26:07There were many people in policy-making positions in the Department of State who were essentially
26:14willing to have a funny, ambiguous relationship with South Africa.
26:25The focus was on Soviet penetration and the possibility of the Soviet Union using unstable
26:32situations in Africa to benefit itself, to take root and foment trouble.
26:42They were afraid of the MPLA.
26:44They called us communists.
26:48The South Africans were terrified of the MPLA.
26:51They didn't have that terror of the FNLA or UNITA.
26:55They were allies.
26:58They didn't like the MPLA because the MPLA declared itself against apartheid.
27:10In Luanda, the MPLA was staging parades.
27:13In the countryside, it was losing control.
27:19We were alone, poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly armed.
27:25We requested help from the Cubans to help us resist that aggression.
27:33Keen to show leadership in the developing world, Cuba sent 400 military instructors
27:38to Luanda.
27:40Moscow hadn't been consulted.
27:52The Soviets knew absolutely nothing about it.
27:57We took the decision because of our long-standing relations over many years with NATO and with
28:03the independence movement in Angola.
28:08We were very unhappy.
28:10Obviously, we had no desire to see Fidel Castro extend his influence in the African continent.
28:22Our government in Washington perceived Fidel Castro as a Soviet proxy.
28:29We thought, with respect to Angola, that if the Soviet Union could intervene at such distances
28:35from areas that were far from the traditional Russian security concerns, and when Cuban
28:43forces could be introduced into distant trouble spots, and if the West could not find a counter
28:49to that, that then the whole international system could be destabilized.
28:57It was a question of globalizing our struggle vis-Ã -vis the globalized pressures and harassment
29:03of the U.S.
29:05In this respect, it did not coincide with the Soviet viewpoint.
29:13We acted, but without their cooperation.
29:22Quite the opposite.
29:23There were criticisms.
29:26So?
29:30North of Luanda, Holden Roberto's FNLA troops were heading for the capital.
29:36They wanted to seize it before Angola's Independence Day.
29:40They had high hopes of success.
29:46We actually had a celebration party in the CI headquarters in Washington.
29:50We expected the news by the end of the day that we would have captured Luanda.
29:59Led by Cubans, the MPLA troops halted Roberto's advance.
30:05In the middle of the valley, about 2,000 122-millimeter rockets began landing, and we had nothing
30:18to answer with, and our forces broke and ran.
30:25The military force of the FNLA had been blunted.
30:29UNITA's ally was in trouble.
30:34A bigger challenge now faced the MPLA.
30:40In October 1975, South African troops had invaded Angola.
30:46From their bases in Namibia, they had joined forces with UNITA.
30:51We advanced approximately, I think, something like 80 kilometers a day.
30:55By this time, our troops were getting good.
30:56I mean, they were really getting on with it now.
30:59They were out of those vehicles and into assault formations, which should have held out of
31:03these people, you see.
31:04Then they would pack up and move because they didn't expect us.
31:12The South Africans were helping UNITA, and Zaire was supporting the FNLA.
31:18So it was only fair that the MPLA ask the Cubans to come and support us in the struggle
31:23against the invasions.
31:32Just two days before independence, thousands of Cuban combat troops began arriving in Luanda.
31:43In Moscow, this was greeted without enthusiasm.
31:46It was only when the Cubans had landed that we got involved.
31:52Of course, the Cubans kept asking us for help.
31:54They wanted weapons.
31:56They wanted food supplies.
31:59Once we started sending things to Angola, we were soon in over our heads, even though
32:03it wasn't in our plans to go there.
32:13Moscow began shipping hundreds of tons of arms, tanks, and missiles direct to Luanda.
32:30As the MPLA began rehearsals for Independence Day, battles were still raging just miles
32:35from the capital.
32:41In spite of that, it was important for us to proclaim independence, and we did so.
32:56The MPLA celebrated Angola's independence in Luanda.
33:02Its enemies had failed to take the capital.
33:09The 11th of November, 1975, was the hardest day in my life.
33:14I remembered the 14 years I'd been fighting.
33:18I remembered the dead, all those who had made sacrifices.
33:29Agostinho Neto greets the Soviet ambassador.
33:32The MPLA was recognized as Angola's government by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and most of Africa.
33:43Its fight against South African troops gave the MPLA political credibility.
33:51South of Luanda, the Cubans prepared to end the South African advance.
34:00It was a decisive battle, because if they broke our defense, it would be very difficult
34:05then to stop them getting to Luanda.
34:09There were roads going to the north, roads going to the center, many roads, which would
34:15have made their advance very powerful and fast.
34:25The Cubans were ready, waiting.
34:32Angola would have been lost.
34:34Mobutu's troops were close to Luanda.
34:38The South Africans had penetrated over a thousand kilometers.
34:41They were close to Luanda.
34:56The Cuban and MPLA forces outgunned the South Africans.
35:05They were shot very badly.
35:06I just saw these lorries with blood dripping out of it.
35:10It wasn't very nice.
35:12And then to go and investigate, and for the first time to see that they were actually
35:16your own troops, it wasn't very nice at all.
35:22They left everything on the field, men, vehicles, weapons.
35:27It was a great victory over the South Africans.
35:33Both African and American hopes of a quick victory over the MPLA were crushed.
35:39Washington was running out of options.
35:41Right after Vietnam, the American people in no way, and the Congress and the media, would
35:47put up with the U.S. putting its forces in to control the outcome of a country that none
35:52of us, none of the American people were interested in.
35:58The administration fell back on the CIA.
36:02It secretly provided money for Roberto and Savimbi to recruit mercenaries from Africa,
36:08America and Europe.
36:24We did kill when we had no particular reason to.
36:29We tortured to achieve information that they probably didn't have, and this was not captured
36:38enemy soldiers.
36:40These were probably just local civilians.
36:45And that atmosphere permeated its way through the whole unit.
36:52We were just a loose band of bandits with a very dangerous leader and a few associates.
37:04Among the mercenaries, there were some very fine soldiers, Kallen for instance.
37:11I've seldom seen such a good soldier.
37:14He had phenomenal courage.
37:18He was a psychopath, a raving psychopath, and a couple of men right near him were psychopaths.
37:26Thirteen mercenaries were captured by the MPLA and put on trial.
37:32Kallen and three others were executed.
37:36The CIA was still active.
37:39The Congress would have stopped us up front if we had not successfully lied to them, putting
37:44in arms, putting in advisers, bringing in South Africa.
37:49We kept it propped up for a while, but opposition was mounting.
37:57Still shocked by events in Vietnam, the Congress cut off additional CIA funds for Angola.
38:05This abdication of responsibility by a majority of the Senate will have the gravest consequences
38:13for the long-term position of the United States and for international order in general.
38:19A great nation cannot escape its responsibilities.
38:29In Angola, America hoped for victory.
38:32Instead, hatreds were inflamed.
38:36The Civil War outlasted the Cold War itself, leaving thousands maimed, dead, or homeless.
38:50In 1977, the great powers' attention shifted to the Horn of Africa.
38:56As regimes changed, so did alliances.
38:59The Soviet Union and the United States switched sides easily.
39:09In Ethiopia, the emperor had been ousted and replaced by Marxists.
39:17Mexico had a new ally, Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam.
39:31When the Soviets moved into Ethiopia to assist the communist dictator there, Hailemariam
39:42Mengistu, I thought that this was a threat to the stability of Africa.
39:49The Soviets at that time were proclaiming over and over again that the scales of history
39:54were tipping in the favor of the Soviet Union.
39:56The Soviet Union would outstrip us in economic performance.
40:01The Soviet Union was getting a strategic edge.
40:04The Soviet Union was riding the crest of the so-called national liberation struggles.
40:11The new regime in Ethiopia turned against America.
40:21Mengistu expelled most of the Americans from Ethiopia in the following months, arrogantly
40:30terminated the American aid program.
40:35Neighboring Somalia had been a Soviet ally for years.
40:40Its army was equipped with Soviet weapons.
40:48But now that Moscow was also linked with Ethiopia, the Somalis considered turning to Washington.
40:54They had very little chance of getting American full support.
41:02But they knew that if they tried to present themselves as anti-Soviet, they would improve
41:08their chances.
41:12The Somalis turned against the advice of their Soviet ally and prepared for war with
41:16Ethiopia.
41:18But President Carter turned down their appeal for American arms.
41:26I thought that Somalia should not be permitted to succeed in trying to take Ethiopian territory,
41:36and I refused to give the Somali government any weapons.
41:40Nevertheless, in July 1977, the Somalis seized large tracts of the Ogaden Desert.
41:48The Soviets tried to stop the advance through diplomacy.
41:56Gromyko suggested joint mediation with the Americans.
42:02But Brzezinski rejected that, saying it would have legitimized the Soviet presence in the
42:06Horn of Africa.
42:09Brzezinski felt that the American presence was legitimate everywhere, but the Soviet
42:14presence wasn't.
42:22Anti-Soviet demonstrations in Somalia greeted the government's decision to send the Russian
42:26advisers and their families back to Moscow.
42:31All Soviet support was now switched to Ethiopia.
42:44The Soviet Union began shipping in weapons and 15,000 troops to fight in Ethiopia.
42:50The troops were Cuban.
43:06It was the only operation we conducted in full agreement with the Soviets.
43:12No such cooperation took place even in Latin America.
43:17Quite the opposite.
43:29The Cuban troops in Ethiopia played a very important role.
43:37The Ethiopians couldn't have provided the military organization to destroy the Somali
43:41troops in such a short period of time, even with our help.
43:52With Cuban troops and Soviet support, the Ethiopians drove the Somalis out of the Ogaden.
43:59But Moscow wouldn't let the troops advance into Somalia.
44:05Among the Soviet military, we thought about occupying Somalia.
44:10But the Soviet government was right not to allow this, because it would have made our
44:14relations with countries like the United States of America, Great Britain, and others more
44:19difficult.
44:25Mengistu Haile Mariam basked in glory.
44:29The Cubans and Soviets had saved his regime.
44:38In Washington, some saw the victory as proof that the Soviets were abusing detente.
44:46The Horn of Africa was not important to America as of itself, but it was important as a measure
44:53and a test of how the Soviets were interpreting detente.
45:01Quarrels about the Third World were getting blown out of all proportion.
45:05These disputes about Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, and Somalia, none of them were worth it.
45:16Twenty years later, no one even remembers who was doing what.
45:29In the hunt for Cold War gains, the superpowers spawned an arms race in the developing world.
45:37Their solemn promises of restraint were blown to the winds.