• last week
American voters have chosen to return Donald Trump to the White House as the 47th president of the United States. For onlookers in Taiwan, Trump’s previous comments on China's Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s chip industry have raised questions about the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

On this episode of Zoom In Zoom Out, TaiwanPlus reporter Andrew Ryan sits down with Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. We discuss Trump's reelection and how Washington’s commitments to Taiwan have endured across administrations.

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Transcript
00:00Welcome to Zoom In Zoom Out. I'm Andrew Ryan coming to you from Washington DC.
00:18Now the United States presidential election has wrapped up and American voters are sending
00:23Donald Trump back to the White House for another term. Now the international community is assessing
00:29the potential impact on the rest of the world. Now today we're going to be talking about the
00:34impact on Taiwan, and here joining us for the conversation is Bonnie Glaser,
00:39the Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the
00:43United States. Bonnie, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you for having me, Andrew.
00:48Now in just a moment, we're going to be talking about Donald Trump. But first,
00:51I want to talk a little bit about the importance of Taiwan and the threat that it faces right now.
00:56It feels like we're kind of at a more critical juncture than say five years ago.
01:02Well, I definitely think over the last five years, we have seen the Chinese
01:06threat to Taiwan grow in many different domains. We've seen more cyber attacks. We've seen an
01:13increase in disinformation, for example, around Taiwan's elections earlier this year. And of
01:20course, we've seen a lot more military activity, Coast Guard and even drone operations around
01:27Taiwan. And if we look back, you see a really significant shift around the time of then
01:34Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. That was August of 2022,
01:40when the Chinese just decided to erase the media line in the Taiwan Strait.
01:45They had started operating across it just a few times during the Trump administration. But then,
01:52we've been seeing virtually daily activity. But importantly, you really do see that countries
01:58recognize that Taiwan is important. Of course, it's in part because of Taiwan's central role
02:05in semiconductor supply chains. The whole world has woken up to the importance of TSNC as the
02:12company that has the fabs, that builds the most advanced chips.
02:17That's right. And 90% of the world's most advanced chips are produced in Taiwan.
02:21So obviously, it is of importance, but it's more than that.
02:24It is more than that. I think that there is concern that if Xi Jinping were to take Taiwan
02:29by force, that that would lead to the use of force elsewhere, that Beijing would seek to
02:34settle other territorial disputes that it has by use of force. We have not seen, let's remember,
02:41China use force in any significant way since 1979. And if they use force against Taiwan and
02:48were successful, that certainly could embolden them to use force elsewhere.
02:54Now, I want to bring the United States into the picture. How consequential
02:58are US presidential elections for the future of Taiwan?
03:02The United States is Taiwan's most important partner. And of course, we used to have a mutual
03:10defense treaty with Taiwan from 1954 until 1979. And since then, the Taiwan Relations Act has been
03:19in place. So US policies, whatever they are, really matter for Taiwan. And I don't think
03:27that we've ever seen fundamental changes when we have a change in president in terms of policies
03:34toward Taiwan. But there's always some anxiety. Some presidents have been a little bit more
03:40cautious about maybe provoking Beijing and have been more careful in dealing with Taiwan.
03:47Other presidents have been willing to do maybe more with Taiwan. But if we look back in the past,
03:53I'm not sure they would provide the best lessons for the future. Because this really is in some
03:59ways, a very new moment. It's very different than in the past. So we've heard that Xi Jinping has
04:05instructed his military to be ready to have the capability to take Taiwan by force by
04:122027. He may not be able to reach that goal. It doesn't mean that Beijing will use force.
04:19But that means really over the next five years, maybe even longer, this is a very dangerous period.
04:27During the campaign, Trump mentioned a number of things related to Taiwan. One of the things he
04:33said was that Taiwan stole the United States chip business and that it should pay the US for
04:38defensive weapons. What do you make of his comments and the implications it could have for Taiwan?
04:45I think that Trump said that Taiwan should pay for protection because they already pay for
04:50defensive weapons. And because of the fact that the US sells a lot of weapons to Taiwan,
04:55no other country in the world does, it all adds up. It's not protection money. These are for
05:02real capabilities to help Taiwan defend itself. And nobody should think otherwise.
05:07These weapons will help Taiwan, particularly the asymmetric weapons. We've recently seen a report
05:14that the HIMARS, some of them have been delivered to Taiwan. Very important capabilities. So yes,
05:22I think Donald Trump has said various things that doesn't necessarily mean that they will be put
05:29into practice. Let's also remember that Trump respects companies that are successful. So I
05:37think he actually respects the fact that Morris Chang went from the United States to Taiwan and
05:43built a very successful company. I don't think that necessarily means he's seeking retaliation.
05:49But I think it is clear that under Trump administration, he will demand more in his
05:54cabinet, will demand that Taiwan spend more on its own defense and do more for its own defense.
05:59This is also not new. This has already been building under the Biden administration. But
06:05we've been looking for, I think, Taiwan to get to 3%. And every president of Taiwan says that
06:11he or she would get to 3%. But now people are saying more. Maybe it should be 5% or even 10%.
06:18That's probably unrealistic, but there will be pressure to do more. But I don't think we will
06:23see any fundamental change in US policy toward Taiwan. I think everybody knows that Taiwan has
06:30strong bipartisan support.
06:33I do want to talk a little bit about Donald Trump's relationship with Xi Jinping, the
06:38Chinese president. He talks very favorably about him. He says Xi is a tough guy,
06:43invited him to Mar-a-Lago. Do you think that poses a risk for Taiwan?
06:49There are scenarios in which it could pose some risks. So during the Biden administration,
06:56when Xi Jinping met with President Biden, it has been reported at least two times
07:01that Xi Jinping has asked Joe Biden to do something on Taiwan. So he asked President Biden
07:07to stop Nancy Pelosi from going to Taiwan. President Biden did not do so. And then more
07:14recently, it was reported that he asked Joe Biden to say publicly that the United States
07:20opposes Taiwan independence. Our policy, of course, is that the United States does not
07:26support Taiwan independence. And the difference is, I think, important, even though it sounds
07:32like it's not that different. If there were an opportunity for Taiwan to be independent
07:37and Beijing allowed it to happen, why would we oppose it? So Americans have never felt comfortable.
07:44And it's not the first time during the Clinton administration, Beijing also tried to get the
07:48U.S. president to say that he opposed independence. So what would happen if there were a
07:53conversation between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping? And Xi Jinping asked Donald Trump to do something
07:59on Taiwan. And then Donald Trump might think, oh, he wants something from me. What can I get from
08:05him? And we know he has this proclivity to be transactional. So what might he seek to get then
08:13from Xi Jinping? And would there be some kind of a deal? And I hope that's just my imagination,
08:18that that never happens. Toward the end of the Trump administration,
08:22there seemed to be pretty strong support for Trump in some sectors in Taiwan. They felt that
08:29he was strong on China and had perhaps supported Taiwan in certain ways. Did you notice that as
08:34well? Is that something that is largely understood? And is it still the case that
08:40there's kind of some preference for Trump in some sectors in Taiwan?
08:45It's a fascinating question because I think a few days before the election, I saw one poll,
08:52the results that were out on Twitter, that suggested I think it was something like 16%
08:57supported Trump and others supported Harris. So it was a very large majority of people that
09:05supported Harris. I think that's because of expectation that the relationship would continue,
09:11there would be predictability. Trump, some people I think worry that he might introduce some factors
09:18of using Taiwan as a bargaining chip. We know that Trump said during his first presidency
09:25that Taiwan was basically the tip of a Sharpie pen and China was the big Resolute desk in his
09:32office. In other words, it's Beijing that's really important and Taiwan is not. And so
09:39we didn't know that until really the very end of his presidency. That came from John Bolton's book.
09:46But now we're starting an entirely new Trump presidency. So starting out with this anxiety,
09:52it is a little bit different. And I think that most people in Taiwan have thought that
09:58predictability, continuity would be better for Taiwan.
10:03Now, if the Trump administration were to make any unilateral changes to the United States-China-Taiwan
10:11relationship or the status quo that you see in the Taiwan Strait,
10:14do you think that a Republican-controlled Congress, which we're looking at,
10:19would have the power and would have the will to offset those changes?
10:24Well, we'd have to get specific and talk about what those were. So we know that Taipei has
10:31been quite concerned about the continued U.S. support for Ukraine. The government in Taiwan
10:38sees that if Ukraine loses, if the U.S. doesn't support Ukraine, that that
10:42might have implications for Taiwan's security. Well, right now, I think there's more support
10:46in the U.S. Congress before the even changeover to the new Congress for Taiwan than there is for
10:54continuous support for Ukraine. There's divisions, not only between Democrats and Republicans,
11:00but also within the Republican Party. So it is possible that there will be a desire to
11:08extricate the United States from this conflict in Ukraine. And even though some people in Congress
11:14would say that has no implication for Taiwan, we're just going to focus more on strengthening
11:19deterrence of the Taiwan Strait, people in Taiwan might nevertheless be nervous.
11:24And what is wise leadership in Washington in terms of dealing with Taiwan?
11:28Well, I certainly think it means consistent rhetoric about our support for Taiwan,
11:35not saying, well, we should charge Taiwan for protection. That's just not effective signaling.
11:43I think that we should have very effective signaling in our conversations with Xi Jinping
11:48about the unacceptability of any use of force against Taiwan. And we should encourage our
11:54allies to continue to do that. Because Xi Jinping has to see this is not just a U.S.-China issue,
11:59it really is a global issue. And then, of course, the willingness to help Taiwan, whether it's
12:06arms sales, continuing training, providing other capabilities to help strengthen Taiwan's
12:13resilience. I think all of that is important. And many of these things, I really think that the
12:19Biden administration has stepped up on. They've really been doing so much more than was being
12:26done previously. And it's a response to the growing threat from China that we talked about.
12:31But this threat is going to continue. We have to make sure that Xi Jinping doesn't miscalculate,
12:37that he doesn't think he can succeed in taking Taiwan by force. So, I think we have work to do.
12:45I hope that the Trump administration will be coordinating very closely with Taiwan.
12:51And finally, the million dollar question,
12:53if push comes to shove, would Donald Trump defend Taiwan?
12:57Well, I think that it's clear that Donald Trump does not want to get drawn into a war.
13:03But really, Joe Biden doesn't either. And that doesn't mean that he wouldn't if he hadn't. But
13:10I think that if he is asked, and he was during the campaign, whether he would defend Taiwan,
13:15he said, oh, that's my source of leverage, I'm not going to answer that question.
13:19And he probably will not give the same answer that Joe Biden gave, which he said four times,
13:25I will come to Taiwan's defense. But he also said, we made that commitment. So that's his
13:30interpretation of what the Taiwan Relations Act means. And we know that even Kamala Harris,
13:35in the interview she did with 60 Minutes, she was not clear. She said, that's a hypothetical,
13:41I'm not going to answer it. So I think Donald Trump is not going to say, yes, I will defend
13:46Taiwan. He should not see that as an indication of weakness. What I hope is that he will be
13:53consistent. He will be seen as showing resolve. And there are various ways to do that. The worst
13:59thing is that you have tough rhetoric, but you're not doing the important things to strengthen your
14:04military capabilities. So I believe in having credible threats. So you want to speak loudly,
14:10you don't want to speak loudly and hold a soft stick, speak softly and carry a big stick.
14:16That's always makes much more sense to me.
14:18Bonnie Glaser, thank you so much for joining us.
14:20Thanks for having me.
14:23For more news from Taiwan, check us out on social media. Take care and we'll see you next time.
14:53Transcribed by https://otter.ai

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