Mayday S24 E02 Disaster at Dutch Harbor PenAir Flight 3296
After a four-hour flight, the pilots of PenAir 3296 make their final approach to a notoriously tricky Alaskan island airport. With no margin for error, their twin-engine turbojet touches down. But the crew can't stop the plane and it careens off the runway. Investigators are at a loss to explain the accident. That is, until they uncover a story of crossed wires and a treacherous tailwind.
Transcript
00:00In the course of landing at Dutch Harbour in Alaska,
00:05Hang on, I'm sliding.
00:07the pilots of the Pen Air 3296 leave the runway.
00:11All I could see was the sea.
00:13Everyone brace!
00:17We were going to dive.
00:24None of them escaped.
00:27None of them escaped.
00:29It's a tragedy to lose a passenger, whatever the reasons.
00:34The NTSB investigators gather clues.
00:43We had to examine the system parts.
00:45They discover an error that proved fatal.
00:50It's a revelation.
00:57Go, go, go, go!
01:01Go, go, go, go!
01:23The flight 3296 flies over the Aleutian Islands of Alaska.
01:31We should be getting directions here to descend soon.
01:34I'm going to see if I can't get the weather.
01:36Yeah, it's changed.
01:38Weather's been updated.
01:40It's 310 at 11 knots.
01:43The on-board commander, Paul Wells, is 56 years old.
01:46He has just been hired by Pen Air.
01:48He has 25 years of experience with other companies.
01:52OK.
01:54Paul is a formidable man.
01:57I flew several times with him.
01:59He knows how to make decisions as on-board commander.
02:02Peninsula 3296, descend pilot's discretion.
02:06Maintain flight level 2-9-0.
02:09Pilot's discretion 2-9-0, Peninsula 3296.
02:15Co-pilot Justin Lunn is 39 years old.
02:17He has been working for Pen Air for 5 months.
02:21I couldn't have had a better co-pilot.
02:23He's a rigorous man. He's a former soldier.
02:27There are 39 passengers on board,
02:29including a swimming team with their supervisor.
02:33Commercial pilot Steve Rainey is accompanied by his son, Jacob.
02:39We were going to a swimming competition.
02:42We worked hard to raise the money needed to finance the trip.
02:48It's a two-hour flight between Anchorage and the Dunalaska airport,
02:52also called Dutch Harbor.
02:56The plane overflew the most steep and isolated landscapes on the planet.
03:02The plane overflew a spectacular region of Alaska.
03:05The state peninsula is incredible.
03:15My son went to sit a few rows further to enjoy the landscape.
03:20The pilots are in command of a Saab 2000, built in Sweden.
03:25The Saab 2000 is a twin-engine turboprop plane,
03:29which can accommodate about 50 passengers.
03:33It's a good aircraft to reach the remote regions of Alaska.
03:4030 minutes before landing,
03:42the co-pilot contacts the meteorological observatory of the Dutch Harbor airport.
03:47Hello, 3296. Right now, winds 210 at 6 knots, gusting to 14.
03:55Temperature 8, dewpoint 1. Altimeter 2950.
04:00All right, copy the weather.
04:04The Dutch Harbor airport has a very short landing runway,
04:08vulnerable to weather conditions.
04:10The pilots need to follow a special training for this purpose.
04:14The pilots need to follow a special training for this purpose.
04:18The Dutch Harbor airport is located in a mountainous region.
04:22The winds can change from one second to the next.
04:25There can be strong turbulence and ice.
04:28We therefore have meteorological observers to monitor the conditions.
04:32We wouldn't know without passing.
04:34What did she say the wind was?
04:36Wind was 210.
04:38Pretty much a direct crosswind.
04:41I guess we can go ahead and start heading down.
04:44All right.
04:55Peninsula 3296, are you planning on RNAV runway 31?
05:0020 minutes before landing,
05:02the Anchorage controller asks the pilots on which runway they plan to land.
05:07Affirmative.
05:08Negative.
05:09Negative.
05:10We want the RNAV 13, Peninsula 3296.
05:15The Dutch Harbor airport is located on an island
05:18behind a mountain of 490 meters.
05:21Airplanes can land in two directions.
05:24Runway 13, arriving from the west,
05:27and runway 31, arriving from the east.
05:29Most pilots prefer to land on runway 13
05:32because there is more room to maneuver,
05:35which allows them to refuel and take off again in case of problems.
05:40And just like the other day, if there's any major changes in the wind,
05:44we'll just, we'll switch.
05:48We always expect the worst while hoping for the best.
05:51That way, we avoid bad surprises.
05:57Ladies and gentlemen,
05:5820 kilometers from the airport,
06:00the passengers are preparing for landing.
06:06All right.
06:08Flaps 20, flight attendant is secure.
06:11Flaps set.
06:1220.
06:13Indicating 20.
06:15Gear down.
06:18At 4 minutes from the airport,
06:20the pilots begin the approach procedure.
06:23Down three green.
06:28At less than 300 meters,
06:30the plane is shaken by turbulence.
06:34Ah, bump.
06:36There's a bit of a bump there too.
06:39Yeah.
06:40Yeah, there you go.
06:42It's going to be ugly in here, isn't it?
06:46Paul was fighting against the wind as he approached.
06:51A few seconds after landing,
06:53flight attendant notices that he is too high.
06:57What do you think?
06:58Go around.
07:00At Dutch Harbor, I don't take any risks.
07:03If you're too high, you put your foot down.
07:06Max power.
07:09I would not have been able to land safely
07:12without putting the passengers at risk.
07:17The pilots are ready for takeoff.
07:22We are about to land.
07:24We are about to land.
07:29The plane is shaking.
07:31It's shaking a lot.
07:33It's shaking a lot.
07:35The pilots have put the throttle back on and have returned to altitude.
07:41I told myself that there was a problem with visibility.
07:45Dutch Harbour Traffic, Peninsula 3296, going around. We're going to come back around for a visual.
07:51We were to keep an eye on the relief, cross a layer of clouds, and maintain a reasonable speed.
07:58Our attention was divided between several factors.
08:03After only three minutes, the pilots of Flight 3296 are ready to try a new landing.
08:11If we couldn't land, we would have gone to another airport.
08:19The pilots are a few seconds from the ground.
08:33We seemed to be gliding towards the landing strip, but that didn't really worry me.
08:51The flight commander wants to slow down the plane.
08:55But there is a problem.
08:58I was pushing on the brakes harder and harder, and I realized that we weren't slowing down at all.
09:06I saw the sleeve before. The winds were strong.
09:10And an alarm bell rang in my head.
09:20The pilots can't stop the plane.
09:24I had two options. Finish the landing, or take off again.
09:28I realized that the runway wasn't long enough to allow us to put the gas back on.
09:33In the cockpit, Steve Rainey is aware of the danger.
09:41I lowered my head, and I told everyone to prepare for the impact.
09:48Hang on, I'm sliding.
09:52The plane zigzags on the runway.
09:56I thought I was able to land on the runway, but the plane was going way too fast.
10:01The pilots arrive at the end of the runway.
10:05I could only see the sea.
10:10The pilots of Flight 3296 are unable to stop the plane.
10:16I saw a road, and I told Paul.
10:19Go right, go right!
10:21We didn't have a choice.
10:24The plane crashes into a cliff, hits a rock, and rushes straight into the water.
10:31It was our only chance.
10:34They only have a few seconds to stop.
10:38I was sure we were going to sink.
10:40The left wing hits a pole and a traffic sign, and the propeller breaks into mortal fragments.
10:59In the cockpit, there is a disturbing silence.
11:03I could feel blood running down my face.
11:06My shoulder hurt, my head too.
11:11I couldn't believe it.
11:13One of the propeller blades pierced the fuselage and hit Steve Rainey.
11:18A propeller went through the ceiling and got stuck right next to me.
11:25Jacob, get off the plane! Don't wait for me!
11:28Steve's son, Jacob, got out without a scratch.
11:33If he would have stayed in the seat next to me, he would have died.
11:37Because the blade got stuck right there.
11:40But a passenger near Steve is seriously injured.
11:45I had experience in life-saving operations.
11:48I was trained because of my job.
11:50So, more or less, I acted by reflex.
11:52I went to see him to take his pulse and check if he was breathing.
11:57Rescuers arrive in the next few minutes.
12:00Ten injured passengers are taken to the hospital.
12:05David Holtzman, 38, succumbs to his injuries.
12:11In ten years, he is one of the only two passengers killed in a domestic flight to the United States.
12:18At the hospital, I learned that the passenger had not survived.
12:22It was a huge blow.
12:26The NTSB investigators, the National Transportation Security Council,
12:31are sent to Alaska while the plane is loaded on a fence and transported to a safe place.
12:37We weren't able to transport him the day after the accident because of the weather.
12:41We had to wait a day to move the plane.
12:46We're on record at 5.46 p.m.
12:50The investigators begin by questioning the on-board commander.
12:54The longer we wait, the more the memories fade or change.
12:57So, we proceed to the interrogation as quickly as possible.
13:01I didn't close my eyes between the moment of the accident and the interview.
13:04So, my memories were not very clear.
13:07Okay.
13:09Take us through the events leading up to the accident.
13:15Everything was normal.
13:17Just a nice flight.
13:20Everything was going fine until the accident happened.
13:23This is often what the pilots say after an accident.
13:28When I went to turn off the anti-ice, I got out of position on final.
13:33The on-board commander, Wells, explains that the plane was hit by an upward current
13:37when his eyes left the instruments.
13:44What do you think?
13:45Go around.
13:46Max power.
13:52We were too high.
13:53And instead of doing the stabilized approach and continue to the runway,
13:59we elected to go around.
14:02So, you're now set up for a second landing.
14:05Do you remember your speed at touchdown?
14:09126.
14:17And where did you touchdown?
14:19I planted it pretty much on the thousand, right on the touchdown zone.
14:24Put it in reverse and then I noticed it had stopped accelerating.
14:29I pushed down as hard as I could.
14:32But there's no response from the brakes.
14:34Brakes!
14:37I got them all the way down.
14:40No response.
14:41Exactly.
14:42Zero braking.
14:44But like on ice.
14:47It was disturbing.
14:48We knew we had to examine the brakes to understand what had happened.
14:53Did you get an update from the weather observer?
14:56Yes, they said anywhere from 10 to 20 knots.
15:01The winds were changing.
15:03Any concerns at all on the second approach?
15:07The winds were dying down on the water.
15:10It looked like a direct crosswind.
15:13I had no doubt that this was going to be a fine approach.
15:20The on-board commander said he thought he was going to land with a lateral wind
15:24and he was sure the approach would go well.
15:27Your FO did the pre-flight on the aircraft?
15:30He did.
15:32Did he bring anything to your attention at all that was out of the ordinary?
15:37He did, actually.
15:39He noticed something with one of the tires.
15:43Pre-flight inspection complete.
15:45Any issues?
15:47Bald spot on the left outboard.
15:51The investigators learn that the inspection of Flight 3296
15:54revealed wear on the left exterior tire of the aircraft.
15:59It's not showing any cord.
16:01I'm not worried about it.
16:04It was not downpowered.
16:07It was not downpowered.
16:09I'm not worried about it.
16:11It was not down past the red line on the tire
16:14and didn't, to me, appear to be of any concern.
16:18I've had requests from maintenance technicians
16:21about tires in the same condition as this one.
16:24They've basically always said that the tires were viable
16:26and that the aircraft could fly.
16:29Have you reached any conclusion, just in your own head,
16:33about what you think went wrong or may have happened?
16:36If I had to make my best guess,
16:39I don't think it was brake failure.
16:43I think, more than likely,
16:45it was one of those showers that put down some sleet or hail on the runway
16:49and I just couldn't see it.
16:55That's the only thing I can think of.
17:00Anything else you would like to add?
17:04I can't be more proud.
17:08I'm sorry.
17:10Take your time.
17:17I couldn't be more proud of my crew.
17:22Commander DeBoer was emotional.
17:24He had just been involved in an accident.
17:27He had just been involved in an accident.
17:29Commander DeBoer was emotional.
17:31He had just been involved in an accident.
17:41So, they came in on runway 13
17:44and the pilot said his airspeed was 126 knots
17:48and they touched down at the 1,000 foot mark.
17:51At that speed, they should have been able to stop well before the end of the runway.
18:14What were the runway conditions?
18:17Was there rain? Ice? Snow?
18:21Anything on the runway that could have prevented the plane from stopping on the runway?
18:28No rain. Seven degrees.
18:31So, hydroplaning is out of the question.
18:34Too warm for ice to form.
18:37The investigators eliminate the hypothesis of Commander DeBoer.
18:40The runway was not slippery because of the weather.
18:45And this day, the runway was in good condition,
18:48but there was plenty of other information.
18:51What about debris, skid marks? Where are we at with the runway survey?
18:55Got it here.
18:58The investigators are looking for clues left on the runway.
19:02The runway is very important.
19:04We have surveyed the runway from long to wide.
19:06We have examined it under all its seams.
19:10Starting at 1,835 feet past the threshold,
19:13we've got a dark 170 foot long skid mark.
19:16Then there's further skidding down the runway.
19:23Then the plane crosses the center line to the right and then straightens out.
19:28Which tire skidded?
19:30Which tire skidded?
19:33Based on the position of the skid mark?
19:36Zofort tire, left side.
19:39The Saab 2000 has four main wheels capable of braking.
19:43Why would only one of them be blocked?
19:51Wasn't that the one with the bald spot?
19:53Yep.
19:55The tire left a straight black line.
19:58We didn't see the exhaust crevices.
20:00That means the tire had skidded on the wear mark and not on a good condition.
20:09We also found tire fragments.
20:13Here.
20:15So the tire blew?
20:17Yeah.
20:22Hold on.
20:23That's one heck of a long skid.
20:25Even a brand new tire would have blown.
20:28The fact that the plane had skidded on a worn tire,
20:31which ended up exploding maybe a second earlier than a brand new tire would have.
20:36So in the end, the wear didn't contribute to the accident.
20:40This shouldn't happen.
20:41The plane has an anti-skid system.
20:44The anti-skid system is activated when one of the four main wheels detects a skid.
20:51The brake pressure is released on the two outer or inner wheels
20:56to ensure the stability of the plane while the other wheels slow the plane down.
21:03After learning that the tire was worn,
21:06we immediately wanted to examine the anti-skid system
21:10because that's what it's supposed to be used for, to prevent skidding.
21:15Did the anti-skid system not work properly,
21:18leading to the exit of flight 3296?
21:37During this time, the investigators formulate other hypotheses about the long braking tracks.
21:44Overweight?
22:04According to the manifest, the captain calculated their landing weight at 45,213 pounds.
22:14And the maximum allowable?
22:1746,114.
22:25900 pounds under.
22:27Close, but within the limits.
22:31The airplane was not overloaded,
22:34so we could rule out the hypothesis that weight was a factor in the accident.
22:40Why did they have to brake so hard?
22:52A tailwind at the time of landing causes an increase in the speed of the aircraft,
22:57so the plane would have needed a longer braking distance.
23:09I'll deal with that.
23:10I'll go help with the anti-skid system.
23:15Was flight 3296 hit by a tailwind that made it accelerate and leave the landing strip?
23:29Thanks for coming in.
23:30You bet.
23:32The investigators question the meteorological observatory at Unalaska airport
23:37about the winds during the landing of flight 3296.
23:53Dutch Harbour is a special airport.
23:56The topography around the landing strip causes sudden changes in weather conditions,
24:02so a meteorological observatory, posted on the ground,
24:06allows the pilot to communicate information in real time.
24:12And what was the weather like at the airport when Panair was on approach?
24:15There was a storm coming in, but at the time it was clear.
24:20And what about the wind on the first attempt?
24:26About 270 degrees at 10 knots.
24:31Looks like a crosswind.
24:33Second attempt?
24:34About three minutes out, the wind shifted around to 290 at 16 knots gusting to 30 knots.
24:4430-knot tailwind?
24:45Mm-hmm.
24:47That would be a strong tailwind,
24:48and if a line pilot decides to land in these conditions,
24:52it means they're considering a test pilot.
24:55What about when they landed?
24:56What was the tailwind then?
24:59The winds were 15 knots.
25:03The investigators' concerns about a tailwind are confirmed.
25:08Thank you for your time.
25:09My pleasure.
25:13A tailwind causes a strong acceleration of the aircraft.
25:19The pilots then risk leaving the runway before they can stop the aircraft safely.
25:34What's a Saab 2000 max tailwind for landing?
25:37Can a 15-knot tailwind put the Saab in trouble?
25:4315 knots.
25:45Right at the limit.
25:47Why would they risk it?
25:56Down.
25:57Okay, you got the yoke.
25:58I got it.
25:59Yeah, we're down there.
26:00The investigators know that the pilots landed at the airport in difficult conditions
26:05and that they landed with a tailwind at the limit of what the aircraft was able to withstand.
26:12Brakes.
26:13I cut them all the way down.
26:16Brakes.
26:22Okay.
26:23Weight, roughly 45,000 pounds.
26:25Speed at touchdown, 126 knots.
26:28The investigators calculate the effect of a 15-knot tailwind on the aircraft's ability to stop.
26:35We looked at the aircraft's performance and developed several scenarios
26:40to understand if the aircraft could have stopped in these circumstances.
26:43Tailwind, 15 knots, flaps 20.
26:47And let's do a loss of half of the braking power because of the skid.
26:52When the left outer wheel began to skid,
26:55the Saab's anti-skid system would have released the pressure from the two outer wheels,
27:00greatly reducing the braking capacity.
27:10They had room to spare.
27:13With a 15-knot tailwind and two functional brakes, the aircraft should have stopped.
27:20What are we missing?
27:24Let's look at the FDR data.
27:33Hold on a sec.
27:35Just after touchdown, there's an anti-skid fault caution.
27:39This confirms the investigators' hypothesis.
27:42A failure of the anti-skid system caused the accident.
28:00We've got to get to the bottom of that warning.
28:02We've got to get to the bottom of that warning.
28:26No issues with the control unit?
28:28Wheel sensors?
28:32Same with the control valves.
28:44There's still the cables that connect the components.
28:53Right here.
28:55Let's take a look at the wiring.
29:02Hey there.
29:03Can we get those wire harnesses sent up to the lab?
29:20These are pretty beat up.
29:33These are identical.
29:35Can't tell the left one from the right.
29:36Can't tell the left one from the right.
30:07There's no numbering on these wires.
30:10There's no numbering on these wires.
30:28So we've got three here.
30:34There's four wires here.
30:37There's an extra wire on the top half of this cable.
30:49There's four in each of these.
31:01They're crossed.
31:03No wonder the anti-skid system failed.
31:07When the left outer wheel began to skid,
31:10the anti-skid system accidentally released the inner brake pressure.
31:15The outer wheels continued to skid and the left tire exploded.
31:20That was a revelation.
31:23When you had the cables crossed,
31:25the airplane released the air pressure on the two wheels,
31:29which worked perfectly good,
31:31and the good wheels continued to skid.
31:37Brakes.
31:39I got them all the way down.
31:42As the inner wheels can't brake,
31:44and as the left outer tire exploded,
31:47the pilots are no longer able to slow down the airplane.
31:52We had a 75% brake loss,
31:55and only the right outer wheel allowed the airplane to slow down.
32:06The cables have to go through the entire landing gear.
32:16How did the maintenance technicians manage to cross the cables of the braking system,
32:21leaving the pilots of the Penair 3296 flight with only one functional brake out of four to stop the airplane?
32:28See? It's not a straight line.
32:30And the wheel attachments are identical.
32:32So imagine that you're trying to put two cables in a small space at the base of the landing gear.
32:38How do you know which one connects to the right and which one to the left?
32:41They're both easy to confuse.
32:44How long could these have been crossed?
32:46According to the records,
32:48there was a full overhaul of the left main landing gear.
32:52When?
32:54January, 2017.
32:56The cables were reversed two and a half years before the accident.
33:04We found that the airplane had been in maintenance for two years,
33:11and the technicians had no way of checking if the cables were connected in the right place.
33:18So how many flights did it make once it was back in service?
33:25About 500.
33:27Investigators learned that the bad wiring of the anti-skid system went unnoticed for nearly four months.
33:35So why did 500 flights manage to stop, but not these guys?
33:40Maybe the malfunction was happening, just on a smaller scale.
33:45The balding tire?
33:47Was the wear on the left exterior tire a sign of the anti-skid system malfunctioning?
33:54We suspected that the airplane was skidding regularly.
33:58But this kind of problem is difficult to detect,
34:02because you have to skid for more than a second and a half for an anti-skid system malfunction alert to trigger.
34:08So this could have been happening gradually, with repeated small skids creating the bald spot on the tire?
34:14Yeah, but when they landed at that speed with that tailwind, they break longer and harder than in previous flights.
34:23Brakes!
34:26I cut them all the way down!
34:29That's what's dangerous with this kind of malfunction.
34:32You're not going to notice a problem until you really need to slide on the brakes.
34:38Hang on, I'm sliding.
34:39Hang on, I'm sliding.
34:56There's one thing I'm curious about.
35:02Could they have stopped if they landed into the wind on runway 31 instead?
35:10It's possible.
35:22Then why did they choose runway 13 in the tailwind?
35:26Did the pilots of the Volpenair 3296 deliberately ignore crucial information about the wind to try a risky landing?
35:36The decision to land on runway 13, despite a rear wind signal, was inappropriate.
35:42They were experienced pilots, so we didn't understand why they made that decision.
35:47The investigators turn to the conversation recorder at the cockpit.
35:56What do you think?
35:58Go around.
36:00Max power.
36:04Dutch Harbor traffic, Peninsula 3296, going around. We're going to come back around for a visual.
36:10Yeah, we're just going to get out of here, do a 180, and come back in.
36:16Roger.
36:17Alright, you're at 1,000 feet.
36:19Pause for a second.
36:20So the captain says that he's doing a 180, which would line him up with 31.
36:26But that's not what he does.
36:28He takes a sweeping 360 degree turn around the mountain to 13.
36:38Why?
36:43We're at 1,200, coming back around for a visual 13.
36:48For a visual 13.
36:5031.
36:5231.
36:5331, I thought we were doing 13.
36:56Okay, sure. I'll try it again.
37:01Stop the tape.
37:04So the captain wants to go to 31, but the first officer questions it.
37:09The captain and the co-pilot didn't agree on the choice of the landing runway.
37:16I would say that the captain didn't have a good leadership.
37:20Okay, get a wind check from her again.
37:22While he's preparing his second approach, the captain gets informed about the weather.
37:27Dutch weather 3296, another wind check.
37:31Right now, midfield winds at 3-0-0 at 24 knots.
37:37Oh, God.
37:38Oh, crap.
37:40Stop the tape.
37:42Sounds like they're not happy with that tailwind.
37:45And yet they kept going.
37:47The recording contradicts the co-pilot's statement about a lateral wind.
37:53They were surprised by the direction and the force of the wind.
37:57But what was disturbing was that they knew what maximum force of rear wind the aircraft was capable of supporting.
38:06But they still took the decision to land.
38:13Try it again.
38:14Keep talking to weather.
38:16Why did the pilots of the Volpenair 3296 decide to land with a tailwind on a short runway in Dutch Harbour, Alaska?
38:27All right, we'll try it again.
38:28All right.
38:29Last try, Rog.
38:32It's like the captain's just going along with what his first officer's saying.
38:37He needs to take on more leadership.
38:40The captain knew that runway 3-1 was the best option, but he never insisted.
38:47The captain listened to the co-pilot and landed on runway 1-3.
38:52That proved that he lacked authority.
38:55He misjudged the circumstances at the time of landing and did not take an objective decision.
39:14Instead of discussing their options, they continued their descent.
39:19Give me speed.
39:20Plus 15.
39:22The investigators deduce that by choosing to land on runway 1-3, the pilots made a deliberate and inappropriate decision.
39:32By making this decision, they not only put themselves in danger, but they also put all the passengers in danger.
39:39Crossed wires, tailwind, some poor leadership. It all added up.
39:45And very little margin for error at such a tricky airport.
39:53The pilots of the Volpin Air 3296 defend their decision to land on runway 1-3.
40:01We're at 1,200, coming back around for the visual 1-3.
40:063-1.
40:083-1.
40:093-1, I thought we were doing 1-3.
40:12OK, sure. We'll try again.
40:15After a first attempt, the flight commander assures that the co-pilot saw no wind changes on the runway.
40:24He asked me for my opinion, so I looked to get an idea of the situation. It was a side wind.
40:30If the conditions hadn't changed, I didn't see any reason to change the runway.
40:34Dutch Weather 3296, another wind check?
40:38Right now, midfield winds at 3-0-0 at 24 knots.
40:45Oh, God. Oh, crap.
40:48But what we were seeing didn't correspond to what the weather observer said.
40:54It was clearly a side wind.
40:58The waves and the tailwind indicated a side wind.
41:02The co-pilot, Steve Rainey, didn't make the same observations.
41:09I saw a tailwind of 20 to 30 knots.
41:12As a pilot, I wouldn't have attempted a landing.
41:17When you get contradictory information, you have to know how to make a difficult decision.
41:29Down.
41:30Okay, you got the yoke.
41:31I got it. Yeah, we're down there, 80 knots.
41:33When the brakes didn't work, the flight commander couldn't slow down the plane.
41:39Brakes? I got them all the way down.
41:42We couldn't slow down. If only one of the brakes worked, it would have stopped and the tires would have exploded.
41:48This plane doesn't have an emergency braking system.
41:51So, in the event of a failure of the main system, we have no way to stop the plane.
41:58Hang on, I'm sliding.
42:01The decision to steer the plane towards the road prevents it from diving into the water.
42:07Go right, go right.
42:10What prevented us from diving was our decision to land on runway 13.
42:14There was a traffic lane that gave us more space.
42:23Unfortunately, fragments of the left propeller pierce the fuselage, killing a passenger.
42:31It's a tragedy to lose a passenger, whatever the reasons.
42:36That was terrible for me.
42:40Investigators conclude that the cause of the accident is a bad wiring of the anti-skid system.
42:48The bad choice of the pilots to land on a runway with a strong tailwind is a contributing factor.
43:00What bothers me is that we are waiting for us to follow the information of the observers in writing.
43:05As pilots, shouldn't we make the best decision according to our observations?
43:12SAAB published a bulletin asking technicians to inspect the wiring of their aircraft's anti-skid system.
43:21Human error is unacceptable, especially if it's a bad wiring.
43:27It's something essential, especially for a system as important as brakes.
43:33The accident changed Steve Rainey's attitude towards flight.
43:39It took time before I felt comfortable again.
43:43But we live in a world where flying is essential.
43:46We have no choice.
43:47I hope everyone can learn from this accident so that it doesn't happen again.
43:52Weather conditions and maintenance are not factors to be taken lightly.
44:22For more UN videos visit www.un.org