Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (retd), former DG, Military Operations and and Director, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi speaks with Col Anil Bhat (retd.) on the India-China border disenagement and prospects | SAM Conversation
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00:00Welcome to SAM Conversation, a program of South Asia Monitor. Today, we are going to
00:15discuss disengagement by the People's Liberation Army of China on the line of actual control,
00:26for which it is our pleasure to welcome Lt. Gen. Vinod Bhatia, former Director, General
00:32Military Operations, former Director, Center for Joint Warfare Studies, an old accomplished
00:44paratrooper who's seen a lot of the line of actual control during his service. And it's
00:51taken about over 20 meetings at the co-commander level. However, it's the BRICS summit, which
01:03has caused a positive development of President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi
01:14to meet and for Xi Jinping to talk about or agree to a disengagement. I expect Gen. Bhatia
01:33to give us, you know, go into the details. And here, it's always, as they say, the devil
01:40is in the details. Gen. Bhatia, while, let's welcome this as good news. Please take on
01:52from here. Thank you, sir. Always a pleasure to be on the platform of South Asia Monitor
01:58and especially with you, sir, my senior from the academy days. Thank you, sir. Sir, I think
02:04it's been a major breakthrough because after the May 2020 forward deployment by the PLA
02:11in eastern Ladakh, especially, the two remaining points of friction, which had not been resolved
02:17were Dim Chok, basically the CNI Junction, Chadung Nala Junction, and the Dibsang Plains.
02:25So these two were creating unnecessary, you know, rift between the relations between India
02:30and China also. And China always wanted the relations to improve without getting into
02:37the LHC resolution. Let the LHC be as it is, let's do other business. Right. And the India
02:48stands always that we need status quo as of 4th May 2020. That was the date which we
02:55have identified as a forward deployment of the PLA. So this was going on for a long time.
03:01And honestly, sir, if you ask me, I was not expecting this resolution so early. The fact
03:07that the Chinese came in, let me go a little, sir, if you permit, I'll go a little bit of
03:11the Chinese strategy. To understand China is very important. Unfortunately, we don't
03:16understand China. And worse still, Chinese don't understand India at all. Our understanding of
03:21China through a US perspective, basically the Western perspective, what they write,
03:25but in the Indian context, things are different. So what I want to say is that China's strategy
03:30has always been over the last seven decades, it is claim, occupy, legitimize, exploit and
03:40integrate. Now, they did that in Tibet. They did that in Northern Mongolia. They did that
03:46in Turkmenistan, East Turkmenistan, sir. They're trying to do the same thing in Taiwan states.
03:53So this is the Chinese, Chinese view of the strategy of doing things. So even in the case of
04:00India, or the India-China border, which is about three, four, eight kilometers, as for our,
04:05that's our border. China has always said that the border, they've
04:11did on the border as 7th September 1959. And based on that line, if you see
04:18the intrusions of May 2020, when the world was fighting the COVID, combating COVID,
04:23and that is the possibility. Then opportunity China got to come and occupy what they perceive
04:30as their territories. So line of actual control, what we call, is basically sir,
04:36at the cost of reputation, it is not one line, it is not two lines, not three lines, four lines.
04:41It's the lines of perceptions, basically. The Indian perception of line of actual control,
04:47the Chinese perception line of actual control, sir. The Indian perception and Chinese perception
04:51line of action. What we do is, you know, when they come, we map everything and we then plot it,
04:57and we think that is their perception. And similarly, China also perceives Indian perception
05:02in their own. So there's a total model and it is not defined, there's no common understanding.
05:08Despite that, I think we must look at the pluses. The two armies, the PLA and Indian army,
05:15for four decades, literally, it was 1975 for three and a half decades. 24th October 1975 was the last
05:22shot fired in Angus. And we maintained that. We maintained that based on...
05:27No, in 1975, are you referring to Tulungla?
05:31Yes, sir. Yes.
05:32Tulungla, no. They did not fire. They tortured those four personnel of 5 Assam Rifles.
05:415 Assam Rifles, the same battalion which escorted the Dalai Lama.
05:45No, I am talking of 1975.
05:4975.
05:4975 October, the incident in Tulungla involving four personnel of 5 Assam Rifles.
06:01Absolutely right.
06:02They killed them by torture, not by bullets.
06:06No, there was a firing incident also, sir.
06:08I see, they were, exchange of fire also.
06:11And the last shot in Angus which was fired on 75, sir. And then suddenly, sir,
06:17when they are looking up, we have five agreements. And the last agreement was October, again,
06:21it was on 24th of October, 2013, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, the forward
06:28agreement, sir, the BDCA, 2013. So those five agreements were literally thrown by the Chinese
06:33into the dustbin. And they did not, they disregarded the five agreements and came and
06:38did the forward deployment, sir. Unfortunately, as I see it, sir, they did not
06:45appreciate, expect an Indian resolve, a steady resolve, a resolve.
06:53The response was there, the resolve was absolutely, absolutely measured resolve
06:59that you cannot come any further. And we faced up to them in a very measured manner,
07:04which I call no blinking, no blink mentions, right, sir. We did not do a blink mention.
07:12Even if we went to Kailash range, sir, we vacated the Kailash range,
07:15which is a good strategic signal to the Chinese. And everyone criticizes that,
07:20but every QPQ option, sir, has a limited value in time and space. It cannot be unlimited, sir.
07:27We did not want escalation, they did not want escalation, sir. So you find after Galwan,
07:32and despite Galwan, where 20 of our soldiers were made supreme sacrifice,
07:36and reportedly 43 PLA soldiers were also killed.
07:40That 43 is the official figure, but there are reports of, there have been many more, many more.
07:46But 43 is generally agreed upon. Despite that, there has been no escalation since 16th of June
07:562020, sir. So obviously, the Chinese also did not want an escalation. And they realized that this is
08:02not going to, you know, India is not a pushover. And after 1979 Vietnam, this is the first time
08:08that they agreed to go back from occupied territory, sir, which was in Penguangso,
08:14which was in Galwan, in Gogara hot springs. So this is something which we have not seen earlier
08:20with the Chinese. So that was because of India's strategic resolve. And now when it comes to it,
08:27over a number of political discussions, diplomatic discussions, military discussions,
08:3522 rounds of talks, we kept the channels open, kept talking to them. But we have demonstrated
08:41relative strength on the ground that especially along the line of action. I think that is what
08:48was for some. And also say, if I may say, it is the China's Himalayan blunder
08:55to have come in 2020. The Galwan was China's Himalayan blunders.
08:59Why I say that is, if you look at the big picture, China is challenging the US for the
09:05unipolar war. They want a bipolar war. And if they want to challenge the US,
09:12they cannot be on the wrong side of India. They will need India, if not a pro-China India,
09:20at least a neutral India. India is the resident part, the resurgent part, the global leader.
09:26India is not what we generally talk about India. In fact, now at this point, when we have had
09:34a quad going, even in the quad it has been proved that it is the Indian maritime forces,
09:42the Indian Navy. It is a fulcrum. Whether the US and UK admit it or not, but as far as Japan
09:57is concerned, Japan is the one which is very clear about who is the major force in the
10:05Indo-Pacific region. It took the US so many years to approach it as Indo-Pacific
10:22and not Asia-Pacific. Why I am mentioning that is because this action of the Chinese of
10:35disengaging whatever level, whatever amount, it has come because of a grouping that has
10:45sort of clicked or whatever in the bricks of Russia, India and China, which should make the
10:59US very uneasy. Well, that's a separate thing. At present, we are concerned about
11:07what, how much the disengagement is. So, please continue.
11:13The disengagement has been, you know, some certain quarters, it has been seen as a win
11:19for India, definitely a win for India, but also equally win for China. China needed the
11:25disengagement as much as India needed the disengagement. One, it is very costly,
11:32there have been constant consequences. Two, China has opened up too many fronts.
11:37You know, the five major conflict points, flashpoints of conflict have a China connection,
11:42Taiwan, South China Sea, East Sea, because Japan has made a military alliance with North Korea
11:46and of course, the India-China border. So, if you see China, I think after they realized that
11:52they could not achieve their aims, their strategic intent. So, they have started,
11:58you know, weighing India. And rightly so, they were looking at a face-saving exit.
12:03Let's only not talk that they have done a great favor, no, it is their requirement as
12:07much as they needed that. The two, the world's, you know, largest populations,
12:13old civilization, new cultural linkages, they need, India needs peace for development.
12:20China also needs peace for development. Yes, yes, no doubt.
12:25Now, you know, very good, you brought this out. This, ever since Galwan, ever since 2020
12:40June, their deployment of forces on the Arunachal part of the LSE has become very, very heavy.
12:51Do you think there's, and that also is costing them?
12:57Yes. You know, this, the beefing up that happened,
13:04we tried to keep pace with it, but even that I think has been costing them
13:11heavy. You think there's going to be any thinning down in that?
13:16Obviously, they need the thinning down because 40% of the PLS conscripts
13:21we have to understand that. 40% of the conscripts and the conscripts come for a two-year tenure
13:27and every six months they have a turnover. And the conscripts, because they come for a two-year
13:32tenure, they are in frontline units. They cannot be in technical units, the air force, navy and
13:36others. So they're basically frontline units. So imagine in our unit, we had a 20% turnover
13:43every year or every six months we have 10% turnover. So there's a problem of role definition,
13:48there's a problem of motivation, there's a problem of people looking to stay. Hydro is
13:51not easy. Hydro is very taxing, very, very taxing. Yes, of course, of course, of course.
13:57Army is battle-hardened, we are combat-rich, we know hydro-tube, we are the best hydro-tube
14:01soldiers. You could do Kargil. Who in the world can do Kargil actually? We have stayed there and
14:08looked at our men. No, no, there is absolutely no doubt. You know, the Western world talks about
14:16Alpine, that's their ultimate. Alpine is 8,000. Alpine, Alps are 8,000. We are going up to 22,000.
14:285,000 meters average height? 5,000 meters average height in eastern Latakh? And we are looking at
14:35you know, real heights. We redefined, we redefined mountain warfare since 1947-48.
14:44And that is where I think it is not only about, I think we owe our overall strategy,
14:49and we should start giving ourselves credit, we should claim credit for it. Our overall strategy
14:53has been good. Our overall strategy has been excellent, absolutely. Where we defended the LAC,
14:58we continued our diplomacy and binding to balance with, you know, in the pod and other multilaterals.
15:04And we also built up capabilities, dominated the sea lines of on-channel vulnerability.
15:09So, it is not only, you know, one thing. So, it is the overall strategy, which actually,
15:14and China need economic markets, and we did not stop that. We also need, our China policy should
15:19be pro-India, not anti-China. Of course, they hurt us, there is no doubt about it. And 650 million
15:25of our youth, who were popular in 1962, who had, you know, 1962 history, now they are now anti-China.
15:33So, this is what the Chinese have not achieved. Unfortunately, everyone says that China thinks
15:38through. I don't think they thought it through. I think it was a bad decision for China to come
15:43into Ladakh. So, that is how I see the things. And now that disengagement is happening,
15:49and it is a very good thing. They are going to withdraw from the, basically, the bottleneck at
15:56Lakhinala, which will give us access to the patrolling points, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
16:05Access was there earlier also, but it was not, it was not working out in time and frame.
16:10Rather, you come from the north, from the Tagginger side, which is a very long one,
16:13also the Jeevan Nala side. So, now we get that access. And I also, whatever is coming out is
16:18that the patrolling would be coordinated, frequency, the strengths will lay down, and
16:26they would patrol some days and we would patrol other days. And this is actually a very old
16:31thought. That you cover Monday, Tuesday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday.
16:37Yeah, avoid meetings.
16:42Avoid a face-off, avoid a clash.
16:46Over the years, we managed it well. We would, you know, on the LAC, we all served on the LAC.
16:52We would, if patrolmen interact, the men would interact, we would even break together.
16:57Because it does not really matter, you are patrolling. And then we had face-offs and we
17:01resorted. We had the drills, the banner one, banner two, some of those were over a very long
17:06time. But actually, the face-offs, the history of face-offs, they restarted in a big way,
17:11on 14th of April, 2030, when Dipsang happened. Same place, bottleneck at Laki Nala,
17:1719 and a half kilometers inside, when the Chinese came and pitched up the tents and started,
17:21made a quasi-permanent camp. And that was resolved on the 5th of May,
17:262013, after about 22 days of face-off. So, after that, they have come well-prepared this time in
17:33mid-2020 and they came multiple places, multiple places, 700 places. So, what I feel is that they
17:40realized the futility of the whole thing. They have got a face-saving set. We got what we wanted,
17:45they got what we wanted. It is a win-win situation for both of us.
17:50But also, I think in military history, world military history,
17:54this is the way we have managed this border from 1967 till late.
18:04It was really without firing at each other, please, because that's the time they
18:11pressed us very hard, let's not fire at each other. It has been by literally
18:17stretching our hands and stopping them, grappling, fisticuffs, mukke baazi. I mean, it's unique.
18:28This is unique and this is some show of restraint by the Indian soldier. That restraint broke,
18:36of course, on the night of 15th, 16th June, 2020, after we lost 20 personnel and the CO.
18:48Absolutely, but I would give equal credit to the PND also because as you know,
18:58that reaction didn't come from Delhi or anywhere, it just came from our troops.
19:06It was a spiral actually and that is what the Jaisalmer government has done is now,
19:10it reduces or it minimizes the chances of a spiral because the troops are not facing each
19:15other directly now. So, that we both are looking at peace and tranquility, but having said that,
19:22let me also qualify that we should not trust the Chinese.
19:26Absolutely.
19:29If Hindi-Chinese bhai-bhai was 1962, I think Hindi-Chinese bhai-bhai 2.0 was Galwan.
19:38So, we should not get into situation where Hindi-Chinese bhai-bhai 3.0. So, please, we should
19:42build our capabilities, we should enhance our capacities, build our infrastructure,
19:49keep our contingencies there, we should have reserve troops.
19:53Don't let the guard down, don't thin your, you know, maintain your modernization and
20:02and you know, whatever deficiencies we have that must be maintained.
20:09We need to enhance our ISR in a big way because we should not be taking back the game.
20:14Our troops are good, but they need the support of infrastructure, they support,
20:18they need the support of capability development and they will need, you know,
20:26let me tell you in the media, you know, they all are aware of the smartphones are there everywhere.
20:31They should not get away that everything is peaceful, everything is peaceful is fine,
20:35but everything is peaceful only as long as you maintain vigility, you maintain operational
20:39readiness and preparedness. Otherwise, to break down doesn't take any time. It has taken four
20:45and a half years to get to this stage. So, we should ensure that it doesn't happen again.
20:51And for that, we need to be prepared and we need to invest monies and invest them optimally.
20:56It is not that we not only invest money, invest them optimally, prioritize the whole thing
21:00and our priority should remain not Eastern Ladakh alone. Our priority,
21:05like you rightly said, should be basically Eastern sector, Arunachal Pradesh.
21:11Yes, yes.
21:14And also Central sector. It is not only Eastern Ladakh, our focus has shifted to Eastern Ladakh
21:18and Chinese follow Sun Tzu. You know, we all are totally focused on this. And we may get surprised
21:25in other places, the disagreement in two places only. It does not say that they will not do
21:28anything in, let us say, Arunachal, whether the Western sector.
21:33Absolutely, no, no, no. We must be prepared for surprises from them and must cater for those,
21:42you know.
21:42There are contingencies and I am sure we are catered for. My little knowledge says
21:50that we are fully prepared now. We may be a slow starter, but at the operational and tactical level,
21:57we have not been found wanting. If the strategic surprise was achieved in 2020,
22:02it was strategic surprise. At the operational level and the tactical level, I think we did
22:06exceedingly well. We built up, we have to understand, it is a month of May,
22:10altitude, you are at the fag end of your logistics. Because your logistics only lasted till May and
22:16June beginning. You expected the passes to open and logistics to come in. Despite that,
22:22you know, stamina, logistics stamina was at the fag end. We still managed to do push and
22:27hold troops and support them and sustain them. So, at the operational tactical level,
22:32I think we should give ourselves a pat. And now the time to synergize the three levels,
22:37like we synergize the political, diplomatic, military level, we synergize the strategic,
22:41tactical, operational level. At the strategic level, we should understand China's strategic
22:46intent, what they do, we have to look deep. And that look deep is not for the armed forces,
22:51we do not have the wherewithal, we do not have the, it is not our, it is not our,
22:56basically, it is not our task to look deep. Looking deep, the strategic end has to come
23:00from somewhere else. So, that has to be... No, no, that has to be strong. That has to
23:06be strong. That should not be, you know, slow footed.
23:14Because everyone blames the army. Now, the army's role is limited in time and space,
23:20in depth it is limited. No, no, we have had, we have had, we should
23:25learn from our, what we have suffered in the past. Look at Kargil, we took, we were seven
23:32to eight months late in reacting. It is an intelligence failure. Or it is rather maybe
23:42maybe not reacting to intelligence. A combination of both.
23:48Basically, the strategic intent was not there, Lahore declaration of February 1999,
23:52put us at ease again. Whatever, but see, look at the way we had to pay.
23:55We should not, we should, we should let the, let the dialogue, political-diplomatic dialogue go
24:01on, but the military should do what the military is required to do. And not only do, I am sure,
24:05I am sure they are doing it. I am more than sure, more than confident that they are doing it.
24:09So, disengagement is very good and we should now look at sustaining it for some time.
24:15Then let us talk about de-escalation, let us talk about de-induction, but we should be
24:22making sure that everything is verified, re-verified and we should not initiate something
24:29which will depend later. You, I think you put it, you put it very precisely.
24:40It is, I thank you for bringing all this out. Is there anything else that you would like to add?
24:48No, I think we should cover everything. I think we should see it as a positive step,
24:54but not be complicit. Absolutely. No, under no circumstances should we reduce our,
25:01you know, guard or at all, at all. And particularly there is a history of
25:09surprises from China, which must be, must be catered for. Thank you very much.
25:15Thank you very much. And thanks to you. Thank you, sir.